


International Panel on Exiting Violence

FINAL REPORT



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Constructing an International Panel on Exiting Violence: Comparative lessons

Vlad Berindei, Jean-Pierre Dozon, Yvon Le Bot,
Sabrina Melenotte, Michel Wieviorka

INTRODUCTION

Starting in the late 1970s, violence began to acquire a new political and intellectual status, at least within liberal democracies: it became, but perhaps only temporarily, a taboo, an indisputable evil, whereas before it was sometimes considered unavoidable because it could be emancipatory. Revolutionary and anti-colonialist thinking in particular had given it a legitimacy that it was clearly losing. Perhaps only the Christ-like figure of “Che” survived this change for a long time.

Since then, violence has been increasingly conceived in relation to its victims, current or past, and not only in terms of possible challenges to the powers of the state, which in principle holds a monopoly on legitimate violence. This development had been preceded, in the wake of May ‘68, by significant women’s movements denouncing rape and other sexual violence, which were not at the time recognized in the public sphere. The focus has recently widened and today has reached a major institution in the history and imperium of the West, the Catholic Church, with the exposure of paedophilia and other sexual abuses by part of its clergy.

In addition, entire communities have begun to request public and international recognition of violence, particularly applying the legal label of “crime against humanity” to their historical suffering—genocide, mass killings, the slave trade, slavery, etc. Thus, the issue of violence has been at least as much associated with the memory of the victims as with its treatment by historians. In the same context, humanitarian organizations, starting with medical groups, have highlighted the “right of interference”—that is, the right to provide assistance to civilian populations facing serious violence, even if the organizations are in principle prohibited by international rules from intervening when a state refuses them this possibility.

THE AIMS OF A RESEARCH PROJECT

This brief picture of these developments, which represent a profound change in sensitivity, must be qualified by several observations concerning the phenomenon of violence itself.

First, while one cannot claim that violence is disappearing, it has been transformed. Its classical forms—its “repertoires”, as historian Charles Tilly called them¹—specific to the industrial era, have been replaced or have added new modalities and new meanings. In particular, political violence aimed at taking over state power by revolution, or by resorting to terrorist actions, has often been distorted upwards and become meta-political, sometimes with strong religious dimensions, and

1. Charles Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2006.

downwards, to take on the infra-political appearance of organized crime. While it can be international (i.e., made up of national actors capable of forging links with each other), it has more clearly become globalized (i.e., built or organized on a supranational scale), particularly with jihadism or global drug trafficking. Already political, violence has also become geopolitical and weighted with other meanings, including economic and religious ones. Moreover, the advent of the communications era, with the internet and social networks, has had a profound impact on the way violence emerges, moves, and evolves, as well as on new methods of countering it. Finally, it is perhaps necessary to consider a certain return to the legitimacy of violence within liberal democracies, as suggested by the existence of radical protests that do not hesitate to resort to it, or to refer to it (e.g., the “black blocs” and other “ultras” of the left and right), and that have given some resonance to the prospects of revolutionary or insurrectional change (e.g., the “Yellow Vests” in France).

Second, approaches to the study of violence have also changed. The most spectacular change is certainly the growing importance of analyses dealing with the lost or perverted meanings of collective action when it becomes violent, particularly in its terrorist forms, and with the processes—sometimes loss of meaning, sometimes overload of meaning—that very directly affect the actors. These correspond to logics of subjectivation, desubjectivation, and hypersubjectivation, in which a person or group construct themselves as the central actors in their experience (subjectivation), veer into discouragement, apathy, and demoralization (desubjectivation), or restore a plethoric meaning to their experience through an ideology or religion (hypersubjectivation). From this perspective, research has been able to align itself with symbolic interactionism and theories such as phenomenological sociology or ethnomethodology, particularly in the work of Randall Collins².

Finally, preventing and exiting from violence have become increasingly central concerns both on the international stage and on a more limited national or local scale. What happens to victims, their relatives, and their descendants after a terrorist attack? How should we deal with the trauma of those whose emotional, social, and family environment has been destroyed? What should be done with child soldiers involved in a guerrilla war once it has ended: do we punish them and/or try to provide care so that they can recover a relatively normal life? How can we arbitrate between justice and peace after a genocidal event, especially when attempting a return to communal life while at the same time seeking to identify and prosecute those most responsible? How can we build or rebuild the rule of law and democracy where civil war has ravaged everything?

To all these questions and many others in the same vein, the solutions proposed, including specific mechanisms (transitional justice, truth and reconciliation commissions, disarmament programs, memorial projects, etc.), come from all kinds of actors: consultants, experts from think tanks, NGO activists, social workers, psychiatrists, diplomats, judges, heads of international organizations, etc. The human and social sciences are obviously not alien to the knowledge and know-how produced by such expertise and policies for ending violence. But besides calling for some critical assessments, on the whole this knowledge—or, more precisely, the literature from which it originates and which is massively recorded in reports—has not yet made it possible for the issue of ending violence, and the corollary issue of prevention, to be raised in the field of research itself.

The program described in this report is largely based on this observation: violence is changing, has taken on new forms, and is linked to new challenges. It therefore behoves the human and social sciences to study these forms and challenges, and, at the same time as drawing on the literature produced by experts, to take ownership of this central issue of ending violence. Our ambition, formulated in nine research themes, has been to bring together these two objectives. Dealing with

2. Randal Collins, *Violence: A Microsociological Theory*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008.

these themes requires drawing on a wide range of human and social sciences disciplines (political science, sociology, anthropology, history, psychiatry), and making links among them to greater or lesser degrees.

But, while seeking to open up a new field of research, this effort is not about some community of researchers locking themselves in a kind of ivory tower, far from practical expertise and practical questions. Quite the contrary: the results of the work of the contributors to this report are offered to all who are directly interested in contemporary forms of violence and policies to end violence, particularly public authorities and the many actors in the NGO world. For this reason, the thematic chapters are each accompanied by recommendations that we are submitting here for these readers' attention.

CIRCUMSTANCES AND STEPS OF THIS PROGRAM

This program, and its nine themes, is also the result of special circumstances. The first is the longstanding links that the FMSH has established with Colombia, particularly, until recently, with its National Centre for Historical Memory that has been working to promote knowledge, and sustainability of the peace agreements between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) after several decades of civil war.

The second, quite different and certainly more imperative, circumstance is the terrorist attacks in Paris that occurred in January 2015, (Charlie Hebdo, 12 dead; HyperCacher, 4 dead) and then in November (the Bataclan theatre and around the Stade de France and bars and restaurants in the 10th and 11th districts of Paris, 130 dead). In the face of these tragic and staggering events, the public authorities, in addition to demonstrations of support for victims and security measures, asked the human and social sciences community to provide them with ways of understanding these events beyond those they had at their disposal.

The FMSH responded by very quickly organizing a seminar in which specialists in Islamism, contemporary jihadism, and specific problems of French society (particularly those generated by ghettoized suburbs) were invited to attend, along with representatives of public authorities and civil society organizations. In the wake of this first initiative, the FMSH also developed a program entitled "Violence and Exit from Violence". This is composed of two observatories, one dedicated to radicalization and the other to ending violence, which bring together researchers interested in configurations of extreme violence including, but in addition to, those facing French society.

It quickly became clear that the events that had occurred in Paris and that could clearly be repeated in the form of jihadist attacks, were part of global contexts and phenomena, regardless of Islamic State's local territorial objectives. It also became clear that, in order to understand their implications, it was important to avoid boxing them into what seemed to be the particularly worrying drift of a religious fundamentalism commonly known as Salafism. Other religious fundamentalisms (Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Buddhist) could be at the origin, if not of terrorism, then at least of radicalization and exclusion. And extreme violence, with all that it implies in terms of action, is certainly not the exclusive domain of religious fundamentalisms, as evidenced by recent mass killings or genocides, the bloody *modus operandi* of criminal organizations, or even the case of Norwegian far-right activist Anton Behring Breivik, who alone caused 77 deaths on 22 July 2011. The latter might have been considered a unique event until the attack by the Australian Brenton Tarrant on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019 (49 dead).

Designed to be largely comparative, the research program began with a symposium in partnership with the Institut Montaigne on Transnational Jihadism between East and West (31 May–2 June 2016), which particularly addressed issues of radicalization and deradicalization, that is, relating to the entry into violence and possible exit from it. It was at this conference that the idea of the

program took shape, the results of which are presented here.

Through close dialogue with the Carnegie Corporation in New York and the French institutions Commissariat général à l'égalité des territoires (CGET) and Conseil supérieur de la formation et de la recherche stratégiques (CSFRS) and through their financial support, the FMSH was able to set up the International Panel on Exiting Violence (IPEV), a set of working groups corresponding to nine themes:

- For a Comparative, Anthropological, and Contextualized Approach to Radicalization
- Deradicalization
- Between Salafism, Sectarianism, and Violence: The New Faces of Radicalization
- Independentism and Exiting Violence
- Public Policies against Violence
- Reconciliation and Justice
- The Uses and Abuses of Memory
- Reconstructing the Self
- Gendered Approach to Violence and Exiting Violence: MENA Region and Diaspora

The IPEV program, which takes a comparative approach and is supervised by an international scientific committee (chaired by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, who is also President of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic), officially began in Paris in January 2017 with a new symposium bringing together more than 100 researchers and practitioners. During the first two years of the program, the different groups met several times. An intermediate meeting was held in Tunis (3-4 July 2017) in partnership with the Institut de recherche sur le Maghreb contemporain (IRMC), the Institut tunisien des études stratégiques (ITES), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Two others were held in September 2017, one in New York at the Carnegie Corporation and the other in Washington at the Carnegie Endowment.

A final symposium was held in Beirut (20-22 June 2018) in partnership with the American University, where a first working report was presented. It was from this last event that the drafting of a more complete report was undertaken.

RESULTS AND PROGRESS

As mentioned above, the FMSH program was initially structured around two quite distinct circumstances and contexts. On the one hand were the peace agreements that were apparently well underway in Colombia to put an end to the long and murderous civil war that had been taking place in that country for more than 50 years. On the other hand, the terrible attacks perpetrated in France in 2015 once again challenged the social sciences on the question of “jihadism” and what was known as the phenomenon of “radicalization”. These were two different and contrasting orders of events, to say the least. One represented the emergence of a new form of extreme violence in relation to a nebulous Islamism, with a new “state” being formed in the Middle East (Daesh) by spreading terror there; the other highlighted a potential exit from violence and conjured a wide history of armed struggles of more or less Marxist origin but often taking a criminal turn, which had taken place over decades in several Latin American countries.

But, beyond the circumstances that opportunely made the two coincide, the challenge of this program, or, more precisely, its intellectual and practical ambition, was to connect these different events and contexts, to link them in a common reflection on violence and the emergence of violence and, more broadly, to boldly set up, for heuristic purposes, a broad comparison of situations and problems. Thus, for example, a guiding idea was that our understanding of “radicalization” (a notion

that is accompanied by the equally overused notion of “deradicalization”) should not be limited to the universe of jihadism or Islamism in its “fundamentalist” version (as one of the chapters of this report shows, the two are not equivalent), even if, given its burning relevance, this universe should be examined closely. On the evidence, as we have seen, extreme violence, deadly and cruel acts, and processes of intense brutalization have occurred or are still occurring outside such a universe, linked not just to religious motives but equally to completely secular ideas or aspirations. As a result, it was very useful to think about a wide range of situations, analysing their historical, social, family, cognitive, and/or ideological implications.

The great originality of this program, which simultaneously links violence and ending violence, is to have invited researchers, whose individual knowledge sets have generally resulted from very different field experiences, to work together on a common theme. The meeting of researchers who have studied European radicalisms, particularly ETA, with those investigating the shadowy movement of young people from Europe to join Islamic State, was particularly beneficial. It showed that there was no “mechanical” causality between ideas and radical actions. It also showed that understanding the transition from one to the other required taking into account a complete set of mediations, and that studying family history, networks of sociability, territorial specificities, and so on made it possible to grasp how individuals constituted themselves as subjects capable of giving meaning (i.e., not motivated by mental disorders) to what had been or was becoming their tipping point into violent action. Moreover, alertness to this type of mediation has led researchers working on the theme of “deradicalization” to enrich it with the notion of disengagement. As with the radicalization process, the challenge has been to identify the capacities of individuals to explain and justify their distancing themselves from violent action, as well as the meanings they had initially given to that action. Some of them could be helped in this by peers who had experienced similar experiences. This two-way movement, which can be described as subjectivation and desubjectivation, does not preclude a third term, hyper-subjectivation, in future discussions.

Of the nine working groups that provided the content of the program, a majority were broadly comparative, while two dealt with themes more specifically dedicated to the Arab-Muslim world. First, by addressing both the question of Salafist currents and their possible link with engagement in violent action, as well as various social movements (the “Arab Springs”), serious state crises, and quests for autonomy or political independence that have shaken the region for the past two decades, the program was able to provide, we believe, a more detailed and nuanced assessment of the extreme violence that has taken place there.

The second theme related to the Arab-Muslim world, but which is not specific or limited to it, demanded particular attention: the violence or, more precisely, violences that affect women’s lives, first in the domestic sphere (in particular sexual violence) and then continuing or increasing in the public domain (e.g., when such violence is part of armed clashes affecting civilian populations). Across the entire program, in meetings and discussions, this concern has become a major issue, for, if it gets to the heart of these deadly acts of violence by revealing a continuum between private and public, it is also central to designing and organizing the mechanisms that make it possible to escape them. This means (in contrast to what has often been done, sometimes quite badly) that it is essential for women to be represented in negotiation processes as well as in transitional justice procedures, and that they have decision-making power in these contexts.

As well as a gendered perspective, it should be recalled that the issue of ending violence has been the program’s spearhead, providing the basis on which to gather this immense set of issues together and to build a specific field of research. To this end, several levels of analysis have been taken into account, which are both distinct and necessarily linked.

A first level includes problems related to exiting violence at the individual scale. It is of course relevant to the perpetrators of violence, as shown by the specific problem of “deradicalization”

(or, more precisely, according to the proposed redefinition, disengagement). But it also addresses all those who have been the direct or indirect victims of violence (or who have been forced to commit it, as many child soldiers have) and who have a need for personal restoration or reparation. While clinical and psychosocial measures make it possible to identify the suffering of a particular victim and to effectively deal with the traumas that have affected them, it is clear that the exit from violence, even from this strictly individual perspective, does not end there. It also involves extricating oneself from this involuntary position of victim by becoming part of more public or collective undertakings to end violence. This applies, as has been pointed out, particularly to women. But more broadly, it also concerns all victims, since the violence they have suffered is part of a large-scale phenomenon (consisting particularly of attempted murder, mass massacres, genocides), which requires, due to the number of victims it has generated, collective reparation and restoration measures.

Among these measures, considerable attention has been drawn to what have been called “memorial projects”, whose aims are both commemorative and cathartic, particularly for all those who have survived extreme violence and who have escaped it, and for the relatives of the disappeared. There is no doubt that these projects, which are increasingly implemented following extreme violence, have genuine virtues, particularly when they concern categories of the population that have experienced difficulties in obtaining recognition of their wrongs and suffering. But it is clear that a hasty use of memory, particularly when overtly linked to those in power or when it provides a smokescreen for exclusion, can have impacts that are contrary to its objectives, and can generate new tensions or even new violence. This is why such projects should be subject to special ethics and care, so that they can usefully contribute to public debates and, above all, help those for whom they are designed to free themselves from the position of victims and once again become political actors in the process of exiting violence.

Post-conflict mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions, which often aim less to punish the perpetrators of crimes than to restore the social fabric or social order (and, consequently, to establish amnesty as a transitional measure, even if it means supporting a memorial project), have also been examined, based on case studies mainly from Latin America, but also from Africa and the Middle East. It has emerged that these mechanisms are often counterproductive, for they are likely to generate formidable challenges due to feelings of injustice and revenge among those who have been, or claim to have been, victims of violence; these projects, as a result, can totally undermine the peace process. This finding suggests that, in order to be effective, post-conflict mechanisms must include justice procedures and a significant number of convictions; not doing so will propagate the belief that the search for peace involves a deliberate policy of impunity.

It should also be added that post-conflict mechanisms are more generally part of public policies, which are a forum for confrontation and accommodation between myriad actors: state actors, civil society actors from local associations or NGOs, and international actors (United Nations agencies, large NGOs, think tanks, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and international courts). As the chapter dedicated to these public policies shows, mechanisms for ending violence or to be implemented post-conflict are in fact co-produced by all these actors and peacemaking experts. This can lead to extremely variable results. For example, it may lead to successfully bringing a particular person responsible for mass crimes (legally qualified as crimes against humanity) before the ICC or before specific international tribunals, avoiding all-too-common practices of granting amnesty. In stark contrast, it may accomplish little more than trying to maintain a certain status quo between belligerents, or even simply to negotiate some humanitarian intervention with them. There is therefore room for further examination of the varied panorama of these co-productions and their contrasting results. It must also be admitted that, at a time when certain major powers are called upon to become more closely involved in given situations (making the situations even

more complex as a result), many enterprises specializing in ending violence are becoming heavily dependent on international power relations and the strategic interests associated with them.

In summary, then, the program with its working groups were clearly ambitious and even risky, since, on the basis of broad comparisons and particular focuses on jihadism and the Arab world, it aimed to link violence and the ending of violence. However, while this certainly provided an intellectual challenge, it was in itself (as reflected in the chapters presented here) only a stage of analysis and reflection in a process that clearly needs to be continued. In addition to the theoretical and, in some respects, practical contributions it offers—e.g., criticism of the notion of “radicalization”, emphasis on the importance of women in peace processes, questioning of amnesty policies—it has the great merit of having successfully engaged more than a hundred researchers and practitioners from Africa and the Middle East, the Maghreb, Europe, and South and North America.

So far as we know, never before has a research program on such sensitive subjects succeeded in building such a community and consolidating it through meetings in Beirut, New York, Paris, Tunis, and Washington. There is no doubt that, as it continues, the program will continue to expand more broadly in the future, to improve its thinking, and to provide practical recommendations, particularly for those who are directly facing and/or working to overcome extreme violence.

CHAPTER 1

For a Comparative, Anthropological, and Contextualized Approach to Radicalization

Leaders: Jérôme Ferret & Farhad Khosrokhavar

Contributors: Rachel Sarg, Fadila Maaroufi, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Marie Kortam, Alfonso Pérez-Agote, Bruno Domingo, Benjamin Ducol

RADICALIZATION: A GLOBAL SOCIAL REALITY?

In recent years, the radicalization process leading to (violent) extremism has become a global social phenomenon affecting most states and their nationals. In the Western world, this notion has become widely associated with terrorism, and particularly assimilated to the “jihadi” type of extremist threat, which became a global crisis following the attacks on 11 September 2001. In Europe, the successive terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) placed this issue at the forefront of the public agenda. Furthermore, the worldwide spread of jihadism reinforced the dual feeling of fascination and rejection towards this new “wave” of violent radicalism. In Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the Caucasus, jihadism instituted itself as a large-scale revolutionary movement, integrating, in most cases, local agendas into its global discourse. In the Middle East, the Iraq war leading to the fall of the existing regime and the escalation of the Syrian Civil War as of 2013 have enabled the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) and of a new wave of jihadism. Europe has endured since 2015 many outbursts of terrorist violence, resulting in both a disturbing number of casualties and a psychological toll among civilian populations, followed by corresponding political reactions.

The intelligence and law enforcement agencies frequently thwart attack schemes, highlighting the parallel and ongoing mobilization of violent actors and law enforcement agencies. Relayed by mass media, the multiplication of attempted terrorist attacks deepens the feeling of vulnerability in our pacified societies, while, at the same time, changing the perception of terrorism as a “risk” that, if not “acceptable”, is at least more integrated in daily political and social life. A form of partial “normalization” of the phenomenon is established, as defined by the sociologist Emile Durkheim, because this violence now affects all societies in a regular and sustainable manner (Ferret 2008).

The fact that terrorism is now considered in terms of “risk” and “management”, that public policies are crafted around the issue of “radicalization”, and that social behaviors are adapting demonstrates that Western societies are now considering these issues as long-term systematic problems rather than as isolated social anomalies. The ensuing adaptation of the legal and technical mechanisms gradually banalizing the exceptional measures throws into question the traditional balance between public freedoms and protection needs, often tipping the scale in favor of the latter. Indeed, surveillance is taking a new place in the emerging security economy based on a more precautionary and anticipatory rationale, in an effort to identify as early as possible those who may potentially pose a threat to society.

Beyond the scope of those who directly commit terrorist offences, we now seek to understand and intervene with respect to people “in the process of radicalization”—that is, individuals developing extremist visions of the social world that could lead to violent action. However, this ambition is

far from simple and requires a better understanding of the dynamics and processes, but also of the limits and sometimes fallacies, that this issue encompasses. That is where comparative analysis is of great help, as it can allow us to connect phenomena sometimes distant in space and time, and to compare variables (social, religious, political, etc.) at different scales, either socially (individual, group, society) or geographically (cultural areas, states, transnational networks, local spaces). It thus provides us with the necessary distance to better grasp the new forms of political and social violence beyond the growing social fears and legitimate emotions.

ACKNOWLEDGING THE PLURAL DEFINITIONS OF RADICALIZATION

“Radicalization” is often perceived as a fashionable notion, in part because of its growing use in media coverage. Yet, one would be hard pressed to state a clear definition of what “radicalization” is. Today, the term has multiple meanings. Despite having permeated into everyday language, it is still frequently the source of many misunderstandings (notably because it is used in different circumstances and for different purposes in the media, and in scientific, political, and social fields). Contrasting these plural definitions provides a better understanding of “radicalization”: what it is and what it is not, and how the various groups define it.

Farhad Khosrokhavar has long studied the emergence of this terminology, its uses, and the associated attempts at theorizing its meaning. He contends that, since the 11 September 2001 attacks on American soil, the concept of radicalization has become pivotal. He conceives it as a process through which a person or a group adopts a form of violent action directly linked to an ideological extremism that is based upon political, social, or religious beliefs and that challenges the established political, social, or cultural order (Khosrokhavar 2014). In the scientific literature, radicalization is often considered as the articulation between an extreme ideology and a more or less organized form of violent action (Bronner 2009). Without radical ideology, this violent action can take multiple forms (delinquency, violence possibly linked in some degree to a situation or a mental disorder, more or less spontaneous urban riots, etc.); as for radical ideology, it can remain entirely theoretical, and, for many individuals, it does not lead to violent action. Radicalization, in its strictest sense, happens when there is a conjunction between these two elements (Khosrokhavar 2009, 2011, and 2014).

Thus, we discover a duality to radicalness, which neither of its two components possesses alone: on the one hand, extremist ideology, and on the other, extremist action, which draws inspiration from said ideology but cannot be reduced to its simple implementation, as it has its own specificity. Once the process of action is engaged, it follows a separate trajectory, guided in part by the eventualities and necessities of its own realization.

We should note that the domain of terrorism greatly overlaps with that of radicalization¹. When referring to terrorism, we seek to encompass and explain the tendency of groups as well as of some states to use ideologized violence (Wieviorka 1988 and 2012), although the notion of radicalization, with its focus on individuals and smaller groups, excludes state terrorism. The notion of “terrorism” does not revolve around the fact that individuals become radicalized and embrace violence, but rather, and quite significantly, around the political and social meanings of the phenomenon. When addressing “radicalization”, the sensitivity of the sociologist shifts towards the individual,

1. Terrorism, a relatively long-established term (coined in 1794), historically referred to the doctrine espoused by partisans of the Terror and exposed the modalities of the power of the State (the partisans of the Terror held the reins of power from March 1793 to July 1794) and not an opposition to it. During the Ancien Régime, the struggle against the State and the violence against the government was rather expressed through the notion tyrannicide. It was only during the nineteenth century that the notion of terrorism took the meaning of struggle against the government and the State through violence.

their subjectivity, and the modalities of their subjectivation and of their adherence to the group. It also focuses on the interaction between the group and the individual in a game of back-and-forth involving individual psychology as well as the dynamics of the group, its proclaimed ideology, the charisma of its leader, and the level of emotional attachment of its members to the leader. Stepping away from violent radical Islam for a moment, such processes can be observed in other social and cultural contexts.

Violence emerges through various types of radicalizations in various domains, be they religious (the Catholic faith has had its dark hours, with the Inquisition and the persecution of Protestants, for example), political (taking into consideration genocidal rationales, such as in the case of the tragedy in Rwanda, but also violent acts perpetrated by various right-wing or left-wing extremist groups, or ethno-nationalist violence), or social (proto-political urban riots, the violent actions of some anarchist alter-globalist groups, etc.). For instance, Pérez-Agote's work (2006) on Basque nationalism has demonstrated how violence became structured because of the stifling by the Francoist Regime of a Basque culture experienced through a unique language and traditions, resulting in the creation of groups such as ETA in the late 1950s, which initially favored military confrontation with the Spanish state, and then developed *Kale Borroka*, a singular and autonomous form of street violence studied by Ferret (2012 and 2016).

This conception of radicalization emphasizes a combination of extreme ideology and forms of violent action. However, more often than not, the term "radicalization" is used to describe the conservative religious influence displayed in the behaviors of some social groups, or even some distressed neighborhoods. In this context, "radicalization" does not encompass acts of terrorist violence, but various sectarian behaviors, disharmonious interactions with the other segments of society, or with the global society, as well as some disagreements on social and political values (e.g., the place of religion, women's rights, the sources of judicial and political legitimacy, etc.). When applied to Islam, "radicalization" tends to become synonymous with "communitarianism", "re-Islamization", or "Salafization", in reference to the doctrines and orthopraxes widely spread in the Western World since the early 1990s.

Fadila Maaroufi, when analyzing the spread of a literal Islam in Brussels, follows such an approach, leading her to examine communitarian dynamics, the effects of which initially appear paradoxical. For individuals, this communitarianization is charged with meaning, despite translating into a strong social pressure, group injunctions restricting freedoms, stereotyped gender social roles, and a male supervision of female behavior. For these reasons, Maaroufi manifests surprise at the vigor and success of re-Islamization centers. Nevertheless, this does not fit precisely the framework of analyzing terrorist radicalization. It is rather a perspective helpfully questioning the inherent violence of power relations between men and women in the context of an Islamic religious extremization. In the latter case, the scope of the notion of radicalization is widened beyond terrorism to admit a larger object. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2015) thus suggests apprehending "radicalization" as a process entailing a significant departure from established social norms (the *status quo*) and a pursuit of extremist points of view. This challenge to the *status quo* can be political, religious, or social in nature. These points of view may or may not constitute a basis for the use of violence. Thus, it is impossible to stipulate that the ideological or cognitive dimensions of radicalization are automatically linked to its actional dimension.

There is no basis to claim that all radical thinking leads to violent action. Thus, it is necessary to properly make the distinction between radical ideas and radical action, and between radicalization as a personal psychosocial phenomenon and as a political process leading to violent action against society or institutions. There are many contemporary examples of emerging groups or social movements undergoing extremization (by departing from the "average" social point of view) and using radical mechanisms while rejecting violence. In his work on the Spanish "Indignados

Movement” as well as various other movements ongoing in Spain, Jerome Ferret (2014b) has shown the existence of a “rejected violence” in such processes, which can nonetheless be classified as a form of “radicalization”. Thus, there is a space for nonviolent radicalism in a dynamic of confrontation against the state, although there is still potential for violence.

AVOIDING CULTURALISM: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE

The notion of radicalization should not be associated exclusively with Muslim countries or extremist groups that claim to belong to a political Islam, whether in the West or elsewhere in the world (India, Thailand, China, etc.). The radicalization leading to (violent) extremism is exerted throughout the world in the name of various ideologies, secular and religious. We could cite neo-Nazi or neo-fascist extremism in Europe, white supremacism in the United States, but also environmental extremism (specifically ecoterrorism, a subset of “deep ecology”) or anti-abortion extremism (the followers of which have killed doctors providing abortions to women in the US).

However, radical Islam has been at the center of a vast majority of studies on radicalization, due in part to the impact of the September 11th attacks on US soil and the turmoil of the Middle East, with the invasions of Afghanistan (since late 2001) and then Iraq (2003), and the civil war in Syria. Furthermore, unresolved crises play as additional factors, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Islamic radicalism in the West, where Islam is not yet perceived as an indigenous religion. It is apparent that a terrorist attack committed “in the name of Islam” is experienced by the population as much more threatening than, in Europe, Corsican, Basque, or Irish terrorism, and in the US, anti-abortion terrorism, or alt-right terrorism directed against the federal government. The symbolic dimension of Islamic terrorism is thus integral to the perception of the threat in the West; yet there have been fewer casualties in Europe following the 2005 attacks in London than from other forms of terrorism or violence (e.g., French organized crime in Marseille). Islamic terrorism, even at the hand of radicalized Europeans, is perceived as foreign to Western society and culture (hence the disquieting aspect of “domestic Islamic terrorism”, which embodies a threat to, but also a betrayal of, the European or North American identity).

This approach also questions the models on which the collective rules of social life are built: community-oriented (with the risks of communitarianism) or integrationist (with the risks of denying cultures). However, this dichotomy may be oversimplifying radicalization, as individuals have radicalized in societies favoring either one or the other model. The effects of re-Islamization endeavors, which eventually create a system, are undoubtedly of more interest, notably because of their influence on the evolution of relations within the family.

Studies on radicalization can carry the risk of considering the “average” (elevated as a norm) as the standard by which to measure the legitimacy of ideas and action. Historically, it is through the often-radical departure of some individuals or groups from shared societal norms that processes leading to societal change were initiated. In a nonviolent register, the resistance and the radical action of Gandhi or Martin Luther King come to mind. It follows that radicalization can create room for reflection on social change and the transformation of the norms of a society. The question of violence, its place, its legitimacy, and the modality of its use, then becomes political, and some ideologists integrated it very clearly in their architecture of thought. This last approach puts an emphasis on the very frequently political nature of radicalizations, which are motivated by a desire for social change, with or without recourse to violence or particular types of violence (e.g., against certain categories of population, following specific rules, etc.). Over-psychologizing the analysis of these dynamics can lead observers to depoliticize the commitment, militant in nature, of some individuals.

Similarly, the absence of automatic links between the ideological or cognitive dimension and

the actional dimension should not be taken to mean that no such relations can exist. Today, the issue of the permeability between those two dimensions is the subject of much debate to determine if religious ideology or re-Islamization groups—often referred to as “Salafi”, despite sometimes following different orthodoxies—constitute a gateway to violent radicalization. Samir Amghar (2011) summarized fairly well the stakes of this debate. He acknowledges that some terrorists have gone through a “quietist” Salafism before joining violent groups. For him,

Frequenting Salafi circles for any length of time can ... lead individuals dissatisfied with the quietist nature of Salafism to engage in violent political actions after leaving the movement. In this context, it can operate as a structure of Islamization providing a pre-socialization to politics and jihadism. Salafi preachers, whether in the Western or Arab world, regularly inveigh against the political, moral and social values of the West. Even as they defend a quietist view of Islam, their interpretation of jihad has served as an ideological matrix for proponents of a holy war in Europe. This is why jihadi preachers have long used Saudi theologians as an ideological reference to justify their actions. However, while the Salafi theologians had an ambivalent attitude towards the use of jihad during the 1980s and 1990s, they lifted any ambiguity after the September 11 attacks by denouncing all forms of political violence and terrorist actions.

The potential permeability between “quietist” Salafism and “jihadism” remains ill-understood. Some, like Gilles Kepel (2015), point out the importance of this ideological variable, while others, like Olivier Roy (2016), highlight that many known terrorists did not belong to a Salafi community, but rather tend to have converted late in life, often whilst having little religious culture. There is empirical data to support both theses, which can be viewed as complementary and weighed depending on the fields under study and the results they provide².

We will tentatively conclude by stating that, if the adherence to an ideology and/or a fundamentalist re-Islamizing community can in some cases be a factor in pre-violent radicalization, that permeability is by no means automatic³. In fact, quietist Salafism plays an ambivalent role, as it can mitigate and regulate the behaviors of individuals already engaged on a path towards violence by providing an alternative, or, should it be the case, by inciting them to disassociate from jihadi circles. Indeed, a number of programs aimed at disengaging from violence rely on this repertoire

2. For Rachel Sarg, the recent dispute between the two French researchers Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel—pertaining to the value or lack thereof of the religious factor in explaining the trajectories of new terrorists, which led to the famous phrase ‘radicalisation of Islam, or Islamisation of radicalness?’—has shaped the public debate around the responsibility of the religious factor in jihadi radicalisation. This controversy, about which we abstain from taking sides, does have the merit of bringing forth the issue of the religious motives and ‘cultural background’ of jihadism: are certain beliefs and world views a fertile environment for radicalisation? This immediately raises the question of how ‘religious’ and ‘religion’ are defined. On the one hand, many radicalised trajectories have shown that the gateway to radicalisation is not found through ‘religion’, nor Salafism in particular. Individuals can start on this path through political violence, and afterwards seek a religious rationale to justify their involvement. On the other hand, from a social sciences standpoint, this question implies the existence of an accepted definition of the ‘religion’ object. Time and time again, sociologists of religions attempted to define it (through substantialist, functionalist, or reductionist approaches, ...), yet there is no consensus on a universal definition that would be able to encapsulate this object into its own universal category. However, rather than attempt to assess the nature of the religion object and its responsibility in radical trajectories, various studies have strived to grasp the paths of engagement, the modalities of their construction, and their subjectification around expectations, beliefs, feelings as well as life projects. Yet, what separates an ordinary believer from a ‘radical’ rather lies in the nature of the relation to their beliefs, values, and ideas. Radical adherence is characterised by an unconditional belief in assertions which prevents intra-individual competition (Bronner, 2009). The key to this issue may not be tracing the origins of the involvement of religious factors as much as shedding light on the mechanisms leading to that extreme belief in assertions and on the ways to re-establish some conditionality and critical perspective.

3. This also applies to an ideology like Basque nationalism: Ferret (2014).

of religious orthodoxy to divert some jihadists away from violent action. Such programs are implemented mainly in Middle Eastern countries and face additional challenges in Western countries where more stress is put on leaving behind entirely certain beliefs conflicting with Western democratic values. Furthermore, it should be noted that some individual processes of radicalization leading to jihadism operate through direct socialization rather than any lasting affiliation with fundamentalist communities.

As outlined here, the utmost caution should be exercised when considering the issue of radicalization. The very notion finds itself at the center of much debate and confusion precisely because the actors in the field do not always discuss the same phenomenon. Depending on whether the ideological/cognitive dimension and the actional dimension are treated jointly or separately, both the framework of the issue and the social and political modality of its management may vary. In addition, there is a public appetite for mono-causal explanations. In this context, how should we apprehend the radicalization processes and the resort to violent action?

FOR A COMPARATIVE, ANTHROPOLOGICAL, AND CONTEXTUALIZED APPROACH TO VIOLENT RADICALIZATION

As the notion of radicalization has emerged, many theories attempting to explain it have been put forth, focusing in turn on macro factors (cultural or social determinants, local or international context, etc.), meso factors (relational dynamics, group effects, etc.), or micro factors (individual psychology, cognitive processes, etc.). These studies point out, in turn, the breakdown of social ties⁴, or political factors, and their perception by radicalized actors (Crenshaw 2005).

For those involved in the social sciences, there is a need to explore in a broader perspective the forms of activism and then investigate the deep motivations of extremist actors, in particular by asking questions about the long-term consequences of stigma, humiliation, insidious forms of rejection or exclusion, as well as of anomie and the loss of utopia in society⁵. Radicalization is a process which takes place between the short and medium terms, or occasionally in the long term: some adolescents excepted, one does not become radicalized in a few days. It is a longer process, often involving at least several months of “maturation”, that begins with some imperceptible changes to the individual’s ways of thinking, socializing, and displaying affection, the significance of which the entourage cannot grasp. At the end of this process, when the individual, or in some cases the group (some individuals together), is “ripe”, the short-term prospect may be radical action.

From a psychosocial perspective, a counter-intuitive approach highlights that adherence to radical Islam or a violent group can be attractive for vulnerable youth in search of meaning and direction. The conversion to radical Islam can be seen as a positive turning point in their lives, providing them with newfound values, religious practice, prohibitions, and clear goals—all things that may have been lacking in their previous lives, marked in some cases by delinquency, cannabis use, and excessive partying. This process leads to a gradual crystallization of radical beliefs. As noted by the psychoanalyst Fethi Benslama (2016), the contrast between their former and their new life is all the more striking because this religious impetus is most commonly preceded by a period of apathy, self-deprecation, and shame.

Exclusion and lack of recognition are not simply individual injustices, they constitute forms of

4. See, for a summary of theories on radicalisation, especially regarding Islamic extremism, Khosrokhavar (2009).

5. The intelligence and enforcement strategies often understate the relevance of this dimension, when in fact radicalisation must not be analysed solely in terms of security considerations, but rather encompass the whole social body. The role of social sciences may be to decentre the debate, which might otherwise be exclusively focused on enforcement, and underline the economic, political and even socio-anthropological dimensions of this phenomenon from a global perspective, in which the symbolic and actual dimensions of globalisation undeniably play a role.

oppression, with dangerous consequences for the whole of society. Low self-esteem, which shapes the way these individuals see themselves, results in a sense of humiliation, frustration, and anger that can turn into a desire for revenge. Recruiters exploit this feeling of exclusion and humiliation, and turn it into hatred for society and its components. What they offer is a reversal of values, where the one who felt excluded can now become God's chosen and rise to the rank of hero—albeit a “negative hero” who inspires fear rather than admiration, as Khosrokhavar (2015) points out. Nonetheless, to those resigned never to receive any social recognition, this is a means to escape anonymity and insignificance. Those who previously denied them recognition and consideration become infidels living in sin, pleasure seekers doomed to go to hell. Conversely, the radicalized converts, who endured their contempt, are now granted a moral superiority. They earn respect from their new comrades-in-arms and are invested with a sacred mission: terrorizing and subduing all those who had scorned them. The subjects are encouraged in this path by the admiration and the fear that it arouses.

By converting to radical Islam, the subjects acquire an ambitious vision and goals, transcending the limited horizon and alternatives available in their old life. This new position allows them to bolster their self-esteem and alleviate their undermining feelings of inferiority. Radicalization provides a way to mitigate a situation of vulnerability, suffering, and depreciation that may be related to a social context or a psychological condition, which is why adolescents are disproportionately affected. During adolescence, individuals wrestle with questions about their identity and their place in society, leaving them all the more receptive to jihadi propaganda. It preys on their aimlessness and their quest for meaning, giving them ideals, a collective dream, moral prohibitions, a simple set of values, life rules, an identity, a new name, and a sense of community. It is a comprehensive offer, providing adolescents or fragile individuals with structure, directions, and life goals, which allow them to offset their shortcomings and harden themselves in face of the world. According to the new vision of the world with which they are presented, there is but one source of truth, and the dichotomy of good and evil is clearly defined. This has a soothing effect for all those lacking directions and authority.

Therefore, beyond the stated argument of assisting persecuted Muslims, the conversion to radical Islam highlights the desire of individuals to redeem themselves and escape their condition. Radicalization represents a means to alter the course of a life seemingly all but predetermined, to forgo the status of victim and rise to the rank of agent of one's own destiny. Radicalized women go through the same process, paradoxically reclaiming control over their lives by choosing to leave their country, marry a pious fighter and voluntarily assume a subservient role.

It seems that assuming this subordinate status while joining as a fighter in the name of Islam may be a way for them to transcend their condition and reclaim their position as subjects. Hence, radicalized women should not be seen merely as victims. Denying that their involvement might stem from their own volition and agency would be no different from saying that these women can only be slaves to the wills of men, which they are not by any stretch of the imagination. As with men, their radicalization can be linked to familial factors, trauma, or vulnerability. At first, the process gives the individual a feeling of safety, insulating them from the rest of the world, away from society, family, school, and environment. This sense of belonging to another realm and the promotion of alternative world views empower someone who felt lost to find some direction and build a substitute identity.

The jihadis' desire to escape the world and their lives is reflected in their ultimate aim: the staging of their own death, which should supposedly secure their passage to heaven. Paradoxically, the media coverage of their death is meant to show their existence to the world and enshrine the moment when they decided to leave it, as if they wished for no one to ignore their sacrifice. As Olivier Roy points out, “the terrorist's death is neither a hazard nor an unfortunate consequence of

their action, it is at the heart of their project” (Roy 2016: 8). Albeit central, death is not the ultimate drive behind their conversion. Rather, conversion is primarily an attempt to give a new meaning to their lives and extricate themselves from a materialistic and individualistic society that no longer lets them dream. Mainly, radicalization presupposes taking risks, seeking adventures, facing dangers, and trying to give another meaning to one’s life. Although the motives are plural, those who have gone to Syria often invoke their desire to join a cause and help persecuted Muslims. The need for spirituality, excitement, and the sense of belonging to a group at odds with society plays a significant part in their choice. This commitment represents a way for the individual to take revenge for an array of traumata experienced within society. In short, undergoing radicalization is chiefly a means to break away from one’s life, build a new environment, and project oneself into an idealized version of the future in which one will finally know fulfillment. Considering death as the end of the project—and the radicalization process as a nihilistic one—would be omitting the significance of what paradise and the afterlife represent for the believer. Through radicalization, one can offset one’s shortcomings and build a substitute identity which one will wear like armor, creating a feeling of invincibility. This is precisely the reason why reversing the process can prove so difficult: for the radicalized, forsaking their convictions and their beliefs means becoming vulnerable again, facing doubt and fear, the judgment of others, and the self-questioning of their actions. Finally, it is necessary to stress the importance of both the sense of belonging to a group and the links that the radicalized individual forges with its members. For one who suffered from a feeling of loneliness and exclusion, leaving behind a group which rapidly became a surrogate family can be a terribly difficult feat to accomplish from an emotional point of view, especially, as is often the case, when siblings are involved.

A high proportion of the young Europeans radicalized share similar territorial origins: peripheral districts and suburbs in France and working-class towns in Belgium, the Netherlands, and elsewhere in Europe. In these territories, where mass unemployment is the rule and social success the exception, and from where the few who meet with success depart as soon as they can afford it, adolescent socialization is built around concentric transgressions. In the vast distressed neighborhoods surrounding Paris, Lyon, or northern Marseille, groups of like-minded youth unite around micro-territories corresponding to territorial subdivisions as defined, in most cases, by policies of urban planning foisted upon the population. For part of the youth in distressed neighborhoods, permanent transgression—from petty incivility to organized delinquency and petty crime—has become a way of living, of being, and even an identity, as being a source of trouble for one’s family and neighborhood, and for the authorities, the police in particular, allows one who is “nothing” and does nothing to become a subject.

That transgressive culture does not constitute a counter-society, for lack of the intellectual and financial means to become one, and thus can exist only in a relationship of “aggressive dependency” towards social models simultaneously desired and despised when it comes to consuming products which can be obtained only through crime, whether theft or illicit traffic. Such a mind-set predisposes youth to every manner of waywardness, every excess that can maximize their nuisance to a society experienced as hostile, discriminatory, exclusionary, as well as hypocritical due to its empty promises.

Transgression is always one small step away from resentment, so it is little wonder that many youths cross the line between the two. Yet most of them simply keep trying to climb through the window of a society that barred its door. However, some will go further and enter more or less lengthy processes of “anti-social” radicalization: among them, some will go to prison, but many will cross paths at some point with radical Islam, which has become the predominant and often only political agenda widely promoted in distressed neighborhoods. When this potential for resentment and revolt is met with a radical ideology, whatever its nature, the result is always explosive,

and the jihadi lure experienced in our societies does not contradict that rule.

Nonetheless, if most studies on the radicalization phenomena converge on one point, it is the variation of trajectories leading to involvement: there is no standard profile of a radicalized individual. The most recent studies with a focus on radicalization mechanisms have tried to develop models explaining these phenomena, but all ultimately found the same lack of common characteristics, thus highlighting the multiplicity of factors and profiles involved.

DIGITAL INSTRUMENTS: AMBIGUOUS MEDIA IN THE PROCESSES OF RADICALIZATION

Today, the various psychosocial processes of radicalization unfold in new contexts utilizing the instruments of the digital world. In this regard, the Internet and social media have become one of the dimensions of “modern” culture in the service of a neo-traditionalism conceived as the future of humanity. In fact, the viewing of radical content on the Internet and the online recruitment tactics employed by different radical groups and movements have often been judged the main root of the phenomena of violent radicalization.

Benjamin Ducol (2015) presented an illuminating analysis of the role played by new media in the introduction of some individuals to violent extremism. He argues that the advent of the online media sphere is synchronous with its almost immediate investment by violent dissenting movements, which were easily able to turn that new space into a key platform to spread their ideas and rally people to their cause. Whether for white supremacist groups or the first generations of jihadi mobilized in the Bosnian region, as early as the early 1990s, the internet became a catalyst for fringe political actors who were otherwise rather muted in the public sphere. Because of the various advantages the Internet offers over other media (decentralized communication, lower costs, circumvention of the traditional media gatekeepers, worldwide audience), many dissenting movements wasted no time in seizing the Web as their preferred communication platform, but also, and more importantly, as a key space to forge a common underground identity, a shared dissenting narrative, and an “imagined community” whose members share a converging adherence to a logic of political struggle fought beyond the traditional and democratic framework for dissent.

Already an indispensable tool for violent dissenters and terrorist movements⁶, the internet keeps evolving, and thus constantly renews the ways and means to present, circulate, and interact with the ideas, beliefs, and visions held by the actors of political violence in all its forms. There are worlds between the advent of the BBS (bulletin board systems) used by American neo-Nazi groups or the static websites promoting a “jihad” in Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Chechnya in the 1990s, the jihadi or white supremacist forums in the first decade of the 2000s, and the social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter) or their encrypted (Telegram) and live (Facebook Live) counterparts used today by actors of violent underground dissent.

As shown by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2015), ISIS relies massively on the Internet to recruit foreign fighters in Central Asia to swell their ranks in Syria, Iraq, and increasingly Afghanistan, with radical groups investing significant resources into their social media presence (Facebook, Twitter, blogs) to promote their ideologies in Russian as well as in regional languages (such as Tajik, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz). The Russian Facebook counterparts (VKontakte and Odnoklassniki) have thus provided a bridge between the jihadi recruiters and the populations of Central Asia. In this region, marked by wide-spread illiteracy, the radicalization toolbox also includes “night letters” (*shabnameh*)—CD-ROMs with footage of sermons, training camps, or victories in combat—and

6. As an indication of the interest expressed by the actors of violent dissent movements in the digital sphere, while the white supremacist David Duke asserts that the Internet should facilitate a ‘global revolution of white consciousness’, for the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, currently leader of al-Qaeda, ‘more than half the battle is in the [digital] media space.’

increasingly, as is the case in Afghanistan, propaganda in the form of text messages sent directly on mobile phones. There, the Internet has proved particularly effective in radicalizing thousands of people, because it can provide friendship, acceptance, or a sensible purpose to those who are socially ostracized and susceptible to recruitment.

While researchers collectively recognize how important a role digital spaces and the Internet play in the violent radicalization phenomena, little consensus has been reached on the exact nature of that role when it comes to radicalization and violent dissent⁷. Simply put, it would be rather unsound to suggest that the Internet is the one and only variable contributing to the violent radicalization of individuals. Public perceptions of the internet, marred by some “technodeterminism” and many stereotypes ascribing a placating effect to it, tend to cast it as an all-powerful conduit operating as a “hypodermic syringe” on those who are vulnerable or succumb to the propaganda material spread by violent dissent groups. This mono-causal interpretation of a social media-induced descent into radicalization tends to be discarded today in favor of a broader perspective embracing the complex influence of digital spaces in the path to violence⁸. Presently, several authors even tend to agree that radicalization phenomena are not caused by the Internet itself, although it can be a conduit or a catalyst. Therefore, knowing if the Internet and digital media play a role when it comes to violent radicalization would matter less than reframing them in their proper context and exploring their effects further.

There are two aspects to this reframing. In the first place, “autonomist” interpretations of the Web, which regard the digital sphere as independent from the real world, must be eschewed. Recent studies, multifactorial by nature, have shown that the trajectories of violent radical involvement usually find their impetus at the junction between the real and the virtual worlds. Whereas these two spheres are commonly considered as separate or even hermetic, in this domain as in many others, they actually are extensions of one another.

In the second place, we need to disaggregate of the relative influence in each individual path to radicalization of the virtual spaces, and of the way in which individuals “use” and “expose themselves to” radical discourse and content online. To that effect, Ducol (2012) outlines three major archetypes of the roles the Internet can play in the path towards radicalization and involvement in political violence: that of initiator, conduit, or continuum.

7. Until recently, the literature on virtual spaces and radicalisation resulting in violence, the vast majority of which is more descriptive than analytic or explanatory, was focused on describing the content circulated online and the spaces where radical right-wing (De Koster and Houtman, 2008; Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Caiani and Parenti, 2016), jihadi (Torres-Soriano, 2010; Ducol, 2012; El Difaoui, 2013), or nationalist (Northern Irish: Bowman-Grieve, 2010; Basque: Ofir and Weimann, 2012) underground dissent identities are collectively forged. Despite the important volume of scientific literature accrued on this topic (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai, 2017), few academic studies delve specifically into the role played by digital media in the processes of radicalisation and involvement of individuals in violent dissent activism (Lennings, 2010; Koehler, 2014), and even fewer studies approach the subject with firsthand empirical material (Conway, 2012: 13).

8. There are several avenues of debate around the role of the Internet regarding radicalisation leading to violence. Some authors tend to highlight the transformative role of digital spaces when it comes to phenomena of violent radicalisation, whereas others would rather nuance or even put into perspective the influence of digital spaces in the processes of violent radicalisation (Benson, 2014; Archetti, 2015; Ducol, 2015a). To this point, the most exhaustive studies available demonstrate the lack of obvious correlation between the democratisation of digital media on the one hand, and a significant spike in attacks executed by lone radical actors on the other (Gill et al., 2015). While there are some cases of ‘self-radicalisation’ and ‘autonomous radicalisation’, as illustrated by the case of Anders Breivick in Norway (Ravndal, 2013), or that of Roshonara Choudhry in the United Kingdom (Pearson, 2015), they are the exception rather than the rule.

RADICALIZATION AS A WAY TO (RE)BUILD A FAMILY: BETWEEN RADICAL ISOLATION AND EMANCIPATION THROUGH RADICALIZATION

Radicalization also appears at the core of the logic of social integration of the individual in the world. Beyond all the elements mentioned until that point and their various possible combinations, the construction of meaning is often at stake. However, that meaning is not just individual: it also falls within the surrounding environment, including that of the family, in a dynamic way (continuity or discontinuity). Thereby, the socio-anthropological dimensions dealing with the family may be noteworthy in the processes of radicalization. Between the macro scale of international relations, the meso scale of hate groups, and the individual scale (where meaning can be lost and reconstructed by real or potential violence), the issues of disaffiliation, affiliation, and re-affiliation are plural and wide-ranging.

First, it should be noted that some processes of radicalization may simply begin with education and primary socialization within the family. Early childhood socialization can indeed result in extremization. With this mode of radicalization, there is no alienation from the family but, on the contrary, a perpetuation of the family model, if not project. The progression towards violence or even martyrdom can thus be well received in such a family sphere. This can be observed, for instance, in some Palestinian families who justify the violent actions of their progeny by the greatness associated with self-sacrifice. Martyrdom becomes something that builds the family credit and can contribute to its social standing within its community. To take another example, the widows of martyrs, extolled by the Islamic State's propaganda, are *de facto* elevated to a higher social standing within the jihadi community and receive substantial material and social support from the community to mitigate the absence of the lost husband. The children of combatants or martyrs may also feel pride about the heroism of a father erected as a paragon of selflessness, bravery, and moral righteousness. This idealized paternal figure subsequently becomes a role model of violent radicalization to emulate and, in some aspects, possibly outdo. In this jihadi neo-rationale adopted by the family, external communitarian logic takes precedence over the family's internal organization, or rather shape it as a functional and instrumental institution in a societal struggle. In fact, ISIS has promoted some family models and led population policies with the explicit intent to populate the new caliphate in order to form a new generation of combatants. In the Western world, this mechanism of family transmission can also be found in some Basque or Corsican families.

Furthermore, as rightly underlined by Pérez-Agote (2006), the influence of family memories and transmissions must be taken into account in the Basque case, because it sets radicalization not only as an individual and familial synchronous process, but as an intergenerational one. Logics of honor, revenge, and struggle against an enemy (e.g., the state, the West, the Shiites, etc.) can transcend generations, with the radicalized individual ultimately being the bearer of this burden integral to the (reconstructed) memory of the family. He is the perpetuator of this "history", and thus also the legatee of an "inherited radicalization", as described notably by Kortam (2017b) in a study of the Lebanese fighting in Syria to avenge years of Syrian occupation in Lebanon and the parents who were killed or tortured by the Syrian regime during that time. Among the interviews that she was able to conduct was that of Othman, a Lebanese engaged in Syria who had previously fought the Syrian regime under the command of the Tawhid Movement in the 1980s, when he was just a child. His involvement has never been primarily rooted in revolutionary or religious principles. His only desire has been to lay waste in Syria as the Syrian regime and its allies had done in Lebanon during the civil war. Hence, at one time, he fought along the Free Syrian Army, at another along the Al-Nusra Front, and with other groups with sometimes diverging political objectives. Othman's involvement and the struggle against the Syrian regime can be understood only through the lens of a desire for revenge derived from the hatred accumulated during the war and through

years of personal suffering. Because he was a Sunni Muslim, Othman's father was murdered by a Christian party in Chekka during the inter-confessional civil war in 1976, while his brother died in Tripoli fighting alongside al-Tawhid Brigade against the Syrian regime. Othman followed in the latter's footsteps and joined al-Tawhid to avenge their deaths. His commitment is imbued with a single meaning for him, that of a concrete revenge. Jihad, as he says, has its believers and its conditions; but he himself is not religious and does not try to show otherwise, even when among his fighter peers.

Closer to home, there are questions to be asked about the education and the values that children receive in some families. If this family education creates a withdrawn, conflictual, or even hateful relationship between an individual and global society, then the process of radicalization no longer appears during adolescence, but early childhood. It has been observed that education dispensed to children by some individuals or families is not leaning towards Salafism, but emphatically towards "jihadism", with the notable use of videos produced by the propaganda apparatus of the Islamic State as teaching tools. In recent years, a relatively new phenomenon has emerged: Western families emigrating to Syria and Iraq with young children, who are often born or raised in violent contexts and socialized from infancy to the jihadi lifestyle of radical groups. In such cases, there is no longer a process of radicalization; rather, radicalness becomes an integral part of the identity of the young individuals who have never been exposed to alternative elements in building their personality. Thus, radicalization becomes synonymous with primary socialization. Presently, Western states are faced with ethical, social, and safety issues raised by a number of families returning from Iraq or Syria with children and adolescents (some of whom received further socialization to violence in the form of military training). These new groups constitute a challenge inasmuch as any intervention, whether punitive (e.g., imprisoning the parents) or social (e.g., removing the children into the custody of the state) in nature, might be perceived as an attack on the "jihadi" family order and strengthen its different members, whether parents or children, in their radicalism. The issue of the intergenerational family transmission of memories seems to be fundamental when it comes to the new generations—that is, children of former "foreign fighters" or otherwise "radicalized" individuals. The ways in which these children and young adolescents, with their education in and socialization to armed jihad, may eventually reinterpret their values will undoubtedly provide insight into and a better understanding of how to exit violence.

The family sphere can also be recognized as a space of radical socialization through the mutual influence that can develop between family members around a project of violent action. Such cases have less to do with family as an institution and a space of socialization than with family as a space for interactions. Family can be a favourable environment in which to reinforce radical ideas and contrive violent actions because it can offer social proximity, solidarity, trust, and a tight bond between its members⁹. Notably, many attacks or attempted attacks have involved siblings or cousins. We can mention the Kouachi brothers (2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris), the Tsarnayev brothers (2013 Boston Marathon bombing), the El-Bakraoui brothers (2016 Brussels bombings), the Abouyaaqoub brothers (2017 Barcelona attacks), and so on. Networks of violence can thus appear as family endeavours in which siblings, cousins, and even parents can be involved. For Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2015), in the traditional societies of Central Asia, where extended family plays an important role in building identities and providing support, there have been many instances in which husbands have influenced their wives and children, encouraging their family to join them in war zones such as Iraq and Syria, as well as some cases in which women have rallied youth for war in the name of "jihad". Recruitment appears to follow a principle of proximity, with friends, classmates, neighbours, and parents being targeted. It permeates the social network

9. For the Basque case and socialisation through street violence, see Ferret (2014).

through social gatherings (e.g., family celebrations), the spaces where the men conduct their activities, the home, and gatherings of neighbourhood women.

Other hypotheses could also be developed, positing that it is the process of radicalization which induces new family structures, rather than the opposite. In that case, individuals' shared radical world views lead them to engage in a romantic relationship and start a family. The planning of violence is then an integral part of the family project, whether it is merely one of its dimensions or its very root. When "foreign fighters" leave their country of origin, they are often motivated by a neo-familial logic. Thus, while these emigration dynamics are guided by a plurality of motives, they are frequently tinged with the ambition to (re)build a family: individuals following other family members, seeking a wife or a husband, pursuing a romantic adventure, or rejecting Western male and female roles; couples planning to start a family in the land of the caliphate, or to educate their children in an Islamic environment. In a broader perspective, these people also seek to reaffirm themselves in a community logic of family or quasi-family. With jihadism comes the promise of a neo-kinship, the members of which call each other "brothers" and "sisters". While some family factors may contribute more or less directly to an individual's radicalization, family dynamics can seemingly be the ultimate and idealized end of the radical project (e.g., pursuit of a "new surrogate family"; idealization of a family utopia; desire to be wed, to live, and to start a family in the caliphate).

Family thus appears simultaneously as an instance of potential socialization to radicalization, as a space of interaction where family members can develop shared radical views, if not violent actions, and as an end in and of itself of the radical commitment. From this standpoint, the marriages contracted via social networks by young adolescents constitute a paradoxical dynamic of adherence to a jihadi model of neo-family, which draws from a form of traditionalism (e.g., strict division of gender status, parental project, etc.) while remaining very much contemporary when considering its motives and modes of expression (e.g., escapist or emancipatory rationale, pursuit of security, use of digital spaces, reinvented religious frame, etc.). Hence, radicalization no longer appears as an end, but as a space to invest and a way to belong. Its dynamic is instrumental, aimed at meeting the needs for affiliation and for security of one's identity. In this perspective, the organizing principle of radical identity and action seems less prominently dependent upon ideological variables.

Family is also a factor in other processes within which it does not intervene as a direct instance of early radicalization. Individual radicalization then operates beyond the family and its values, and often breaks away from the original family model. Thus, individual radicalization can be approached as an attempt to recreate a sense of belonging even as the family itself, as an institution and a relational space, is subjected to forms of deinstitutionalization. The family is becoming more diverse and uncertain in Western countries (e.g., recomposed or homoparental families, homogenization of the roles of children and parents, etc.)—in other words, less standardized. Some individuals no longer find in it a stable and safe environment. It can even become the scene of violence, or a space lacking the regulation needed for one to build a purpose and a history for oneself. In her work, for instance, Marie Kortam (2017a) delved into the cognitive environment of young French individuals involved in the Syrian revolution and the various stages of radicalization that led to their involvement.

Using a case study of Élodie, a young woman living in the French city of Saint-Denis, Kortam demonstrates how a trajectory of radicalization can find its impetus in a relatively chaotic personal and family course of life, marked by several breakups, by a form of disillusionment regarding the traditional family model, and at the same time by the pursuit of love and belonging. Élodie's trajectory is characterized by constant attempts to take charge of her own destiny, to navigate and surmount her family's history of conflict in order to cement her own legacy. While striving for control of her life, she was beset with traumata and conflict. Prostitution, drug abuse, and alienation from her family

reflect the indescribable suffering that her family experienced. During her childhood, starting at the age of six, she was witness to her parents' increasingly conflictual relationship, due to extramarital affairs on both sides, until their eventual divorce. For her, everything started with this separation. In this tense and unstable environment, she developed learning difficulties and began to withdraw from school. As a young teenager, Élodie joined a gang of five girls in Sevran, near Paris. Several years later, through this gang, she was reintroduced to a young man whom she had known in elementary school and who became her "great love". Another girl in the gang, three years her senior, smoked hashish and drank excessively. She caught the attention of Élodie, who started to follow her lead. Together, they started smoking nearly twenty joints per day, and drinking half a bottle of whiskey each per night. Élodie still lived with her mother but spent most of her time away from home. When she turned 17, she completely dropped out of school. Her intimate relationship at the time aggravated her situation: although she was seeking attention and tenderness, even hoping to find true love, she was the victim of domestic violence at the hands of her partner. In addition to beating her, he went as far as to keep her locked in against her will for several days. Because she was in a relationship with a youth from the cité, Élodie began to be labelled as a "whore". Caught in a spiral of stigma and shame, and under the influence of drugs and alcohol, she began to see herself as she was portrayed by others and slept with several men at a time. This in turn reinforced her feelings of personal anguish, until the day when a man offered her money to sleep with him. She liked the idea and subsequently engaged in prostitution. To avoid returning to her mother's house, Élodie befriended Rami, an alcoholic living on the ground floor of her mother's building, with whom she then spent many nights getting drunk. One day, she discovered that she had become pregnant from a one-night fling. Despairing and ill, she tried to commit suicide, after which she was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, only to attempt to take her life again upon her release. After some time, things started to look up for Élodie. She found employment in a café, where she met her new boyfriend. With his support, she quit drinking alcohol. Despite her chaotic, complicated, and grim past, Élodie does not share the sense of rejection often characteristic of the radicalized youth. Quite the opposite, hers is a process of self-discovery and assertion. She spent her time in search of a man who could protect her, respect her, and be loyal to her. Above all, she wanted to be seen and appreciated.

According to Rachel Sarg (2016), if there is no standard profile for radicalized individuals, it is nonetheless possible to identify common threads in terms of attitude, personality traits, or family background. The multifarious individual trajectories leading to a process of radicalization often display turbulent and unsafe family environments marked by significant conflicts and sometimes violence. The "absence of fathers", "chaotic environments", and "fragmented" and "dysfunctional families" are frequently referred to as characteristic of the home situations in which radicalized individuals grow up. Sarg, through her participation in the implementation of the plan to prevent and combat radicalization in France, translated into effect by the creation of departmental units tasked with monitoring radicalization and accompanying families¹⁰, provided the tools to confirm that, in a majority of cases, the minors monitored pursuant to a report suffered from educational and emotional deficiencies. These elements are often among the only common threads identified by the various professionals in charge of overseeing these youth, along with family and parental difficulties in most cases.

DELVING MORE DEEPLY INTO THE FAMILY DYNAMICS AND RELATING PHYSICAL SPACES TO THEIR PARTICULAR HISTORY

10. Circular from the Ministry of the Interior, 29 April 2014, "Prévention de la radicalisation et accompagnement des familles".

These elements might yield insight into the trajectories of some radicalized individuals who do not have any migratory origins—either recent or remote. The allure, for individuals seeking a stable environment, can lie in the perceived normativity associated with the jihadi family models and the idealized sense of security that they seem to provide. This dynamic is accompanied by various processes of idealization (e.g., the jihadi Prince Charming, the Pure Woman, etc.), which can sometimes lead to some disillusionment. Once faced with the violence entailed in the jihadi lifestyle, these family units ultimately do not last, but, for a time, they provide a space in which to invest, which paradoxically creates the room for one to break away from previous family models, seen as inadequate, while simultaneously embracing a logic of neo-traditional extremization of these models. This avenue explains some factors of radicalization, shedding light on what can drive some radicalized youth born in families without any particular burden, from a social standpoint, towards radicalization in spite of the absence of any recent or remote migratory history (i.e., they are neither descended from immigrants, nor, apparently, have they had prior connections with Arab culture or the Muslim religion). For the individuals who fit this profile, the stake lies instead in an exploration at a specific moment in their personal journey—in an identity or narcissistic defect that the family environment cannot remedy.

A final way to glean insight into the role which family variables might play in some trajectories of radicalization can be found in the ambivalent distance that some children adopt regarding their parents. This behaviour is evocative in other ways of the issue of deinstitutionalization of the family. This trend pertains to families with past migratory trajectories, relating to memory dimensions and issues of deprivation of intergenerational transmission (cultural, religious, linguistic, etc.). The parents, often first-generation migrants who came to find work, had integrated into their host societies by fully complying with the institutions. In many cases, their faith had become marginal, and religion was often set aside in the family education in order to further their aspiration to have their children integrate in turn. They often have led lives marked by arduous work, as employees in the agricultural or industrial sectors, lives of sacrifices to secure a better future for their offspring. However, in a context of economic crisis, their presence progressively grew unwelcome by some, and they were faced simultaneously with unemployment and various forms of social and economic marginalization. Along with such marginalization, they have suffered from forms of territorial relegation, racism, or belittlement. The descendants of this first generation of immigrants are often very well integrated and have benefited from modes of social advancement which have abated most of the differences from other segments of society. They do not define themselves primarily by their migratory origins, or by their faith, but rather by their social and professional standing. Withal, some descendants of first-generation migrants have also experienced the devastating effect of the economic crisis, struggling to enter the labour market and suffering from the associated forms of marginalization. Among the latter, some are intent not to emulate their parents' attitude. In fact, they consider that their parents and/or grandparents were abused and humiliated by the social system, and are resolved not to reproduce this family model of subjection. At the same time, also feeling objectively and subjectively rejected by the social body, they idealize their migratory origins, which they invest with meaning in a disruptive move away from the family religious culture. As underlined by Amghar (2006), for instance, "the new prevailing relation to the Islamic faith among these youth is not the replica of their parents' communitarian religiosity. While the religious affect of the latter was based on ethno-national rationales governed by a traditional relation to faith, the former refuse to reproduce the patterns of the first generation". This results in a form of generational revolt, a distancing from parental models, creating gaps where some dynamics of radicalization can flourish.

The second or third generation do not wish to reproduce the parental models. They consider that their parents have been humiliated and reproach them for their lack of insurgency or mobilization; they seek to avenge these family affronts, which are subject to growing generalization until

they eventually include “all Muslims”. This process of detachment works simultaneously through a rejection of society and its methods of functioning (seen as based on unshared values such as mass consumption, obliviousness to human relationships, etc.), and through a quest for origins, as regards their ancestral country and culture. Precisely, they often criticize their parents for having forgotten or shelved these roots and not having passed them on, withholding a constitutive part of their children’s identities. Then, frequently, the re-Islamization dynamics proceeding from such disrupted family trajectories cross paths with community religious entrepreneurs. Fadila Maaroufi’s observations in the distressed neighbourhoods of Brussels demonstrate how re-Islamization entrepreneurs strategize their action to drive a wedge into families where such gaps exist, questioning family models and offering a form of communal alternative presented as respectful towards origins. Violent radicalization does not appear to hinge upon any other dynamics, but steers them towards extremism.

Historical situations and events have an influence on individual consciousness. The individual develops temporal, spatial, and affective relations of proximity to them, and links these three dimensions. In the sphere of the family, the individual and family history can cross paths with the long history of the state and of global political relations. This issue is central to Perez-Agote’s work (2006) on Basque nationalism. The ban on Basque culture and language during the Francoist dictatorship, in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), gradually crystallized resentment. Many Euskara-speaking adults grew somewhat resigned and stopped using the Basque language outside private spaces. Even at home, many were the families who abstained from speaking Euskara so that their children would not be caught speaking it in public. In any case, these families adopted ambivalent stances on instilling a Basque nationalist sentiment into their children. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the practical solution to that dilemma was, in many instances, a degree of silence within the family, as any alternative, whether promoting or suppressing this symbolic universe, would come at a dire cost. With regard to the transmission of the Basque language, the same dilemma unfolded among more committed Basque nationalist families. On the one hand, the Basque nationalists were aware that speaking Euskara at school could cause problems for their children, but on the other hand, they did not want the Basque language to disappear. In the case of families in which Euskara was the native language, the predicament was even greater, especially when the parents had a poor command of Spanish. Therefore, various positions were adopted regarding the education of children. Some encouraged or even forced their children to speak Euskara at home (and not in public), while others chose not to transmit the language. For the children, the repression of the language translated into a rising perception that the symbolic universe of their family was being nullified, in particular within the school system, and more broadly within the public sphere. This organized exclusion of Basque culture in society by the Spanish political system was, along with the frustration and fear that children witnessed in their parents, one of the catalysts of radicalization.

Thus, in the 1950s, the Basque language became a fulcrum around which youth radicalized in the Basque National Party (BNP). From this situation, a potent social movement aiming to cultivate the language emerged. It represented the first step in the process which led to the creation of clandestine *ikastolak* (Basque schools), where teaching the language was possible. Although the Francoist regime had intended to suppress the Basque language, what it did, in reality, was to prompt the swift rise of its constitutive, symbolic, and political value. In 1952, the *Euzko Gaztedi Indarra* (EGI), the youth wing of the BNP, was established. By 1958, some members of the EGI started to radicalize not on an ideological basis, but as a reaction to the inactivity of the old guard—the nationalists who had lost the war. They formed a study group, *Ekin* (“engage” in Euskara), which rapidly issued multiple complaints against the stranglehold exercised by the BNP and proclaimed the need for direct action. In 1959, the ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, “Basque Homeland and

Liberty”) was founded by these young individuals.

The Basque case perfectly exemplifies how individual and family histories can be interwoven with state history. Many factors led to the rise of violent direct action by the new generation: the fear and frustration experienced by their parents, the latter’s ambivalence regarding the transmission of the Basque language and symbols, the cultural and political inertia of the BNP old guard, and the repression of Basque culture and language in the public sphere. As Perez-Agote points out, intergenerational relations are always valuable when analyzing social change. And a fundamental dimension of intergenerational relations concerns the ones within the family circle. This is the space where osmotic transmissions develop, even inadvertently. Adolescents and youth find themselves torn between the need for a set of specific boundaries and the need to transgress them and go beyond the ambivalent frame set by the family. For these young Basque individuals, Euskara was the language of their parents, but also their own. They criticized their parents for their inaction and resignation in the face of the repression imposed by the dictatorial regime. Despite this criticism, such intergenerational relations are also characterized by strong affective and emotional dimensions, which then transcended the strict boundaries of the family circle to be more broadly assigned to an emotional community of Basque activists. The violent actions led by the ETA were the only public expression of political discontent. The affective identification became very meaningful in the eyes of successive new generations, even beyond Basque nationalist circles, and extending to communities of immigrant origin in other parts of Spain.

In progressive shifts towards violence, individual stories—most often stories of failures and defeats, humiliation and denial—become very consequential. They often interweave with history and vestiges of memory that it has left behind. One could be tempted to cynically say that history always presents the bill at some point in time. Faced with what is perceived as a situation of (colonial or neocolonial) oppression in which the parents were always the victims, the silent losers of history, younger generations can embrace forms of anger which could be construed as legitimate. Such forms of anger have given rise to marches for equality and led to the foundation of associative movements still in existence, but they can also occasion a desire for revenge in the name of a notion of transcendence designed to restore pride where there was humiliation, and to have fear change sides. The jihadism of the youth can thus appear to some as a kind of revenge of the vanquished. However, intergenerational memory processes and the pursuit of “origins” usually fall within the realm of mythical constructs. These youths engage in processes which are reminiscent of the “Born Again” faith in American Evangelical Protestant movements. In the context of Islam, this does not involve the restoration of a family-based Islam, but rather the adherence to a new Islam, simultaneously more erudite and contentious than the faith held by the parents, which then becomes identified as a poor man’s Islam, submissive and almost shameful. The behaviour of these youths is characteristic of converts, with all the excesses of zeal, misplaced pride, and misguidedness which conversion entails. In the early 1980s, Tablighi preachers began to understand the importance of this generational gap, and to this day have exploited it to recruit massively. This “scholarly” resurgence of the old tenets of Islam among the younger generations, while not a direct vector of radicalization, has proven a fertile environment for it. Nonetheless, as previously shown, these *modi operandi* may share a logic similar, as suggested by an in-depth analysis, to the emergence of violence in the Basque Country.

Lastly, to expand on the dynamics considered previously, radicalization can be analyzed as a way for young people to secure their transition to adulthood. Faced with many obstacles in securing a job and conjugality, their adherence to Salafism can be a way for them to progressively step into adulthood. For example, Zegnani (2017) has demonstrated how French youths who join a Salafi community can find employment through the community networks. Often self-employed entrepreneurs, the Salafis provide tangible material support to young individuals bereft of employment

opportunities and social capital. Furthermore, their adherence to the tenets of Salafism frames their pursuit of conjugality and intimate relationships in a religious context, which allows them to circumvent some constraints tied to their ethnic communities (e.g., restriction on unions between Moroccans and Tunisians, etc.). In this context, religious extremization appears instrumental; it does not entail a shift towards violence, although it generally remains under government surveillance and socially marginalized. Radicalization thus constitutes a means to escape the family orbit and gain a degree of autonomy otherwise hard to reach—in other words, to become emancipated from the family and step fully into adulthood. The same kind of logic can be found in the conversion to jihadism, which promises and offers similar resources: the ability to think independently (on the basis of a violent ideology), employment (as a fighter, a logistician, a cook, etc.), grand life ambitions (to save Islam, create a caliphate, spread Islam), a wife or a husband, a house, all within the frame of a normative system which appears explicit and based on community values, as opposed to the dispassionate relationships of Western societies.

Families can also become key actors to help swiftly identify and react to manifestations of violent extremism. They can dissuade family members from joining radical groups. In Central Asian countries, families are incited to notify the authorities if their close members join an extremist movement or visit the territory of ISIS. To that end, Tajikistan introduced legislation on “collusion with extremism”, which applies to individuals who were aware of a case but failed to report it. Parents are expected to notify the authorities as soon as they receive a message indicating that their child is in Syria. If they fail to comply, the family faces severe charges. When families are reluctant to report the case, the neighbours are expected to do so. However, turning families into watchdogs for the state is not the most practical solution. Parents, siblings, and close family members can be pivotal influences in transmitting values, traditions, and positive world views. They can also play an active role in detecting early signs of involvement with violent ideas or actions, in persuading their progeny to stay on the right track. Withal, in Central Asia, the absence of fathers (due to mass migrations and a high incidence of divorce) leads to feelings of resentment and abandonment. And the patriarchal organization of society often leaves mothers powerless to exert a significant influence over their sons. When bereft of its moral authority, the family can no longer play its role in preventing radicalization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The various family dynamics discussed above are still ill understood and insufficiently interconnected analytically. As a consequence, presently, radicalization paradoxically appears as both a product of family deinstitutionalization and a way to build new family models. It represents a critical space where the cohesion of our societies is challenged and confronted violently.
2. Nevertheless, while attempts to analyse violent involvement through socio-economic or educational (i.e., the level of academic achievement) variables have proved unsuccessful—that is, unable to single-handedly explain radicalization—the family is not a more determining factor. In that context, there is much to learn from the field of delinquency studies.
3. Over many decades, researchers have tried to identify the factors behind delinquency, and in particular the key role played by the family, as illustrated by various studies on socio-economic and cultural struggles, family structure or the professional activity of the parents. These studies arrived at the shared conclusion that, when it comes to explaining the mechanisms of juvenile delinquency, “objective” variables are of little use, as they do not represent primary factors. Ultimately, it does not matter if the parents are married or divorced, if parental authority is

shared or not, if there is a form of family breakdown instigated by the absence of one of the parents, it is in terms of relational dynamics that the role played by the family in a trajectory of delinquency—or, we might add, a trajectory of radicalization—must be analyzed (Mucchielli 2001: 224). An area which should yield more answers is that of the dynamics of family relations and their subjective dimension¹¹. These elements strongly corroborate the latest studies on the trajectories of young jihadist, many of whom recount the chasm between their identity and their family, including its values.

4. Rachel Sarg's work (2016) on religious adherence in the prison system has reached similar conclusions. Delving into the family history of individuals in a process of radicalization, she finds that not all of them experienced a chaotic family environment. Thus, it is necessary to refrain from generalizing such factors, notably in view of the lack of reliable statistics collected on a large scale and in various contexts. Radicalization belongs to the category of complex phenomena which cannot be encapsulated with monocausal or deterministic explanations. All the more so as many individuals whose trajectories are beset with family difficulties and wants do not engage on a path towards radicalization. Nevertheless, a certain degree of biographical availability may resonate with and favour radical involvement without there being an automatic link established between family difficulties and radicalization.

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11. Glueck (1950), and Leblanc and Ouimet (1988) have identified links between the quality of parents-children relationships and the emergence of criminal behaviour, in particular when there is a lack of attachment to the parents marked by a sense of indifference or a rejection of one of the parents.

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CHAPTER 2

Deradicalization

Leader: Shashi Jayakumar

Contributors: Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, Bartolomeo Conti, Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Fredrick Ogenga, Phil Gurski, Rahma Dualeh

“There was probably few areas in the social science literature on which so much is written on the basis of so little evidence” (Schmid & Jongman 1988). Our understanding of what makes individuals tip over into pathways of violence in the name of creed, ideology, or religion has progressed to some degree but it is still unsatisfactory, especially because many studies treat pathways to radical thought and activity as static and monolithic concepts. This lack of clarity on the triggers of radicalization, plus a lack of compelling fieldwork on the issue, translates into a commensurate lack of certainty as to how to “deradicalize” individuals. Many national legal regimes simply prescribe the same “normal” judicial treatments for violent extremists as they would for criminal elements (e.g. imprisonment). Though judicial and even criminal processes will be warranted in some cases, at the same time, it must be recognized that many radicalized, imprisoned individuals will eventually be released with the same violent ideology—in some cases, perhaps even with a renewed intensity. Securitized approaches can work, but, on their own, they are not enough to curb further ideologically driven violence. Thus, deradicalization as well as rehabilitation and reintegration have emerged as promising alternatives to conventional punitive measures that, on their own, sometimes fail to address the source of violence.

RADICALIZATION/DERADICALIZATION

There is vigorous debate on what is understood by “radicalization” both by politicians and academics,¹ partly because the meaning of the term “radical” itself changes depending on the culture in which it is used. Alex Schmid, a respected commentator on the subject, posits that the definition of “radicalism” is twofold. First, it refers to “advocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to the radical”; and, second, it encompasses “the means advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical solution for government and society [which] can be non-violent and democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through coercion and revolution)” (Schmid 2013: 8; 2011: 679-680).

As Australian government experts remarked in 2011, “About the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that radicalization is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to

1. A sample of variant academic definitions of “radicalization”: “process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politic-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods” (Ongering 2007: 3), “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology” (Horgan & Braddock 2010: 279), or (most simply, but perhaps also reductively) “the process through which individuals and organizations adopt violent strategies—or threaten to do so—in order to achieve political goals” (Olesen 2009: 8). These definitions are collected conveniently in Schmid (2013: 17-18).

make existing research incomparable” (Nasser-Eddine *et al.* 2011: 13 quoted in Schmid 2013: 1). Experts in the recent past have pointed out that the logic of presupposing a linear pathway of progression (“radicalization”) to actual engagement with violence is deeply flawed. The process is extremely fluid, and the vast majority who are “radicalized” do not engage in violence. As the evidence has increasingly come to suggest, those who do engage in violence could not always be classed as “radicalized” by conventional academic or law-enforcement definitions (Knefel 2013).

“Radicalization”, in its common usage today, evolved in the post-9/11 era as the consequence of a complex phenomenon that involved the interaction of personal and local dynamics, and transnational phenomena. It should be emphasized that radicalization does not always occur on the basis of religion; the example of extreme right- and left-wing movements in Europe in the twentieth century is a case in point. Studies have been produced well before 9/11 on individuals and groups who elected to choose the path of violence in the name of their cause—ETA, the IRA, the Red Army Faction to name but a few (Moghadam 2012; Kassimeris 2011; Alonso 2011; Rosenau *et al.* 2013). Again, there is no single answer as to why some individuals choose these pathways—and why some chose to stay the course while others drifted away.²

Many Drivers, not one

The academic and scientific consensus does not in its present state support the idea that there is one “terrorist personality” and still less that all terrorists are categorically disturbed individuals. As Andrew Silke observes, four decades of reliable studies suggest “terrorists are essentially ordinary individuals” (Silke 2003: 30). Like all ordinary individuals, terrorists are not monolithic. The driving motivator is not always religion (Kruglanski 2014a), and radicalized individuals vary from the psychologically healthy to the psychologically imbalanced, from seemingly model citizens to criminal heavyweights, from disenfranchised minorities to well-integrated citizens with seemingly promising futures ahead of them.

The anthropologist Scott Atran has led teams conducting qualitative frontline investigations by interviewing fighters in Iraq (PKK, Iraqi army Kurds, Arab Sunni militia, and captured IS fighters) combined with online studies to explore reasons behind fighters’ willingness to fight. The research is theoretically informed by a framework integrating research on sacred values (values people refuse to trade off for material or monetary compensation) and identity fusion (feelings of inseparable connection between self and group). Within this framework, people are most willing to engage in costly sacrifices and extreme actions when motivated to protect non-negotiable sacred values—whether religious or secular—and when such values are associated with a group to which they feel viscerally connected and that imbues them with a collective sense of invulnerability. Most subjects saw their spiritual formidability and sacred values as intricately linked, which led them to be more willing to sacrifice (Gómez *et al.* 2017; Davis 2017).

Fieldwork of this type has given some of the most important insights into the group dynamics of individuals engaging in violent acts in the name of a cause. But when it comes to the understanding the trigger—if there is one—for such groups coalescing in the first place, or the wellsprings of the individual’s movement to being attracted to such causes, we are no closer now than we were years ago to understanding what makes individuals tip over into pathways of violence in the name of creed, ideology, or religion.

2. A useful and brief account of the post 9/11 development of the term “radicalization”, particularly as it pertains to Europe, can be found in Coolsaets (2016: 7-15).

“The persistent lack of consensus on the drivers of radicalization helps to explain why deradicalization programs tend to be a potpourri of objectives of all kinds, from cohesiveness to repression to counter-narratives. The sheer number of possible drivers for extremism has also created the temptation to narrow them down into manageable lines of approach, such as a checklist of “indicators of radicalization”[...] Many first-line prevention workers have discovered that theological or ideological discussions are indeed mostly pointless when dealing with “radicalized” individuals. [...] By privileging ideology over context, however, the challenging task of devising a multifaceted whole-of-government strategy could be bypassed. It also meant that all the blame could be offloaded onto the radical individual and that the instigating circumstances that are inherently part of the social environment and context in which that individual lived could be downplayed. Accordingly, the share society has in the creation of these breeding grounds for radicalism could be dismissed. (Coolsaets 2016: 38)

Overall Approach: No Pattern for Radicalization, No Pattern for Deradicalization

The notion of deradicalization depends strictly on notions of radicalization; without an understanding of its causes, how could we reintegrate the radicalized? Just as radicalization is an imprecisely defined and changeable notion, deradicalization also remains concomitantly ill defined, which ultimately results in a lack of certainty as to how to deradicalize individuals. If very little is known about what makes a terrorist, even less is known about what makes an individual leave terrorism behind.

It is necessary to distinguish between “deradicalization” and “disengagement”. “Deradicalization” refers to a process by which individuals are drawn away from violence, sometimes by attempting a change of mindset or ideology, or another form of rehabilitation. Disengagement, on the other hand, refers to a process that can take place over months or years (Horgan 2014: 115-120) during which a previously radicalized individual clings to previous beliefs but no longer plays a part in the violent group, because either they are no longer willing to break the law in pursuit of their aims, or they are no longer convinced of the need for violence to achieve their aims (Barrett & Bokhari 2008). Thus, this disengagement can occur independent of deradicalization.

Both deradicalization and disengagement have been attempted by the state and state-supported programs. But with both—and with disengagement in particular—sometimes the journey away from violence is a personal one and does not require the authorities’ intervention.

Disengagement might occur for a number of reasons. In some cases, it could be part of a wider disillusionment (e.g., realizing that everyday life in the terrorist group does not meet the individual’s aspirations or initial expectations). Many individuals disengage for personal reasons, including a desire to return to pre-extremist-group relationships, while others describe a “turning point” following incarceration or witnessing the deaths of friends or innocent civilians resulting from the group’s activity. Motivations for disengagement vary between individuals, and thus it is extremely difficult to generalize as to its causes³. Post-disengagement life is often fraught with complexities for those who walk away from extremist groups, and the difficulties of reintegration persist with disengaged groups as well as deradicalized ones.

3. For the illuminating study of the disengagement of a single individual from right wing extremism, which illustrates this, see Horgan *et al.* (2016). More such studies are urgently needed.

A 2008 UN/CTITF report identified 11 types of national programs for deradicalization and their characteristics. Experts might have disagreements with some of the points included (religious indoctrination, a feature of some national programs, does not feature), but the list is nonetheless useful:

- education;
- promoting alliance of civilizations and inter-cultural dialogue;
- tackling economic and social inequalities;
- global programs to counter radicalization;
- the Internet;
- legislation reforms;
- developing and disseminating information;
- training and qualifying agencies involved in implementing counter-radicalization policies.

National programs may have the following aims:

- re-socializing ex-members back to normal life;
- acquiring intelligence, evidence, and witnesses in court cases;
- using repentant ex-terrorists as opinion builders;
- sowing dissent within the terrorist milieu;
- providing an exit from terrorism and “underground” life;
- reducing the dependency on repressive means and making use of more humane means in counter-terrorism;
- reducing the economic and social costs of keeping a large number of terrorists in prison for a long time;
- increasing the legitimacy of the government or state agency.

(United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2008: 5)

A Broad Approach to “Deradicalization”

The future will almost certainly see more deradicalization programs and diagnostic toolkits for risk assessment developed and delivered in various countries⁴. These programs will likely aim to move treatment of the problem upstream, and away from the much-criticized securitization of the problem. Further dialogue concerning the efficacy of these programs and toolkits would be advantageous⁵.

While inter-party dialogue between academics and practitioners is important, so too is the distinction between the policies adopted nationally and the methods/approaches developed by practitioners. Our intention in the following pages is to set out what has been tried in various geographic theatres—what we know works, what shows promise, and what has failed. Our aim is not to provide solutions with universal applicability; rather, it is to suggest provisional lines of inquiry, and to highlight some promising models or mechanisms in precise locations and conditions.

4. For a general overview of state-sponsored programs, see Horgan & Altier (2012).

5. The very pertinent comments of Michael Jacobson are worth quoting: “For policymakers, understanding what motivates members of terrorist or extremist organizations to leave is critical to designing effective programs to encourage them to make the break. Unfortunately, the process of withdrawing is not always so straightforward, making the analysis of what is likely to work somewhat difficult. Leaving a terrorist or extremist group is often a lengthy, convoluted, and complicated process. Perhaps even more important, it does not always result in the group member’s abandoning his radical beliefs, so ‘success’ in this area can be difficult both to define and to achieve” (Jacobson 2010: 1).

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN MODEL OF DERADICALIZATION?

In recent years, European countries have been confronted with a growing number of young people (often born and raised in Europe) joining jihadist groups. Recent growing radicalization rates seem more worrying than in earlier years because of the large number of young people involved and the heterogeneity of their profile. In response, most European countries have implemented prevention policies over the past two decades, as well as experimental programs aimed at disengagement and deradicalization of individuals who have been led by extreme ideology to the path of violence. In the following sections, we describe the outlines of a (still) contradictory and uncertain European approach to “deradicalization”.

National Answers to a Transnational Problem

The European programs discussed here were developed starting in the early 2000s, and generally have two main objectives (that can become contradictory): to reintegrate radical individuals and to punish them. Some of these exit programs (many of which originated as attempts to help individuals leave far-right movements) work with individuals already in prison; others take a more upstream approach and work with individuals who might be deemed “at risk” but who have not yet undertaken illegal activities. These programs usually involve a large and diverse variety of actors (psychologists, imams, political analysts, social workers, etc.) and rely on varied and sometimes even conflicting methods.

Denmark has been developing a complex plan of action aimed at preventing radicalization and extremism since the early 2000s. The city of Aarhus today represents a veritable counter-radicalization laboratory (Bertelsen 2015; Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration 2012) with its launch of the Exit Jihadist Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Program. This program is voluntary and based on the involvement of families, the assignment of a mentor to each participant, and a long-term effort to initiate a process of self-reflection to lead to the abandonment of violence as a means of resolving the problems experienced. There is some evidence that tailored programs of this type—especially targeting individuals thorough mentoring, for example—are effective: the number of individuals travelling from the city to fight in overseas battlefield dropped from 31 in 2013 to just one in 2014, though ISIS’ apogee has caused numbers to begin rising again. However, as previously stated, measuring the success of deradicalization is difficult.

Germany’s Hayat program (<http://hayat-deutschland.de/English>) (Köhler 2013), a deradicalization program developed by the Center for Democratic Culture (drawing on methods and practices based on the country’s previous experiences with the far right), takes a family-centred approach, focusing on the emotional elements of deradicalization. The Hayat program plays a key role in the deradicalization of young jihadists through the implementation of programs addressed to young people at the beginning of a radicalization process, to already radicalized individuals, and to people leaving different theaters of jihad and expressing the wish to return to Germany.

In Great Britain, which has seen more than 700 departures for Syria and as many as 400 returnees, a concerted counter-radicalization policy was launched after the 2005 attacks in London (Stuart 2015)⁶. Its program is distinguished by two major elements: the involvement of local authorities and Muslim actors in prevention and deradicalization efforts. The involvement of Muslim actors has produced a variety of initiatives that are original and innovative but also controversial, starting with the Unity Initiative (<https://www.theunityinitiative.com>), which applies a methodology combining the use of alternative narratives to jihad with methods derived from behavioral and

6. On the number of ISIS returnees to the UK, see Barrett (2017: 13).

social sciences.

Consensus and Disagreements on Principles, Tools, and Methods in the Construction of a European Approach

Over the past few years in Europe, the guidelines of a European model (still strongly defined according to national traditions or specific situations) seem to have emerged, encompassing a varied set of principles, tools, and methods to withdraw a person from a radicalization process by promoting his or her rehabilitation into society. Unlike many programs in the Middle East and Asia, in Europe the emphasis has not been on re-indoctrination in an ideological or (still less) a religious sense, but on promoting “exit” from the movement that the individual belonged to, especially through disengagement (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013: 99-100). Besides individual mentoring, the majority of these programs have one or more of the following characteristics: personalized work; engagement with the family or even with the wider community; counseling (either religious or ideological, depending on the individual’s profile); and work on building up resilience, critical thinking, empathy, and self-esteem. Some of these programs use “formers”, individuals who themselves were formerly part of these extremist movements, as part of the attempt to engage the individual in question⁷.

The “Aarhus Model”

In recent years, the Danish city of Aarhus has attracted attention worldwide on account of its approach to dealing with radicalized (as well as “pre-radicalized”) individuals. The “Aarhus Model” (which is applied not just in the city but nationally too) hinges on the historically close cooperation between Schools, Social Services and Police (SSP). The current approach to the issue of (mainly) young men thought to be radicalized, or on the pathway to radicalization, actually began in 2007 as a way to deal with the issue of a small number of far-right extremists in Aarhus. The approach was again put to use when individuals from the Somali diaspora living in Aarhus began to join al-Shabaab. Subsequently, a second wave from Aarhus either made the journey to join ISIS or else remained in Aarhus but in various states of “radicalization”.

The SSP component is in the form of community engagement and cooperation, which sees various agencies closely cooperating and sharing information about individuals suspected to be on a trajectory of radicalization. When the individual is identified, the authorities (the police, sometimes using an imam as intermediary) reach out and offer help. Those who accept this offer are paired with a mentor. The mentoring is, on the whole, non-ideological and (in contrast to other approaches tried in other parts of the world that involve counseling) does not as a general rule involve debates over religious doctrine. However, discussions and activities between mentor-mentee can range over any topic. As one mentor observes, “With all of them, he says: ‘I can, and do, help with homework, applications, practical stuff like that. But we also talk, a lot—about religion, Islam, free speech, politics, international relations. Serious, philosophical, intellectual conversations, twice a week for two, three hours”’.

The Aarhus model has become renowned for its apparent ability, through the methods above, to draw radicalized and pre-radicalized individuals out from their trajectories. As Preben Bertelsen, a psychology professor at Aarhus University, observes, the approach is about inclusion: “These are young people struggling with pretty much the same issues as any others—getting a grip on their lives,

7. For summary of these programs, their methods and approaches, see Radicalization Awareness Network (2018: 89-95). For a practitioner’s take on the importance of the family in an “exit” process, see Köhler (2013: 182-204).

making sense of things, finding a meaningful place in society. We have to say: provided you have done nothing criminal, we will help you to find a way back”.

There are several misunderstandings of the approach. Detractors of the programs who critique the model state that the Aarhus approach is too “soft”; it mollicoddles individuals who might be at odds with the tenets of what it means to be a Danish society, or who might even intend to perpetrate terrorist acts in Denmark. The latter may rest on a misperception: those are thought to be responsible for criminal or terrorist acts (or in the course of planning them) at home or abroad are not candidates for the early intervention; they may be referred for investigation or even possible prosecution.

The authorities in Aarhus acknowledge that their model is not perfect. Some individuals identified as candidates for intervention, or who have been approached to take part, have gone on to fight for ISIS in Syria or Iraq. Some of those who return from foreign battlefields decline all offers of help, and others discontinue their involvement in the program after some time. It appears that many who have returned are disillusioned with what they have seen, but there is considerable difficulty in objectively measuring this assumption or, for that matter, determining the extent to which they still harbor thoughts of jihad, of committing violent acts, or of travelling again to foreign battlefields.

Does the Aarhus model work? The numbers of individuals travelling from the city to fight in overseas battlefield dropped from 31 in 2013 to just one in 2014. But this was before the apogee of ISIS: the numbers appear again to have risen. The Aarhus model may well in the ISIS and post-ISIS have to evolve further.

Further reading (including sources of specific quotations): Henley (2014); Pedersen & Stothard (2015); Kühle & Lindekilde (2010); Higgins (2014); Braw (2014); Agerschou (2014).

For mentoring in the United Kingdom and the experiences and challenges faced by the mentors there, see Spalek & Davies (2012).

Many Paths to Radicalization, No Miracle Solution

Interdisciplinary approach: Although it is often still difficult, if not rare, to bring people from different disciplines or sectors to work together, the interdisciplinary approach has become a *conditio sine qua non* of all deradicalization programs, as a consequence of the shared idea that radicalization has multiple causes.

Trust building: Instead of an accusatory approach, most successful programs use a constructive approach, based on trust building between program workers and the target person.

Work over the biographical trajectory: Working on a person’s individual trajectory has emerged as one of the most relevant tools to “separate” the individual from the group and to allow him/her to begin a self-reflection on his/her own path.

Social, familial, and professional rehabilitation: As scholars have pointed out, radicalization is often a consequence of an estrangement from the familial, social, and professional life of the person. The reinsertion process includes renewing the individual’s links with family members, social life, and professional environment.

The inefficacy of counter-discourse and ideological re-education: Counter-discourse seems to have limited effects on radicalized people. In fact, as found in field research and practical programs,

radicalized people reject discourses produced by “the enemy”. Alternative discourses could have a positive effect only when the rehabilitation process is quite advanced. In Europe, most programs avoid focusing on ideological/theological re-education, but this issue is still highly controversial in some European countries such as France.

What Balance between Security Needs and Reinsertion? A main divergence between countries, but also between initiatives in the same country, is with respect to the balance between the security needs of the country and the social reinsertion of the radicalized person.

Beyond imprisonment: As the French scholar Farhad Khosrokhavar has shown based on his research in prisons, imprisonment can reinforce the radicalization process.

Prisons as Opportunity?

“While most analysis of prisons has focused on them as potential sites for radicalization, prisons can also be places of opportunity. As a British government psychologist noted, in prison, terrorists or extremists find themselves in a completely different environment, forced to interact with a wide variety of people, including non-Muslims. Not surprisingly, then, a number of people have turned away from jihadism or extremism while incarcerated. British-born HT leader Maajid Nawaz began to experience doubts about his organization during his time in an Egyptian prison. As he later recounted, “My experience in prison was a critical step in my de-radicalization.” The prison was a relatively free environment for open conversation, and Nawaz was surrounded by secular Egyptian activists such as Ayman Nour and Said Ibrahim. Nawaz also learned Arabic while imprisoned and began to read a wide range of classical Islamic texts, broadening his horizons. Mosab Hassan Yousef turned away from Hamas, and even from Islam, while in prison. He later said that while serving time in an Israeli prison, he began to read a wider range of materials, including the Bible. In studying the Bible verse by verse, he began to “see things in a different way” (Jacobson 2010: 20).

SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA

Like Europe, Southeast Asia is extremely diverse and lacks a single pattern, its countries’ known terrorists ranging in profile from civil servants in the Muslim-majority country of Malaysia to an ethno-separatist Muslim minority in Thailand. Some Southeast Asians who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan formed the nucleus extremist group in the region, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), upon their return. JI was responsible in the 2000s for a wave of terror attacks in the region (most notably those in Indonesia and Bali). JI has to some degree been neutralized in the region, but other threats have emerged: (1) self-radicalized individuals, starting around 2005, and (2) an estimated 1,000 individuals who have made the journey to the ISIS caliphate, starting around 2014⁸.

8. The numbers are imprecise and clouded by the fact that many are known to have brought their families (women, children). With the recent reverses suffered by ISIS, small numbers are known to have attempted to come back to Malaysia and Indonesia.

East and West

“We have seen that the exit programs in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe all place emphasis on trust building, on a constructive and benevolent rather than accusatory approach, and on demonstrating a fair and professional approach on part of the authorities. In light of what social psychology tells us about cognitive consistency, dissonance, and reactance such an approach seems well placed. But the programs in South East Asia and the Middle East on the one hand and Europe on the other also differ with regard to how openly they seek to influence the potential exiter and in terms of how much emphasis they place on ideology. It is currently not possible to draw firm conclusions about the relative merits of these approaches due to the lack of independent evaluations or data on success rates. Central theoretical concepts and experimental studies from social psychology, however, provide pointers. Arguably, an external intervention should stay close to the potential exiter’s own doubt, make the influence attempt as subtle as possible, use narratives and self-affirmatory strategies to reduce resistance to persuasion, and consider the possibility to promote attitudinal change via behavioral change as an alternative to seek to influence beliefs directly. A fixed curriculum, mandatory ideological re-education, and a strong reliance on the power of rhetoric and arguments—no matter how well-founded in reason and theology—on the other hand, is unlikely to provide a successful formula in a Western context”. (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013: 110)

Singapore’s Approach: the Religious Rehabilitation Group

Forty individuals from the Muslim-minority country of Singapore have been identified since 9/11 as members of JI (or linked to it). More recently, the main threat in Singapore has come from self-radicalized individuals who either plotted terror attacks locally or attempted to make the journey to join ISIS. Again, there is no pattern: some were young, others were old, and included middle-class professionals. However, none appear to have been poor or disenfranchised, nor appeared alienated from mainstream society⁹. Initial analyzes of the first radicalized individuals arrested (c. 2001) suggested that only a very small number were of the charismatic “leader” type, while many others were “followers”. Almost all appear (either through religious instruction or group association or through indoctrination in training camps in Pakistan or the Southern Philippines) to have had a deeply mistaken idea of the nature and purpose of jihad, and mistaken views especially when it came to the idea of Muslim Singaporeans living side by side with non-Muslims¹⁰.

The cornerstone of Singapore’s approach to radicalization is its heavy emphasis on religious counseling in its deradicalization process. The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), the main group in charge of carrying out the deradicalization and rehabilitation process, conducts religious counseling sessions to challenge the detainees’ radical beliefs and rectify their misguided understanding of the religion. Individual deradicalization in Singapore breaks the dynamics of militants’ groups by separating detained leaders and core members from their followers (Kruglanski 2014b) and then counseling detainees individually, sometimes by psychologists but more often by religious counselors (Kruglanski *et al.* 2010). The Singapore approach also seeks to be holistic, allowing detainees access to the gym and to educational courses, and offering financial assistance to

9. Since 2014, over a dozen Singapore Muslims were influenced by ISIS social media and Internet propaganda. The vast majority had the intention to join ISIS in Syria or Iraq. Among the recent cases, on 20 June 2017, two Singaporean auxiliary police officers were arrested for terrorism-related offences under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Not long after, an infant care assistant who was planning to travel to Syria with her child to become a “martyr’s widow” fighting for ISIS was detained. These individuals were all products of online propaganda and were planning to take action by joining the ranks of ISIS.

10. For good overviews of the “Singapore model”, see Ramakrishna (2014 and 2009), Gunaratna & Hassan (2015).

detainees and their family during and after the programs. This support system is key to initiating the realization that the “enemy” is, in fact, trying to help them and their loved ones.

On some counts, the Singapore model is a successful one. Since the establishment of the RRG, 88 percent of the 40 JI-linked individuals detained have been successfully counseled and released (Bei Yi 2018). Compared to individuals who belong to a terrorist group where there is a set organizational religious motif or mantra, which can be broken down easily by the religious counselors, self-radicalized individuals have proven to be more difficult subjects for counseling, as their beliefs originate from different sources and are often intertwined with their own sense of justice and views. Just 25 percent of all self-radicalized individuals detained since 2007 have been released (Bei Yi 2018). In addition, the median age of self-radicalized individuals (many of whom are especially influenced by ISIS ideology) is lower than that of JI adherents. Since 2015, the authorities have detained five self-radicalized individuals aged between 17 and 19. And while the backsliding or recidivist rate in this process is also low—only two individuals are known to have become recidivists—it is worth noting that the two individuals in question were self-radicalized (Yan Liang 2016).

The Saudi and Singapore “Models”

The Saudi Ministry of Interior, faced with several major terror incidents from the mid-1990s onwards, began to develop a strategy that combined “hard” and “soft” approaches. A key part of the focus is on religious and psychological counseling given the detainees, which, over time, expanded to preventative counseling (including to the families of detainees). Second, there are specific efforts to deradicalize and rehabilitate some terrorists prior to their release in special halfway house settings. This latter type of intervention, which is aimed partly at individuals repatriated from Guantanamo, has at its core a religious programs aimed at correcting misunderstandings of Islam, but it also has the aim of putting in place a framework to reintegrate these individuals into society. This opportunity was also offered to those prisoners under the charge of the Interior Ministry who responded well to prison-based counselling. Third, a key part of the program is social services and support (including pecuniary support) given to the detainee and his family. The final part of the program is an “after-care” or post-release component that uses social service provision together with security monitoring to ensure that the released individual does not fall back into terrorism. Saudi officials consider in particular three waypoints as being key in the re-socialization of the individual: getting married (or rejoining wife and family), continuing education, and rejoining the workforce. The Saudi program has seen well over 1,000 individuals passing through its halfway house component, with, according to official estimates (which are themselves disputed), a very small proportion re-offending and being designated recidivists. It is, experts agree, a very culture- and context-specific program, and its various features do not lend themselves to easy replicability in other countries.

The Saudi and Singapore models are differentiated by their cultural and societal backdrops. Singapore has a multi-ethnic, religiously plural society (with Muslims forming approximately 15 percent of the resident population). A great deal of upstream work (not immediately recognizable as countering violent extremism, CVE) takes places in Singapore with respect to community engagement programs and interfaith dialogue aimed at cementing racial tolerance and understanding. In addition, the Saudi program is of a much larger scale. But there are similarities, too: the attempt to correct misunderstandings of religious doctrine, and an “aftercare” component that seeks, through a combination of monitoring and assistance to the individual (and family), to ensure that the individual in question does not “re-radicalize”. In both these models, different government agencies are involved, as befits a holistic, multi-stakeholder approach that involves security, social, and community perspectives (Braddock 2014; Porges 2014; Lankford & Gillespie 2011).

Programs in both of these states focus on “the three Ns” that Kruglanski (2014b) has identified as necessary to deradicalization: need, narrative, and network.

Simply put, de-radicalization depends on three Ns: need, narrative and network. The first step toward de-radicalization involves recognizing the needs of jihadists, which shape their motives, beliefs and reality. Often we only see what we want to see and believe what we want to believe. Valid arguments, however strong, can be utterly unpersuasive if they run counter to our needs. The second step is to devise a narrative that acknowledges a person’s need for relevance and respect and provides a nonviolent means to address that need. That is why current de-radicalization programs in Muslim countries, or countries with significant Muslim populations, employ much more than theological arguments against violence. Programs in Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Iraq address detainees’ need for significance by providing them with vocational education, finding them jobs and, in some cases, even wives. The third step is to recognize that the social network in which militants are embedded is crucial to their radicalization — and de-radicalization. People’s attitudes and beliefs are firmly anchored in the shared reality of their group. Radicalization occurs in a social context that is shaped by family, friends and charismatic leaders. De-radicalization cannot take place in a social vacuum, either. Sophisticated de-radicalization programs such as those in Saudi Arabia or Singapore break the dynamics of militants’ groups by separating detained leaders and core members from their followers. They also make wise use of militants’ families, who are called upon to exert a moderating influence on graduating detainees, helping to prevent their slide back into extremism. (Kruglanski 2014b)

The Indonesian authorities have had to grapple with the issue of extremist detainees since October 2002 when the JI carried out the single biggest terrorist atrocity in modern Southeast Asian history, bombing Bali and leaving 202 individuals dead. Official approaches in the past decade have been loosely structured, emphasizing a “soft approach” to radicalization, including giving perks to detainees (reduced sentences, financial assistance, better incarceration conditions) in hopes detainees would cooperate and turn away from violence. Religious rehabilitation, or correcting misperceptions of the core tenets of Islam (especially governing the use of violence), has not been tried widely (Osman 2014: 223). Even for some former extremists who have been released and who would appear on the surface to have disengaged from violence in Indonesia, what appears to have happened is not “deradicalization”, or some renouncing of armed jihad in the name of protecting Islam, but rather a renegotiation of the time, place, and possibly targets for this jihad.

Recently, over 500 Indonesian militants have joined ISIS with their families. Indonesia’s approaches to extremists’ rehabilitation have been varied both in method and degree of success. Some of the initiatives are government-led, but many others are not. Many of these initiatives work with convicted, imprisoned extremists, including post-imprisonment follow-ups. While it is difficult to measure success or failure, recidivism is a concern, with one credible authority suggesting that, of 400 imprisoned militants released between 2015 and 2016, 40 percent returned to former radical networks, with some even participating in further terrorist attacks (Wright & Karmani 2016; Sapiie 2016)¹¹.

A key facet of the problem stems from the nature of incarceration. Indonesian prisons are permeable, with incarcerated militants having access to cell phones (and therefore the internet and social media) and sometimes even to their former associates (Fabi & Kapoor 2016). Consequently, radical teachings proliferate even within prisons, with some reports suggesting that “ordinary”

11. For a Western view of Indonesian efforts, see Horgan & Braddock (2010: 273-275).

criminals have been radicalized through in-prison associations (Huda & Sim 2016)¹². A small handful of key charismatic ideologues within prison are responsible for keeping the flame of virulent ideology alive in their impressionable associates (Huda & Sim 2016), nor is it uncommon for these individuals to use peer pressure to prevent their fellow inmates from joining official deradicalization programs. One study based on first-person interviews notes, “for Indonesian jihadists, a spell in prison, rather than being an intervention stage, is seen as a way station to further glory. Many leave prison not only unreformed, but also more influential in local jihadi circles” (Huda & Sim 2016).

Case Study: Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP)

One of the more promising and holistic approaches in Indonesia is Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), a small dedicated Indonesian NGO that has four programs conducted in cooperation with the Indonesian Directorate-General of Corrections:

The first is working to empower the capacity of prison officers to manage the psychological and ideological features of their relationships with extremist inmates, and the capacity of parole officers to assist former prisoners’ transitions back into society. YPP’s second program attempts to address a difficult issue: how to engage hard line supporters of IS who are self-contained and antagonistic towards group outsiders. The idea is to get cooperative terrorist inmates to work with the more hardened ideologues and militants in order to slowly soften their positions, so they may be open to further dialogue. Cooperative prisoners are trained in effective strategies to engage their cell mates, and YPP is experimenting with this initiative in two prisons: Pasir Putih on Nusakambangan Island, and Porong Prison near the East Java city of Surabaya. YPP also works directly with current and former prisoners to promote positive pathways away from old networks. Participants are taught how to develop business plans for small start-ups such as catfish farms or electronic repair businesses, and receive assistance with applying for further education while in prison. YPP practitioners believe that attempts to change prisoners’ religious and political convictions (or indeed to replace them with the state ideology) are overly ambitious and can even be counterproductive as subjects may become further entrenched when their positions are threatened... De-radicalization is rather seen as a long-term, personal process, and the small organization considers their most effective role to be providing seeds and opportunities for disengagement from the violent social networks to which the inmates belong. YPP also works closely with the families of inmates, offering support and encouraging engagement with their communities. (Sumpter 2017: 20)

DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALIZATION IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

The problem of radicalization, insurgency, and terrorism in Russia and the post-Soviet space is well documented. Radicalized individuals either direct their activities domestically or join violent jihadist groups abroad. According to the Russian Interior Ministry, as of March 2016, 3,417 Russian citizens of various ethnic origins had joined ISIS (Turovsky 2016).

In Russia’s North Caucasus, radical ideologies have thrived on unresolved ethnic and intra-confessional conflicts, heavy-handed counter-insurgency, lack of democratic channels to

12. One study that interviewed a former radical notes: “One former inmate recalled getting visits from Jemaah Islamiyah members who brought him books on suicide bombing and tried to match-make him with a woman from the network” (Huda & Sim 2016).

voice discontent, bad governance, and economic under-development. Russian security forces have traditionally employed a very hard-power approach in addressing insurgency and terrorist activities. Enforced disappearances have been a major problem (especially in Chechnya, where it is estimated that 5,000 are missing after detentions, in a population of around one million), torture is widespread, and collective punishment is applied to family members in some republics. These harsh measures have visibly contributed to radicalization.

In parallel to military and law-enforcement operations, the Russian government ran a series of amnesty programs in Chechnya in the 1990s, 2003, and 2006. The last two were personally administered by Moscow-installed Chechen leaders (Presidents Kadyrov, father and son), who negotiated with groups of fighters and gave them personal security guarantees¹³. In most cases, especially in 2003, amnesty was conditional on the former fighters joining Kadyrov's group and swearing loyalty to him. Oftentimes fighters were captured and forced under torture to switch sides. No rehabilitation or reintegration assistance was provided to them. Then part of Kadyrov forces, they were tasked with disclosing and capturing (and often killing) their former comrades. This enmeshed returnees in blood feuds, of which there was already an established tradition in Chechnya, and tied them "with blood" to their new group.

By 2009, the conflict that started as a nationalist separatist war in Chechnya transformed into a regional jihadist insurgency operating in all republics of the North Caucasus. Regional and federal authorities began to understand that heavy-handed measures alone produce more terrorists than they kill, and they began to introduce experimental methods (Russkiy Reporter 2011). In 2010, the (federal) National Anti-terrorism Committee (NAC) together with the North Caucasus republican governments tested soft-power approaches. Several regional exit programs for fighters have been undertaken under the supervision of NAC, with varying degrees of success. In two republics, they were accompanied by a series of counter-radicalization measures aimed to overcome a Sufi-Salafi intra-confessional schism that fed the armed conflict.

In the months before the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, the Russian security services cracked down on the jihadist insurgency in the North Caucasus at home and at the same time facilitated the mass exodus of radicals to Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. In the lead-up to the Sochi Olympics, most of the soft measures were temporarily rolled back, but the republican commissions aiming to facilitate the exit of fighters from the insurgency and their return to peaceful life have been revived and continue operating in three republics: Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkariya.

Central Asia

Central Asia has supplied foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq as well as Afghanistan; ISIS-affiliated Central Asians have been recently involved in terror attacks in the Ataturk Airport and the Reina Club (Turkey, 2016) as well as St Petersburg metro bombing (Russia, 2017). A number of terrorist, violent extremist organizations and outlawed Islamic parties operate in the region, which has been the target of sporadic terrorist and insurgent attacks. The numbers of foreign fighters from Central Asia identified by officials and independent experts differ significantly, anywhere from the low hundreds to 2,000-4,000. Critical scholars claim that the numbers of Central Asian foreign fighters have been significantly inflated by the authorities for political purposes. Labor migration, bad and repressive

13. hmad Kadyrov (father) was a former Chechen separatist mufti (religious leader), who swapped sides in 1999 and supported the Russian invasion. His son Ramzan was in charge of his father's paramilitary formation, which was later legalized as part of the Russian Interior Ministry. A few years after Akhmad was killed in a terrorist act in 2004, Ramzan gained control of the Chechen republic and continues to rule it, enjoying the full support of President Putin.

governance, corruption, nepotism, ethnic discrimination (especially of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan), and poverty (perceived as social injustice) are seen as the major drivers of radicalization. Recent developments in Afghanistan are also often named among key destabilization factors and as a serious potential threat, due to high concentration of militant jihadists across the border and their attempts to expand on the territory of neighboring Central Asian states. However, as of today, unlike Russia, Central Asia has no traditional frontline of conflict with militant Jihadi groups; moreover, according to various sources, the overwhelming majority of Central Asian recruits to ISIS have been radicalized in Russian territory and preferred to go to the Middle East rather than Afghanistan.

Central Asian government responses have been mainly focused on strict control of religion, attempts to promote “traditional” Islam, and police crackdowns, including on non-violent charismatic Salafi imams. In recent years, some countries have also launched soft-power and deradicalization initiatives. Tajikistan announced amnesties and has set free over 150 repentant returnees from Syria and “Salafis” who turned themselves in to police. Kazakhstan established a deradicalization center in Astana. Kyrgyzstan, the most open country of the region, has hosted a number of diverse civil society activities aimed at CVE, including raising awareness of radicalization processes, online counter-messaging, dialogue between relevant stakeholders, and community engagement. Civil society attempts to work with prisoners or build the capacity of prison officials to deradicalize former fighters and prepare them for successful reintegration have encountered problems due to denial of access to such individuals. On the other hand, a religious women’s organization, Mutakalim, quite successfully trains inmates of women’s colonies to increase their resilience to violent extremism.

Disengagement Programs: Dagestan (2010-2012, 2016-current)

In 2010, the then-president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, created a commission for the rehabilitation of fighters, which aimed at providing “legal and medical counselling; solving housing and employment problems; and, if necessary, relocating ex-insurgents and their family members” (Crisis Group Report 2012: 30). Commission members included directors of republican security and law-enforcement institutions, two ministers, the republican ombudswoman, the imam of the capital’s central mosque, and some civil society leaders. The commission convened to scrutinize each case, with officials holding long conversations with each surrendering applicant to understand the degree and trajectory of their radicalization, while the investigative authorities interrogated the returnees within the framework of criminal cases instigated against them.

The commission then ruled to either accept or reject leniency for the individual in question (referred to as an applicant), including probation sentences or closure of criminal case. In most of the cases, the returnees received leniency, and, in several cases, they were convinced to disclose large weapon caches and other important information about the insurgency.

Dagestan’s commission had been criticized for excessive publicity and for functioning as a vehicle for the self-promotion of certain officials. All its meetings were televised, with surrendering fighters having to publicly repent, condemn the insurgency, and cooperate with the investigators. After surrender, no program of rehabilitation was offered to former fighters, although sometimes their social problems would be addressed on an *ad hoc* basis. Overall, the program was a success, with only one case of recidivism between 2010 and 2012.

In early 2013, one year before the Sochi Olympics, President Putin replaced Magomedov, and the new republican leader closed the commission. Instead, the project of disengagement was transferred to the municipal level. Municipalities established their own “commissions for reconciliation and harmony”, which aimed to assist former radicals in disengaging from their activities and reintegrating into civilian life. In most of the municipalities the commissions exist on paper; however, in two or three cases, municipal commissions achieved functionality.

The most well-publicized example of a local effort to facilitate return and prevention of outflow is the Center for Countering Extremism run in cooperation with the city administration of Derbent. The center was opened in October 2014 and works with both families who want to find their loved ones in Syria and Iraq and persuade them to return home, as well as with fighters who have regretted joining violent jihadi groups and wish to return to Dagestan. The center is run by a woman who works closely with the security services and acts as a bridge between them and the families of fighters. Having struggled herself to save her own brother (eventually killed as an insurgent in a security operation in 2008) she has a unique hands-on knowledge of the process of radicalization. The center's director chats in messengers with potential returnees when they are in still Syria or Iraq, consults them on the procedures they would need to follow. She then checks their records with the FSB and informs the surrendering jihadists about their prospects in Russia. She further helps with logistics and legal procedure in close cooperation with the security services. In some cases she has also prevented outflow and helped parents stop their children at the borders. At this point however, she admits that her power ends: "I don't know how they will convince him, he has ISIS in his head", she told me referring to one of the cases when the escape of a 24-year-old man had been prevented: "I told his mother: isolate him, you have your family, your Elders, let them convene and try to convince him".

Disengagement Programs: Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria

The Ingushetia commission, established in 2011 using Dagestan's template, was probably the most successful of such initiatives. The Ingush committee kept a much lower profile than Dagestan's, working mostly through informal social networks of kinship and local communities. It never forced its applicants to publicly repent or televised its convenings if the victims were reluctant to speak.

In addition to disengagement, the Ingush republican commission focused on reintegrating former fighters who returned to Ingushetia after serving their prison terms. Usually this social integration assistance was targeted at solving employment problems, encouraging individuals to return to university, or relocating them to avoid revenge from former comrades. The commission has so far reintegrated several returnees from Syria (Caucasus Knot 2017).

The Kabardino-Balkariya commission was created in 2012, but mostly existed on paper until April 2016, when the republic got a new and very committed Minister for Countering Extremism who made some changes to membership, including the introduction of a prominent human rights figure onto the commission. Since April 2016, the commission has reviewed 16 cases, including returnees from Syria and those who planned to go but changed their mind on the way.

Existing commissions' statistics are not always reliable, and conflicting figures concerning rehabilitated fighters appear in different sources¹⁴. Most of the commissions' applicants are or were accomplices of a local insurgency rather than hardened fighters. This could be due, at least in part, to applicants' continued lack of trust in the state as well as the fact that the commissions' role

14. Before being shut down in 2013, the first commission in Dagestan had reviewed 44 applications and concluded 35 positively. According to the Ingush Security Council, over 60 people have been rehabilitated since 2011. However, a member of the Ingush commission claims that he only saw 15-20 people actually rehabilitated transparently and publicly. In May 2016, Dagestan's authorities claimed that their new mechanisms managed to reintegrate 70 fighters and accomplices in one and a half years, but there are no reliable ways to verify this information since the commission's work is no longer transparent.

has been consultative, which means that oftentimes security services have ignored their decisions. Although the commissions have gained invaluable experience, they have lacked a coherent methodology of disengagement or deradicalization.

Regardless of the challenges, the commissions have created a channel for secure, torture-free exit, accumulated unique experience, and shown that the state is ready to support exiting fighters. In a repressive authoritarian setting, these are very important achievements.

The problem of insufficient methodology in deradicalization efforts has been identified by most interlocutors in the North Caucasus. As elsewhere, clashing approaches to disengagement and deradicalization result from competing understandings of the radicalization, deradicalization and disengagement processes. The problem of a lack of an accepted definition of radicalization persists in the case of Russia too. Additionally, diagnostic tools are lacking and there is a gap between theoreticians and practitioners as well as between different generations of social workers.

Integrating Russia in the international debates on best exit and deradicalization approaches could be conducive to that state's development of more effective and humane practices, which could well deradicalize fighters rather than create new terrorists.

Radicalization/Deradicalization in Prisons

In recent years, radicalization in Russian prisons has been an increasing concern. The reported growth in numbers of radical Muslim jamaats in prisons can be explained by both the spread of radical ideologies, including ISIS, and the system of internal relations/hierarchies in the Russian penal system. Since Soviet times, Russian prisons are to a greater or lesser degree run by the so-called thief laws, an informal system of hierarchical relations and laws established by professional criminals, whereby all prisoners are divided into four castes, the elite castes (known as the “thieves”) govern the others through violence and even sexual abuse. For decades the prisons have been informally divided into “Red” and “Black” ones: in the latter, the control is executed by the prison administrations; in the former, the “thieves” control the situation while the administration limits itself to the general control of daily routines.

The growing influence of Islamic jamaats within these prisons is not purely ideological. They are the only force that is able to resist this system of informal relations, thus joining them is a way of gaining protection from the pressure both of the administration and the criminal authorities. For this reason, an increasing number of ethnic Russians and inmates of other non-Muslim origins are converting to Islam in jails. Another factor is that, since the legislation on insurgency-related crimes was toughened in 2014, the sentences for these crimes have increased. Knowing that he will spend many years behind bars, a sentenced fighter has more incentives to establish himself in the prison hierarchy, and creating his own Islamic jamaat is one channel for doing so.

Recently, experts claim that Russian prisons are turning “Green”—that is, significantly influenced by fundamentalist Islamic jamaats. According to Russian Federal Service of punishment fulfillment (FSIN) experts, Russian prisons today contain 300 jamaats that unite over 10,000 prisoners. According to estimates given to the present writer by interviewees from among former (released) inmates, some prisons in Dagestan are 80 percent “Green.” Independent research of this phenomenon is difficult, given that FSIN is a closed system that trusts only its own experts, does not give access to independent researchers, and only reluctantly grants interviews to journalists. FSIN experts oftentimes inflate the scale of the problem, to securitize policies and attract additional funding.

The toolbox of FSIN's responses to the radicalization challenge and its deradicalization activities are just starting to develop. In 2013 the authorities decided to evaluate the scale of the problem, and FSIN was tasked with creating a “preventive register of extremists” and organizing “targeted

correctional work” with them. According to the official response of FSIN to *Kommersant* newspaper in 2016, the service has 800 registered Islamic extremists. The same official document refers to two main measures aimed at “deradicalization”: *isolation* —from each other in different prisons/camps and cells — and *rehabilitation* applying the neurolinguistic psycho-correctional system SCORE.

In reality, radical Muslims are often isolated in solitary confinement and in punishment cells and can be deprived of the opportunity to work. According to FSIN experts, “deradicalization conversations” with this category of prisoners are ineffective. In 2017, the Moscow spiritual board of Muslims delivered training to personnel of the Moscow FSIN with the aim to build their capacity to diagnose Islamic radicalism and avoid inter-confessional conflicts. Prisons and camps with large Muslim populations sometimes invite imams to work with their inmates.

CVE IN NORTH AMERICA

In the United States, homegrown extremism and radicalization inspired by Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda persist. According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director Christopher Wray’s testimony before Congress in September 2017, the Bureau reportedly has over 1,000 active investigations into supporters of foreign terrorist organizations and an additional 1,000 investigations into domestic terrorist groups across all 50 states (Wray 2017). At least 300 U.S. persons have attempted to or have travelled to join extremist groups in Syria or Iraq¹⁵. Since March 2014, 159 individuals have been charged with terrorism-related activities in connection with the Islamic State (George Washington University 2018). While a near majority of that number travelled or attempted to travel overseas to join the IS, 30 percent were accused of plotting to carry out attacks on U.S. soil (George Washington University 2018).

Homegrown jihadist extremism also poses a significant terrorist threat in Canada. According to a 2017 report published by the Canadian government, there are “over 190 extremists with a nexus to Canada who are abroad and who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity” (Goodale 2017). Like many European countries, Canada is working to cope with challenges posed by people returning from extremist-controlled territory, as over 60 extremists have re-entered the country (Goodale 2017). In addition to these challenges, Canada also faces its own “homegrown” mobilization. The government assesses that Canadian extremists will increasingly prefer domestic attacks rather than travel abroad (Goodale 2017).

Mobilization dynamics in the US run parallel to, and even intersect with, Canadian radicalization and recruitment trends. Both countries face challenges posed by persons who travelled to IS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria. For example, three Canadian residents, Hamsa and Hersi Kariye, and Mahad Hirsi, were reportedly killed in Syria along with Hanad Mohallim, their American cousin who also migrated to jihadist-controlled territory (Huncar 2015). Furthermore, domestic plots like the 2014 Parliament Hill shooting in Ottawa, Canada (Nease 2015), and, more recently, the 2017 truck attack in New York City (Grinberg 2017), undoubtedly are part of the threats to these two countries.

A diverse array of individuals comprises the base of supporters sympathetic to IS objectives. In both the US and Canada, radicalization is truly a “homegrown” issue, as the vast majority of IS supporters are US citizens or legal permanent residents (George Washington University 2018).

The incidence of violent extremism and radicalization in Canada is relatively low, at least when compared to several Western European countries for instance (let alone those in Asia and the Middle East). In Canada deradicalization efforts are largely *ad hoc*. There are no known, publicly

15. Authors’ interview with Federal Bureau of Investigation officials on 24 October 2017. This number includes travellers, attempted travellers, and participants in jihadist and non-jihadist groups.

available data on numbers or success rates, and the literature that is open suggests that all attempts to undo the radicalization process are highly localized and applied to very small data sets (often single individuals). It is thus not possible to determine, at this point, whether these approaches work (the data sets are far too small, and there is a distinct lack of longitudinal study). Nevertheless, there are a few initiatives that could include some form of deradicalization. An example is the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV), a Montreal-based centre that offers both a hotline and a number of trained specialists to deal with individuals heading down the path of violent extremism. The CPRLV is best seen as an early intervention model. Another group is run by Navaid Aziz, who sees steering youth away from radical groups “as a civic, moral, and religious duty”.

A youth counsellor to young people living in Calgary, Alberta, he runs a mentorship group with his wife for young people in their local community. “Our focus is on keeping kids safe from the dangers that exist out there, whether they be gangs, drugs, or other forms of violence,” Aziz says. “Protecting them from radicalism is a natural extension of that.” As part of the mentorship program, which runs out of a local mosque where Aziz is an instructor, young people receive lessons on social justice and take part in community volunteer activities intended to provide a sense of purpose and responsibility. “We have study sessions where we focus on critical thinking and teaching young people the consequences of their actions. We also look at the lives of people in the past who confronted situations of injustice without resorting to violence, like Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and historical figures from Islam,” he says. “The purpose of all this is to show young people they are part of something greater than themselves. We do volunteer work in the broader community, particularly with senior citizens, and the kids start feeling like their lives are part of something big and meaningful”. (Hussain 2016)

CVE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn of Africa continues to present a great opportunity for expanding deradicalization studies not only because of the peace and security context in that region, but also for the approaches currently being adopted in dealing with the threat of violent extremism, radicalization, and terrorism exported through al-Shabaab in lawless Somalia. Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have all contributed boot soldiers under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Security Cooperation Framework supporting the African Union in stabilizing Somalia through the Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) to “significantly degrade the growing threat posed by al-Shabaab” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations 2018).

The context in this region is complex, marked by socio-economic and political challenges facing the youth in many countries in the Horn of Africa, challenges that continue to cripple counterterrorism interventions locally. Youth demographics, characterized by a surge of unemployed youth who are increasingly becoming candidates for radicalization and recruitment into terror groupings is a potential security threat. Several cases of youth crossing the border into Somalia from countries like Kenya have been well documented (Ogenga 2016a; 2016b). This includes incidences of young women (Jihadi Brides) who have been arrested along the Kenyan-Somalia border while attempting to sneak into Somalia to join al-Shabaab fighters. Similarly, there is an increasing phenomenon of al-Shabaab returnees, young men and women returning from Somalia to Kenya as disengaged combatants after failing to benefit from the promise derived out of joining al-Shabaab as proclaimed

by the terror group through mass media propaganda.

Kenya's amnesty program has faced several challenges that are opening a window for possibilities of inspecting deradicalization trends inherent in al-Shabaab returnees. Could al-Shabaab returnees be associated with the perceived diminishing of the attraction of its ideology among potential recruits? Is the ideology facing a backlash among youth in countries like Kenya? Could this be a good premise to begin appraising and tracking deradicalization trends in the Horn of Africa, with the aim of building on the scarce literature on deradicalization in the continent and globally? How can different stakeholders respond to questions of youth deradicalization through trends visible in disengaged combatants and returning Jihadists, as evidenced in countries like Kenya, in a more useful and sustainable manner?

It is important to note that a holistic approach to "targeted interventions" that involves multiple stakeholders needs to be adopted. It is not useful to assume that government alone bears the greatest responsibility for peace and security, especially given the recent historical understanding that has called some government interventions into question. The government of Kenya, for example, has been accused of heavy handedness in its response to radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism. Kenya initially sent troops to Somalia after a series of tourist abductions that threatened to affect the tourism industry. The country, then under Mwai Kibaki, invaded Somalia with the blessing of Mogadishu to pursue al-Shabaab. Kenya later negotiated with the UN for Kenyan Defence Forces to be part of AMISOM troops. Locally, Kenya instituted Operation Uslama Watch or Security Watch, which is an example of the government's material interventions that have drawn criticisms from different sections of the counterterrorism community. The operation has been criticized by many observers as discriminatory and targeted at Kenyans of Somali origin and, in many instances, for not being compliant with gender and human rights. Such operations that explicate governments' preferences for military interventions have been accused of human rights abuses characterized by arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances of suspected terrorists, abuses that have, in a sense, contributed to further radicalization.

In a key White House Report (White House 2017) published recently, the United States argues that "Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory wherein Somalia has served as a paradigmatic world example of state failure, warlord-ism and corruption" echoing the "tailored engagement strategy" employed by the US since 2007 to deal with the al-Shabaab threat. The strategy involves "a small number of US special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, providing intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations" (Jones *et al.* 2016). Even though the report concludes that the "tailored engagement strategy" was key in degrading the principal source of terror threat, it concedes that the approach cannot completely eradicate terrorism. So what kind of interventions do we need in the Horn of Africa going forward?

There is a need to rethink the best approaches of countering extremism, radicalization, and terrorism in the Horn of Africa by exploiting opportunities presented by deradicalization trends found in amnesty program in countries like Kenya, where individuals are given the opportunity to surrender to the state for rehabilitation, mentoring, counseling, and reintegration. One of the greatest challenges facing such programs has been the fact that rehabilitation happens in a confined prison-like institutional context and therefore risks being perceived by potential deradicalization candidates as yet another round of incarceration. This in turn increases the stigma associated with disclosure and amnesty and works against the program¹⁶. This subsection therefore highlights the

16. In 2011, the government of Kenya issued an amnesty for al-Shabaab returnees in a move targeted at deradicalization as part of state efforts of instituting a national deradicalization program. However, the program is currently burdened by the failure of reintegration. See Kazungu (2016).

need to fully engage all stakeholders from the grassroots community level and upwards. It argues that media that are owned, managed, and supported by the community stand the best chances of initiating a bottom-up supportive infra-structure that links government interventions, such as reintegration programs, with community members for ownership and participation in a post-amnesty scenario in countries like Kenya.

CONCLUSION

How should countries deal with, or reintegrate, individuals who have been led by extreme ideology to the path of violence? Different programs, policies, CVE models, and deradicalization programs have been tried by way of an answer, with different and often controversial results. There have, however, been some gains in our knowledge. In the past two decades, our understanding of what makes individuals tip over into pathways of violence has progressed to some degree. The emerging consensus is that there is no one pathway to radicalization and not only one profile, but a myriad of factors all coming together in quite unpredictable ways.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Problematic of Notions and Ethical Limits of “Deradicalization”

The terms “radicalization” and, following on, “deradicalization” remain problematic. “Deradicalization” has been criticized in some quarters because it implies an intervention directed at the vision of the person with the aim of changing his/her ideas. As shown by practice, this is difficult, if not impossible, and it also raises doubts of a moral and legal order and leads us to ask, what are the ethical limits of intervention? Given that radicalization means so many different things, and that in certain cultures, contexts, or historical periods “radicals” have positively impacted societies, and indeed have helped to shape the future of societies, it would be foolhardy to attempt to identify a deradicalization “prescription” that attempts to “treat” radicalization. What this chapter has attempted to suggest is not the idea that radicalization must be removed, but that it is in some cases a linked prelude to violence, and it is *this* that needs to be examined more closely by the state, its practitioners, academics, and experts alike. Deradicalization can not and should not replace conflict resolution; nor would it be advisable for deradicalization programs to attempt to solve some of the larger the macro factors that seed conflict in society.

2. The Importance of the Context

The preceding pages, which capture the research and fieldwork of Working Group members, illustrate how and why context is critical. Each “radicalization” process, or movement, fits in a specific context and cannot be understood without it. As a prelude or precursor to violence, radicalization (political/ideological violence) has different origins, causes, drivers, and meanings, according to local/national context. Contributory factors that cannot be ignored might include state-sponsored violence, violation of human rights, corruption, historical relations between majority and minorities etc.

It will be readily apparent that what might well work in one location would not work in other contexts and locations for a whole host of reasons. In each country or region, radicalization (and consequently deradicalization) cannot be understood without taking into account local or national dynamics. For instance in Singapore, religious counseling and rehabilitation is used with radicalized individuals under detention, with great success, but when forms of rehabilitation have been attempted in neighboring countries (Indonesia, for example) the effort has been less successful. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to try this approach in a country like France, for historical

and cultural reasons, not least the relation between religion and state. As another example, the Aarhus model is strictly linked to Danish social tradition, and any attempt to reproduce it in other countries has faced many difficulties, and has sometimes just failed.

Understanding specificities and peculiarities of location and circumstance matters a great deal. The importance of empowering local authorities and communities, is a lesson that could be drawn from the experiences of cities such as Aarhus (Denmark), and Vilvoorde and Mechelen (Belgium). Therefore, there is no easy answer to the vexed question of who should take the lead in deradicalization—Governments? NGOs and civil society? Trusted actors with credible voices? Perhaps it is best in the absence of agreement to settle on this: interventions must be led by the people who best understand not only the context and local issues but also (ideally) the people for whom the interventions are designed.

At the very least, we need to embed ourselves with and within actual communities, to understand which approaches may work, fail, or backfire. A necessary focus of this effort must be youth, who form the bulk of today's extremist recruits and tomorrow's most vulnerable populations. Volunteers for Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and many extreme nationalist groups are often youth in transitional stages in their lives—immigrants, students, people between jobs and before finding their mates. Having left their homes, they seek new families of friends and fellow travellers to find purpose and significance. Ability to understand the realities facing young people will determine whether the transnational scourge of violent extremism continues, abates, or surges. (Atran *et al.* 2017)

3. Between “Deradicalization” and “Disengagement”

Radicalization processes appear to be a complex combination of personal fragilities, multiple pathways, and collective grievances or ideas. Many of the programs considered in this chapter seem to have come up against the realization that, since personal pathways are diverse, an approach whereby the person involved is seen as an individual, not just as a member of a (hostile) group, is required. This is not to say collective issues and circumstances are unimportant. It is just that the *desideratum* of combining a collective work that takes into consideration the social and political dimensions of radicalization with an individual one taking into consideration personal pathways is something that seems, for the time being at least, to be elusive.

“Deradicalization” and “disengagement” are likely to remain entangled—and controversial—for some time to come. It does appear, however, that, in the absence of an agreed standard of successful deradicalization, many countries seem to be more prepared to emphasize disengagement. Unlike deradicalization, disengagement seems to encounter fewer ethical roadblocks and is more readily observed. Disengagement implies a change in observable behaviour; deradicalization implies a change in less observable attitudes and convictions.

Generalizations are difficult to attempt when comparing what has been tried in different countries and regions. Models and practices overlap in many cases, but differences still seem to be readily discernible. For instance, one might speak of differences between more individualistic approaches in Europe and communitarian ones in Africa, and with respect to ideological re-education and counter-discourse in some parts of Asia and the Middle East. In the Europe context, one also encounters approaches more grounded in psychological/social/political practice (e.g., the “individualistic” approach, based on social and psychological rehabilitation, as in Aarhus in Denmark).

There is also the fraught question of whether deradicalization is a collective or a personal process, or both. The question is germane to the critical issues concerning evaluation within deradicalization/disengagement programs. Hard experience has shown that some programs devised to

deradicalize or disengage may probably work for some, but that for those who have already gone deep into violent acts (i.e., actually committing them), they are often useless. Evaluation can pave the way for an understanding of the continuing danger to society that some detainees may (or may not) pose. In particular, it allows those involved in such programs to make the distinction between those who seem to be able to reintegrate into the society and those for whom the programs devised will probably not succeed.

4. Reintegration and Security: An Impossible Compromise

Most important rehabilitation programs share in common the facet of offering the perspective of reintegration into society, or reconnecting the individual in question to the society. Theological or ideological discussions can sometimes have their uses (the Singapore case study provides one example), but, in many cases, it is the emotional dimension of reconnection that is paramount.

It is important to identify channels that can gain a person's trust and help them develop critical thinking, whether it takes the form of a willingness to (re)engage with aspects of mainstream society in the real world or an informed, reasoned eye when viewing extremist propaganda online. The channels in question can be youth and social workers, a prevention official, an imam, a friend, a former extremist—depending upon the specific context and individual involved. The actor in question can act as a credible bridge-builder between communities, and between communities and authorities.

These points will be debated and will continue to excite controversy for years to come. One thing seems certain, however. Ways must be found to allow for continual sharing of best practices across theatres and regions and among a networked community of practitioners, in unforced and unartificial sharing environments that involve multiple stakeholders and see diverse viewpoints freely aired (e.g., those of security experts, counsellors, religious authorities, civil society leaders, kin groups and friends, psychologists, and even marketing and branding consultants). Ways must be found, too, to incorporate the views and experiences of serving security and intelligence professionals. Without this input, the community of experts dealing with these issues will be severely hampered: without the requisite sharing of security services perspectives, any posited “solutions” risk being simply theoretical shots in the dark that simply treat symptoms. What is needed instead is better communication to understand the concerns and experiences of all participants and stakeholders in the process. Perhaps then we will be making real progress.

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CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3

Between Salafism, Sectarianism and Violence:
The New Faces of Radicalization

Leader: Mohamed-Ali Adraoui

Contributors: Samir Amghar, Fabio Merone, Marc Sageman, Dominique Thomas

SALAFISM AS AN INCUBATOR OF VIOLENCE? UNTANGLING THE STRANDS

Considering the relationship between Salafism, sectarianism, and violence in the context of transnational and globalized jihadist violence brings us back to the issue faced by many interested parties (including politicians, academics, journalists, and religious actors): the powerful interaction between religious fundamentalism, the creation of a sectarian and radical fantasy, and the legitimization of a violent ethic which feeds a particular conception of jihad requiring battle against any person or group perceived as an enemy of Islam.

According to this reasoning, Salafism causes sectarian positioning in that it divides a group seen as authentic from other communities which are discredited for their religious beliefs¹ and sometimes presented as political enemies and military targets. Can these causalities be verified by an analysis of several countries located in Europe, the Middle East, the Maghreb and the Indian sub-continent? What links can be observed among Salafism, religious radicalism, and political violence? Should we validate the theory of causality, or at the very least a high degree of ideological, sociological, and political porosity between Salafist socialization and jihadist involvement?

THE LOGIC OF SALAFISM: MAKE ISLAM GREAT AGAIN!

What is Salafism?

“Salafism” is a religious framework whose *raison d’être* can be located in its etymology and epistemology. It is based on a “restorative” conception of Islam, centred on the idea that the “authentic” way of being Muslim was lost shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of faithful believers. The history of Muslim societies, in spite of undeniable developments over epochs, is first and foremost a series of religious cycles. This means that individuals within each age must return to the first and original version of the faith, religious practice, and way of behaving in society. These modes are found among the *Salaf Salih*, an Arabic expression referring to the Ancient or Virtuous Ancestors, i.e. the members of the very first generations of the Muslim community (*al-Umma*). Since its birth, Islam has given rise to different ways of identifying the legacy of Muhammad, Seal of Prophets and, as such, the final Messenger able to claim he bears the Truth revealed. After Muhammad passed away, most Islamic traditions have not been

1. Sectarianism is indeed a concept which originated in the world of religion, initially to describe the behaviour and vision of Christian groups which detach themselves from the majority in order to claim a monopoly on truth and the sense of faith. From this perspective, belonging to a particular group and affiliation with the faith are presented as identical and exclusive questions (Weiss, 2015).

able to boast of compliance with his teachings, nor those of the people (men and women) who followed and are considered as *Salaf Salih*², the source of knowledge or truth, as Tradition has designated them over the centuries.

Islam as many believers think of it today has never been as pure as it was in the beginning. In Salafism this means any revivalist undertaking is founded in the rediscovery of this foundational and paradigmatic era, which represents the return to an objective form of orthodoxy in belief, religious practices, and social relations. The question then becomes how to accomplish this quest for a renaissance of religion and identity which defines Salafism. This raises the issue of how to reform Islam (i.e. a faith, a practice, and a civilization) as it is practised by the believers. The road of Islam is clearly mapped out: it is a question of taking a route which was originally intended without “straying” down “deviant” paths that could lead to the end of Islam.

Although centuries of exegesis have in actuality given rise to various forms of Salafism, ranging from the most radical intransigence to the most rational modernism, in the contemporary era the Salafist framework is most often characterized by exclusivist and reformist movements of a consciously fundamentalist nature. On an individual level these most often result in an antagonistic relationship with the rest of the world, and on a collective level they result in a cognitive and politically violent questioning of ideas and practices which these readings of the religious corpus aim to discredit.

Contemporary Reconfigurations and Possible Porosity

The shift from what is essentially a critique to a more sociological analysis makes it possible, in the contemporary era, to shed light on the plural and often competing ways in which this revival is being put into practice. This results in the need for different ways of classifying Salafism. These groups do indeed share a puritanical vision, more specifically an epistemology based on imitation of the *Salaf Salih*, with well-defined conceptual and practical outcomes (see the discussion below). Nevertheless, there are undeniable differences in terms of both the societal model advocated and the strategies proposed to achieve it.

Thus a number of typologies have been established in recent years to highlight the similarities and differences in contemporary understandings of Salafism. The most famous of these is certainly that of Quintan Wiktorowicz (2006), whose main contribution is to distinguish the present forms of Salafism by their political modalities, with a particular focus on the issue of violence, political activism and power. It is again clear that, although all these conceptualizations of the necessary return to the Wise Ancient Ones are founded on defending a radical definition of God’s uniqueness (*al-Tawhid*), fighting “innovation” (*al-Bid’a*) in terms of religion, and the principle of Loyalty and Disavowal (*al-Wala wal-Bara*)³, profound disagreements have arisen regarding the substance of these ideas. This has fragmented the contemporary Salafist framework, yet also given rise to ideological and sociological porosity between the different groups demanding this revival.

Wiktorowicz’s typology identifies three forms of Salafism. The first is consciously violent and is quasi-systematic in its passionate and insurrectionist reading of the concept of jihad. It echoes the dynamics of compliance with the spirit and letter of the Muslim religion (along with discussion of

2. The term Salaf comes from the root s-l-f, referring to ancestry and thus to the original believers. The word Salih is derived from the root s-l-h, which recalls moral virtue, piety and excellence. In the wake of the Salaf Salih (the Prophet’s Companions and the two generations which succeeded them), the salafi(st)s are the faithful who choose to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors. The Salaf Salih inspire followers through the moral and societal traces (al-Athar) they left behind. As part of the most orthodox Sunnism, their example is the third source of inspiration after the Koran (al-Quran) (word of God uncreated) and Muhammad (al-Sunna).

3. Examples of this include the Egyptian Party of Light and the Tunisian Mercy Party.

what that may be). Manifested in movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, this vision rejects politics in the institutional sense of the word (political parties, elections, etc.) in favour of a violent strategy for constructing a new order (the Caliphate, which is in fact old in the eyes of the jihadists). This order is intended to combine territorially and politically the geographical spaces over which the *Umma* is spread. The second form, on the other hand shares the same objective of re-establishing exclusive sovereignty for all Muslims, but through a national rather than a transnational political ethic. This legitimizes electoral competition where possible and the establishment of political parties⁴.

The third version defends a relationship of both distrust of and subordination to politics (*de facto* or legal). Muslims must concentrate on moving society toward increased compliance with religious requirements on purely religious grounds, without any political activism. The fundamentalist approach called for by these “quietist” Salafists (thus differentiating them from the “jihadist” first group and the “political” or “participationist” second) nevertheless takes into account a major constraint: the preservation of the social order, without which there would be no safety or religious practice for the *Umma*. Because of this, any regime which does not explicitly reject Islam (where the religion is a majority) must be obeyed. In a minority context, the most commonly used “orthodox” practice is “healthy migration” (*al-Hijra*), the purpose of which is to morally and physically separate the believing party from a negative environment for Islam, where there is a serious risk of perversion or even moral ruin.

The high visibility and undeniable influence of Salafist thinking and norms in many societies during recent years have prompted us to highlight another typological form. This form takes into account the contemporary phenomena of possible political radicalization and even violence. On the one hand, due to the diversification of ways of following Salafism, today it is necessary to focus on general Salafist sensibilities rather than clearly identifiable movements. On the other hand, due to the intense debates over materials referring to the appropriate way of restoring Islam “to its origins”, we can identify a phenomenon of ideological dilution of the revivalist meta-goal in the narrative of certain groups. The structuring discourse of these groups remains a return to the origins, but in their daily actions they identify themselves above all through a dynamic of opposition to the surrounding system, removed from all exegetic or interpretative work regarding the nature of the ideal Islamic society and the proper means of achieving it. Finally, as a result of the rise of a virtual universe in which deterritorialized identities and mobilizations are carried out in the context of broad activism without a specific political agenda (unlike the Islamic State, which has not only advocated but put into practice the Caliphate model), other communities claiming the Salafist way of life and reference points (clerics, concepts, etc.) have gained notoriety. If, in the long term, the search for exclusive political sovereignty for all Muslims is sought, it is not through conquest but rather through infiltrating the public sphere (in this case, virtual) which characterizes this mode of Salafism. All these dynamics have thus strengthened Salafism as a symbol of rupture with and opposition to the social and political environment. This has resulted in a dilution of the Salafist framework, in that it is now difficult to identify movements with a clear agenda and strategy. At the global level, Salafism has become a language of opposition rather than representing a homogeneous ideological offering.

Our attempt at a typology therefore consists in differentiating three Salafist modalities in relation to the political order. An objective analysis of these puritanical communities in the predominantly Muslim world, but also elsewhere (Western societies, etc.), must acknowledge their determination to radically alter the social order towards ever greater moral, identity-based, and judicial adherence to the Islamic standard, understood from a fundamentalist perspective. However, beyond

4. Interview with Z., Algeria, July 2001.

interpretative and exegetic divergences, the relationship with the political order is what determines the main differences between the Salafist communities which have expanded for several decades through the Arab world and beyond. Thus, three ways of understanding this return to the origins of Islam must be highlighted, due to the dilution of the ideological content implied by the use of Salafist rhetoric and symbols, and the diversification of current movements laying claim to this revivalist puritanism.

First of all, it is important to emphasize the existence of a preservationist Salafism, of which the stated objective is to maintain a political order without open protest. This mode of understanding actively seeks the conservation of a regime, state, government, or system, including by a conscious alliance with power, as observed in the highest echelons of the Saudi state for several decades. In effect, clerics and princes govern the country as part of a politically targeted Salafism. The goal is to maintain the religious identity of society, without this leading to legitimate militancy for believers who are neither clerics nor princes. Politics are an affair of the duopoly, beyond which neither challenge nor protest is theoretically justified. In this case the defence of Islam is top-down, but preservationist Salafism can also be done bottom-up in the case of the faithful who preach a distancing from militancy. This preaching is done outside the official political sphere, but in collaboration with it if the Muslim state whose authority they accept is threatened. In this case, the political establishment promotes imams, university lecturers, and preachers calling for the proscription of challenges to the ruling power.

Another Salafism seen today is that of transformation, whether through violence or political participation. The main difference here is that the place of power is thought to be potentially available through an insurrectional or democratic process in which the power holder could be forced out. Here, we identify an ethic of change from the top. Jihadist and participationist Salafists preach with the intention of socializing the faithful in an ideology of challenging the powers-that-be, although the strategy advocated for doing so diverges radically between the two.

Finally there is a Salafism of subversion, wherein political power is not a matter of priority. Rather this is a social, cultural, and religious movement whose objective is visibility in the public sphere through infiltration. Tunisia, with certain student movements after the 2011 revolution or certain European countries (Belgium with Sharia4Belgium, the United Kingdom with Sharia4UK, France with Forsane al-Izza...) offer interesting cases of this disruptive and factious Salafism wherein it is not necessarily the institutions which are targeted but rather a moral and symbolic order. Here, preaching in the purely religious sense is abandoned in order to achieve public visibility which is militant but not necessarily aimed at seeking power. The objective, despite the slogans, seems to be more to polarize opposing camps than to mobilize around a common political project.

Ideological similarities exist between the different communities sharing all or part of the contemporary Salafist imaginary and belonging to one of these three categories. However, certain dynamics of both opposition and porosity have emerged as these groups become more important and come into conflict in order to assert their particular visions of Salafism. The main question today concerns the links between moral, cognitive, and identity-based radicalization on the one hand, and political, military, and violent radicalization on the other. If the overwhelming majority of Salafist communities in many countries do not fall within the scope of an ideological or religious doctrine of transformation through violence, can we say confidently that the difference between them is of degree and not of nature?

The state of research in this area is first and foremost distinguished by a lack of work carried out on a large scale (whether in a majority or minority Muslim context) regarding the impact of Salafist socialization on the transition to jihadism. Nevertheless, researchers have published detailed studies of specific geographical and sociological areas, which bring to the current state of understanding important context for the potential existence of a mechanical causality between

identification with Salafism and jihadist engagement. It appears that, despite some exceptions, there is now a phenomenon of separation between the former and the latter. Jihadism results above all from the politicization of a social identity which perceives itself to be under attack, one of the outcomes of which will be an attraction to fundamentalist Islam. Interest in the Salafist imaginary does not allow for the identification of clear sociological porosity between socialization within a Salafism community and entry into a violent group or individual commitment to terrorist action carried out alone.

THE LOGIC OF JIHADISM: MUSLIM LIVES MATTER!

Explaining Marc Sageman's Theory of Turning to Political Violence

The title of our chapter implies a new face of radicalization: from Salafism to sectarianism to violence. Is this suggestion empirically supported? We leave the explanation and definition of the word "radicalization" to another research group. In the following section, we focus on turning to political violence (*passage à l'acte*), which is the major theme of the International Panel on Exiting Violence. The process of turning to political violence described below is based on an empirical analysis of 34 campaigns of political violence, spanning four continents and more than two centuries (Sageman 2017).

The first step in the process is a politicization of one's social identity in contrast to the state and/or society. This emerges from a grievance that divides the world into two mutually exclusive groups on either side of the grievance. State intervention in the negotiations about the grievance politicizes the aggrieved group. The collection of people with this politicized social identity forms an imagined political protest community. Over time, this community becomes a counter-culture, with its own lifestyle, discourse, symbols, and politics. Islam, and in this case Salafism, can be a constitutive part of each community member's social identity. This community is still non-violent, but may become violent under three conditions.

The first is an escalation of conflict between this community and the state. This leads to increasing hostilities between the two parties, with a shift to extremity on both sides. Concurrent with this escalation is a cumulative radicalization of discourse, with war metaphors used to describe the nature of the conflict. It is this violent speech rather than extremist ideology that is the important factor in further radicalization of the conflict. This violent discourse decreases the threshold of violence.

The second condition is a disillusionment with legal means of redress of the grievance. At this stage, most people in the political protest community exit from political activity. However, a few, the most dedicated and loyal to the community, redouble their efforts on behalf of the community.

The third condition is moral outrage at egregious state aggression against one's imagined community. This can take the form of the murder or the unfair punishment of a comrade, threats of eradication of the community, or insults to a core symbol of the group's social identity (such as the defamation of the Prophet).

At this point, a few members of this imagined community volunteer as soldiers to protect their group. In other words, they acquire a martial social identity, and soldiers kill on behalf of their community. This new "bunch of violent guys" grow to believe that they are the avant-garde of a large challenge to state sovereignty and society in general. At this stage, political violence explodes onto the political scene.

In this general process of radicalization, which holds for any political group and ideology, Salafism is just a component of the social identity of the members of this imagined political protest community that is still non-violent but that, under the three conditions outlined above, may turn to

political violence.

Muslim Lives Matter (in life)

Algeria

In Algeria, the Islamic Army's shift toward political violence is the product of a religious sectarianism that does not come exclusively from the doctrinal framework of Salafism. It is above all the result of the exclusion by the Algerian regime of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) from politics, following the cessation of the electoral process, and equally of the forceful and political repression of its members. Many interviews with militants from the Islamic Salvation Army (ISA), the armed wing of the ISF, confirm that the repressive policies of Algerian authorities (house arrest, incarceration, etc.) were the source of their violent radicalization. A former emir of the ISA explains, "I went to an internment camp in the desert. I was released but still threatened by the police. So I knew I was going to die and be killed. I'd been insulted. I was living with injustice so, if I had to die, better to die with weapons in hand and I decided to join the underground"⁵.

Faced with this situation, the ISA felt that it was now impossible to express its political positions except through violence. According to ISA officials, they targeted the institutions and representatives of the Algerian state whom they considered to be accomplices of a tyrannical power (*at-Taghut*). Soldiers, gendarmes and police officers were killed or murdered during ISA military operations. Despite these violent actions, this revolutionary organization enjoyed popular support. This support ended the moment the Armed Islamic Group (AIG) explicitly claimed Salafism, opting for total violence and ceasing to differentiate between representatives of the state and civilians. As such, the AIG criticized the ISA for its political moderation and its desire to spare the Algerian population, and even considered the group an accomplice of the Algerian state. According to more and more sources, because the AIG was infiltrated by state representatives, it responded to the state strategy of attacking the entire jihadist opposition, even the most "moderate". According to many witnesses, it was the ISA which rushed to defend villages threatened by the extreme violence of the AIG. However, the various massacres of civilians of course marginalized the AIG, but also had a ripple effect of marginalizing the ISA.

Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia

Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) is a radical Salafist organization which was founded in April 2011 and outlawed in August 2013. During its brief existence, it was able to give voice to a larger *Salafi Jama'a* (Salafist constituency), which was itself the product of the post-revolutionary politics of contention (Merone 2017).

After the 14 January 2011 Tunisian revolution (*al-Thawra*), there was a widespread expectation of political and social change. A new faction of young radicals emerged, but the post-revolutionary political process frustrated their expectations. In particular, the disenfranchised youth in most of the urban marginal areas of the country did not participate in formal and institutional politics, whether this meant participation in election or engagement in parties or formal associations. Salafist radical ideology shaped this faction. Groups of young people began to transform their social identity with reference to special Salafist groups. For each local area where this phenomenon developed, the *Awlad al-Huma* (the guys of the city/neighbourhood) became a *Firqat an-Najiya* or *Ta'ifa al-Mansura*

5. According to the United Nations working group on the use of mercenaries, the number would be around 5.500-6000 (United Nations, 2015).

(the saved or victorious group), emphasizing their identity as a special group. If religion as such was empowering the inner group identity, the relationship with outsiders was potentially a conflictual one. Most of the outsiders were those living in other areas of the city, and in particular the better off. The “others” were identified as the “haves” as opposed to the “have-nots”. The process of identity formation was also represented in group activities such as football games, picnics in the mountains, or religious meetings.

AST as an organization was formed by a small group of former jihadists who came out of prison after the general amnesty in February 2011. They were the vanguard of a *Salafi Jama'a*, a larger social group that developed in an environment where political and social contention was “translated” into Salafization. This group created an organization that was officially set up in April 2011 (Gartenstein-Ross, 2013). Throughout 2011 and 2012, the leadership of the group tried to create a new Salafist organization out of this new social and religious participation. Because of the post-revolutionary environment of freedom, the organization attempted to build a new idea of what it meant to be a Salafist-jihadist in a liberal environment, whereby jihadists were not meant to use violence to change society, focusing on other means instead. With this in mind, a process of organization building began. Local groups of empowered youth changed into quasi-formal local committees linked to charismatic sheikhs, who became cadres of the organization. This process, however, was interrupted by an escalation in the confrontation with the state. In 2013 two political assassinations created a general climate of insecurity in Tunisia, and the country clearly went through a rapid process of political and social polarization between pro-Islamists and anti-Islamists, with the latter placing Nahda, the moderate party that had won the October 2011 elections, with the rest of the Salafist radical landscape. In May 2013, AST wanted to organize its third congress in Kairouan, but the police decided that the time for toleration was over and prevented the event by force. The tension between the Salafist groups and the state escalated further and tensions remained high until the Egypt military coup against the elected Islamist president Morsi, which came as a warning for Nahda. That party decided to follow the Interior Minister’s decision to outlaw the group in July 2013 and cut its links with AST, firmly committing instead to democratization.

After the summer of 2013, Nahda and the nationalist party Nidaa Tunis came to an agreement on how to take Tunisia fully toward liberal democracy within a larger process of national unity that included also unions, professional associations, and several human rights groups. In 2014 and 2015, the Minister of Interior launched a widespread campaign against all Islamist public activities under the label of “war against terrorism”. As a response to this campaign, the large Salafist radical *jama'a* became a mass of potential recruits for armed jihad. The leader of AST himself declared that the time for peaceful preaching had ended in the face of the state’s decision. Thus, some Tunisians became one of the most numerous groups of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, while others decided to take on the Tunisian state, whether through a Salafist guerrilla force or through targeted attacks against foreign civilians (the Bardo Museum attack in March 2015 and the attack in Soussa in June of the same year).

Salafism and the Struggle for Power in Libya

The configuration of Ansar al-Sharia’s Salafist jihadist movement in Libya (ASL) was symptomatic of the chaotic militant landscape of the country after several months of struggles to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. ASL immediately presented itself as an armed revolutionary militia, carrying out the activities of preaching, social actions, and armed protection of the population. The experience in towns like Benghazi and Derna perfectly illustrates these roles. ASL appeared in Cyrenaica (in Benghazi and Derna) in 2012 using the same methods as those seen in Tunisia (social action, charitable association) but also relying on an armed structure, which is characteristic

of the Libyan political landscape and a determinant element of ASL.

ASL is made up of former liberated opponents who took part in clashes in 2011, and of a generation of veteran former jihadists from the Afghan (1990) and Iraqi (2003) fronts. As in Yemen (see below), Libyan fragmentations have had a profound impact on the evolution of the organization, preventing its dissociation from violent action. IS's proclamation of the Caliphate in the Levant in June 2014 both forged allegiances and created dissidence in ASL in the cities of Derna, Ajdabiya, and Sirte in September 2014. In November 2014, a military offensive was triggered by militants in Marshal Haftar's camp in Cyrenaica, whose objective was to eliminate the main Islamist forces from the Libyan political field. This led to ASL incorporating Islamic jihadist coalitions that had formed in reaction (a form of counter-violence) the same year in Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabiya. On the other hand, Salafism also served the interests of Marshal Haftar, who relied on other Salafist armed militants.

From summer 2014, this component intervened in different armed offensives which took place in Libya, both to remove ASL partisans in Cyrenaica and to support struggles in 2016 to liberate the coastline in Sirte, which had been under the control of IS militants since spring 2015. These factions, which were co-opted by the state, were followers of the legal Wahhabist current, strongly inspired by the influential Saudi preacher Al-Madkhali. Following in the footsteps of Yemen, Salafism in Libya has been subjected to a struggle for influence, and it has been co-opted by certain state actors to legitimize their power as well as being used by the jihadist current as an ideological norm.

Yemen, Jihadists Adapted to Local Realities

Yemen's repeated political crises over the past twenty years have provided opportunities for the local jihadist movement known as Al-Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) or Ansar al-Sharia Yemen (ASY). The jihadist organization is particularly well suited to the reality of Yemeni society's fragmentation. AQAP first established a unifying discourse by erasing the national, regional, and tribal differences present in this southern part of the peninsula. Founded in 2003 in Saudi territory and then relocated to Yemen beginning in 2009, AQAP has never built social barriers between its militants, whether they be Saudi or Yemeni. While in general the social and economic status of Yemenis has remained far lower than that of the Saudis, this dynamic has always been absent from the governing structure of AQAP. Influential roles have also been assigned to people from tribes or regions of lesser influence, incorporating local features and explaining the ties established with local tribal chiefs. Finally, the jihadist movement has relied on a militant narrative which is specifically Yemeni. This is linked to a sense of exaltation and to the messianism of prophetic speech centered on Yemen, particularly in the Aden Abyan region. This has always been an important symbolic dimension in expanding the social base of AQAP in the south of the country.

The consideration of Yemeni political crises as part of the jihadist agenda remains the other central element which explains the local presence of AQAP. Opposition to regimes, whether linked to former president Ali Saleh's supporters, to the Houthi rebels of the Zaydi minority, or to the southern and tribal factions, remains a factor in emancipation for Yemeni jihadists. For example, support given to the populations in the south, in the provinces of Abyan, Shabwa and Hadramawt, coincides with the loss of influence of the socialist ideas of the former South Yemen. Jihadists have been able to benefit from a context of greater social malaise in this region, which is a source of protest against the authorities in Sanaa. In the north, the strategy has been similar since 2010. The jihadist organization legitimized its attacks on the Zaydi Shiite minority (Houthis) by characterizing them as defending the Sunni population. AQAP thus affirmed its desire to replace both the Yemeni and Saudi authorities, who were unable to stem the inexorable Houthi push that would bring that militia into the country's capital in 2015.

The Syrian Conflict: From a Popular Uprising to an Islamist Confrontation

Contrary to the propaganda circulated by the highest Syrian authorities beginning in March 2011, in which they raised the spectre of “terrorist groups”, “Islamists”, and “Salafists”, the Syrian protest movement initially had nothing to do with religion, although it was imbued with relatively reserved Islamic sensibilities. Beginning in 2012, despite the fact that Islam still does not seem to be the objective or driving force behind the protests, signs of an Islamist narrative (whether of a Muslim Brotherhood or Salafist allegiance) have been felt in the ranks of the armed opposition. This is symptomatic of a protest made up of a predominantly Sunni population (70 percent of the Syrian population), which is largely pious and marked by a certain social conservatism. Above all, it is the result of the regime’s brutal crackdown: references to God seem natural for activists and protesters—even those who were deeply secular or atheist at departure, or who belong to other religious communities—who confront death daily, ready to sacrifice their lives for freedom.

Moreover, neither Islamist parties nor the official representatives of Sunni Islam (the *‘ulama*) were involved with the genesis of the protest movement. Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood did, of course, take up the cause of the revolution and mobilize very early on, primarily from abroad due to the absence or weakness of their structures on the ground. The Sunni representatives, divided between loyalists and protesters, did not emerge as a structuring force for revolutionaries.

Similarly, in the beginning, the feeling of belonging to a community appeared much more prominent among the minorities (Alawites and Christians) than among the Sunni population. The trend towards Islamization has, however, been strengthened in the medium and long term by three factors contributing to its emergence. First, there were the insidious practices of the regime’s security services (rape of Sunni women, bombing mosques, insults to the Sunni religion filmed during torture sessions, mobilization of primarily Alawite militias, arms distribution in Alawite villages). These were reinforced by the large-scale punishment of Sunni revolutionary strongholds, which only radicalized the movement on a sectarian basis. Second, the secular component of the movement eroded. This was the result of the regime deliberately prioritizing the destruction of these “secular” militants, and the (forced or voluntary) exile of a large number of its members. It is also explained by the high level of corruption which has affected its political circles in exile. This helped pave the way for the Islamist movements to achieve a stronger grip on the uprising, reinforced by the regime’s cynical strategy of releasing a large number of Islamist rebels from prisons. These people then went on to make up most of the leadership of the Syrian insurgency’s Islamist and jihadist movements. Finally, the most vocal external supporters, who are likely to invest further in providing effective assistance to the Syrian people fighting, have built their approach on solidarity between Sunni Muslim peoples, who are in general susceptible to the anti-Shi’ite sectarian logic. This is the case with support from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood of the various countries in the region, and representatives of the international Salafist-jihadist movement.

Egypt: From Revolutionary Dynamics to Violent Action

From the beginning of the fall of the Mubarak regime, Egypt was one of the most successful incubators of political Islam, including that of jihadist movements. The release of many figures from the Afghan jihad of the 80s and 90s led to the creation of a militant jihadist collective which acted entirely outside the institutional world. This group soon established an opposition to the political programs of the other Salafist parties (an-Nour and al-Asala). These were considered too modernist in terms of their dogma and their recognition of the democratic electoral system. Through media activity, Egyptian jihadists declared solidarity with their Tunisian and Libyan “brothers” Ansar al-Sharia, but also with the Syrian insurgency groups. They also participated in joint projects with

the Salafist centres of Gaza and criticized the actions of the Egyptian army in Sinai. Not wishing to take the side of particular presidential candidates in 2012, these jihadists had, as a societal project, advanced the principle of rejecting these institutions by calling for “ideal and supreme” Islamic governance.

After the fall of President Morsi during the summer of 2013, this group was hit hard by the repression which brought down jihadist preachers. The group experienced a development similar to that of its Tunisian counterparts Ansar al-Sharia. Some activists decided to join other jihadist fronts (in Libya and the Levant). Faced with the repression of the new regime, the transition to armed struggle became an option which would materialize a few months later with the advent of more active armed jihadist groups in Sinai and the outskirts of Cairo.

The Afghanistan/Pakistan Area

There is no pure Salafism in the Afghanistan/Pakistan area. The local fundamentalists come from a different school of Islamic jurisprudence—that is, from the Hanafi tradition rather than the Hanbali tradition that gave rise to Salafism. They are part of the deobandi revivalist that started in India but acquired a more militant outlook in Pakistan after partition. They gave rise to many proselytizing movements, the most prominent of which is the Tablighi Jamaat, which intentionally avoids political activities and aims to change society from the bottom up. These fundamentalists also gave rise to politically violent movements, such as the Afghan Taliban, Tehrik e-Taliban e-Pakistan, and Lashkar e-Jhangvi. Deobandi Islam is an integral component of the comprehensive political social identity of these local militants. However, the political violence in this South Asian region is so intertwined with local political issues, such as local resistance to central government encroachment both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, that it is impossible to separate the religious from the political components of this conflict. In any case, these militants are not Salafists in the pure sense of the word, but fundamentalist deobandis.

France and Belgium

Since the advent of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, France and Belgium been targeted by jihadists. This is due not only to the values these European nations espouse but also especially because of their participation in the international coalition and their involvement in the bombing of the Daesh army. It is thus possible to confirm that the political dimension of Salafism was certainly the catalyst for the attacks which have taken place in these two countries (Bataclan, Nice, Zaventem, Malbeek, etc.). The jihadists saw the international intervention as a declaration of war, and it has been a key trigger in the radicalization of young Europeans who are close to the jihadist organization. Sceptics need only read the statement by Adam Djaziri, who died after attempting to kill gendarmes in June 2017. In a recovered letter, he lays out “the demand for ‘the total cessation of arms sales to the tyrannical regimes of Muslim countries, the liberation of imprisoned jihadists, the possibility of Muslims leaving France to settle in Syria, etc.’”. These demands are political in nature; they derive from a secular and worldly logic rather than one which is religious and Islamic.

IMPACT OF THE VIRTUAL NEO-COMMUNITY

The use of social media among young radical Salafists has been a subject of much discussion in academic and policymaking circles. On the one hand, some observers have stressed how the internet has been a major factor in the development of a global Salafist community (Sageman 2004). On the other, the direct link between accessibility of jihadist websites and radicalization is

still unclear.

There is no doubt that tools of the World Wide Web such as chat forums, Facebook, and Twitter have played an important role in creating a space of communication among members of a community scattered geographically and constantly under the control of security agencies. Its role has been ideological, in the sense that most theoretical material has been provided in “sheikhs” personal forums or blogs. It has also been purely communicative, insofar as sympathizers throughout the world have been able to communicate with each other and exchange opinions on current affairs. Its value has also been propagandistic. In particular, the propaganda videos diffused throughout the Web has served as a model of imitation for many young followers and sometimes as an inspiration for style and personal conduct. The impact on recruitment is, however, unclear. Hegghammer (2014) provides examples of how the “trust factor” is a serious obstacle for recruiters relying on such virtual public spaces, and Lia (2006: 14) downplays the “incitation to action” that such instruments may provide, labelling most Web users “armchair jihadists”.

The use of the internet developed significantly after the rise of the Islamic State organization and its campaigns in Iraq and Syria, with the use of their own official media channels considered to be of the highest importance for jihadist groups. The spreading of a “shared” brand is also an important factor as well as the role of certain videos communicating direct or indirect calls to action. The role the Web has played should, however, not be overestimated. Behind these virtual tools there are still people who operate on the ground, linked to specific contexts and in the midst of real, concrete dynamics.

JIHADISM: THE LOGIC OF COUNTER-VIOLENCE

The Implacable Jihadisation of the Syrian Conflict

Faced with unprecedented repression by the Syrian regime, the trend toward the Islamization of the protest movement in Syria was palpable from the end of 2011, along with its militarization. The international Salafist-jihadist movement could not help but see an opportunity in the Syrian conflict to expand its influence in an area where its footprint had thus far been limited. In fact, this movement describes and conceives its action purely in the context of an armed confrontation which it calls jihad. The question of the militarization of the Syrian protest was taken for granted. The debates were instead going to take place on another level, causing structural fragmentation. These would lead to deep divisions about the fact of fighting under a banner other than that of a jihadist movement. The question was raised in particular of whether the Free Syrian Army (FSA) could present an acceptable ideological platform in order to accommodate jihadi fighters in its ranks. This issue had already been observed in the case of Iraq when it came to identifying, for foreign jihadists, the ideologically appropriate Sunni groups resisting the 2003 American military intervention.

Very quickly, the rejection of the FSA as a legitimate movement would definitively lay the foundations for an ideological jihadist narrative: the Alawites are perceived as a deviant form of Islam. The regime’s alliance with Hezbollah’s Iranian and Lebanese Shiites (considered to be the region’s most menacing enemies) along with the presence of Kurdish nationalist movements fuelled the sectarian sentiment of the conflict. Western interventionism against IS in the summer of 2014, followed by Russia’s arrival in October 2015 as the main external support for the Syrian regime, finalized the idea of a conflict framed as a war between Islam and foreign powers. Turkish involvement beginning in 2016 also constitutes a divisive topic. Finally, a messianic dimension, the Sham prophecy (Syria as the land on which the ultimate confrontation between Islam and its enemies will precede the End of Days), which is strongly believed by IS supporters, brought an important millenarian

element to the Salafist-jihadists.

The evolution of the Syrian conflict and the rise of IS in the Levant have led to a succession of tragic events, responsible for the polarization of the current jihadist field between jihadist actors affiliated with Al Qaeda's movement and resilient Iraqi jihadist leaders who returned to the scene after 2010. Finally, this centrality of Syrian discourse has strongly contributed to creating a generational phenomenon of jihadist volunteers in numbers never before seen.

The Case of Salafist-Jihadist's Appropriation of the Palestine Issue

Initially, although Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and even Kashmir were the territories of jihad for Al-Qaeda (AQ), the struggle for Palestine has remained what it was always in the minds of its militants: the avant-garde of jihad, with the prime objective of liberating the third sacred place of Islam, *Al-Quds* (Jerusalem) from "the Jewish occupation". In the thinking of AQ, nationalist Palestinian groups lost their monopoly on the liberation of Palestine. They are accused of having taken it for their personal interest. For AQ, the defence of Palestine is not linked to patriotism, a national political struggle, a state, or a nationalist party. Moreover, the notion of the Palestinian people is not recognized as such. Salafist-jihadists prefer to use the terms "Holy House" (*Bayt al-Maqdis*), "fortress territory" (*Ard al-Ribat*), or recently "disputed territories" (*al-Aradhi al-Mugh-tasaba*) to refer to Palestine. Above all, Palestine is a legitimate religious cause whose liberation is decreed to be an obligation for all Muslims. However, in this vein, the context never truly allowed for the opening of a direct jihadist front in Palestine. Since this fight cannot be carried out directly in the territory, AQ has targeted the United States as Israel's main ally. Later, with the arrival of IS on the jihadist stage, the same effects were observed. While calls to target Israel have been made by IS, the organization has never really been able to make its mark on the Palestinian territories. It has instead favoured other more accessible regional enemies.

However, since around 2005 there has existed a question of a breach of Salafist-jihadist ideals among Palestinian Islamist militants. Several signs of this have appeared on the Palestinian scene. Since 2006, new Palestinian groups have appeared in the Gaza Strip, bringing with them a different narrative and a specific agenda. All of these state that they are fighting a struggle whose goal is not just to liberate a piece of territory or to establish borders. They perceive the struggle of the Palestinian people as a jihad whose objective is to establish an Islamic Emirate over Palestine, without ever addressing the issue of a Palestinian state.

This radicalization of discourse would strengthen and become more decisive with the evolution of political contexts, both in Palestine and at a regional level. To begin with, the various Salafist groups in Gaza have continued to increase their warnings and messages to the Palestinian people after Hamas' rise to power. Although, of course, they condemn those who argue for a renunciation of the armed struggle (Fatah and the Palestinian National Authority), they also criticize Hamas for having accepted a system of governance handed down from elections deemed illegitimate by the jihadists. Gradually, this radicalization managed to find allies in the radical Palestinian jihadist groups which developed in some of Lebanon's refugee camps and then in the presence of the Sinai insurgency, in which Palestinian fighters of this movement are present alongside IS supporters. Finally, at the international level, the latest US reversals on the Jerusalem issue can only have a stimulating impact on the most radical, of which Salafist-jihadists are the primary breeding ground.

CONCLUSIONS

While many observers portray Salafism as a direct source of violence in ideological and even sociological terms, a rigorous analysis of various countries and instances of transition to violence

leads us to conclude that there is no causal relationship between the Salafist imaginary and violent engagement.

The types of and explanations for the political violence seen in the many ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are, above all, the result of dynamics of social disintegration (particularly affecting the younger generations) and of antagonism between society and the state in countries where access to democratic and peaceful ways of expressing political demands is almost impossible.

The issue of the insecure position of Muslims in the world and the conflicts in which they find themselves is a key factor in jihadist involvement. Followers of this world view see themselves as soldiers of Islam who come to the aid of their fellow believers, and feel justified in doing so.

To understand these manifestations of political violence, we must replace the ideology (whether Salafist or jihadist) with the fact of a *self-categorization* (construction of the self) which has come into contact with specific social and political conditions.

For a number of years, the measures intended to diminish jihadist involvement have often led to more jihadism. Why is this the case, and can we identify a fundamental misunderstanding?

The majority of jihadists today do not go through a true Salafist socialization.

A dynamic of ending violence must be built on social and political de-escalation that takes into account not only the religious dimension, but all the themes and factors which may explain violent action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

LISTEN TO MUSLIM VOICES

1. Consider political and symbolic demands from Muslim societies rather than criminalizing them and treating them with suspicion.

The central challenge is to take into account social demands from groups which feel attacked or discriminated against because they are Muslim. This is effectively a question of establishing systems of both political and symbolic deliberation in which demands for political action to end states of injustice are channelled, legitimized, and taken into account. Salafism is a language which translates complaints and reproaches about the state of an Umma which are often imagined, but whose attacks on the dignity and security of a community nevertheless lead a vanguard to take up arms in order to restore a state of security for their fellow believers, whose fate becomes a religious cause. The idea of an Umma in danger as a structuring theme of jihadist mobilizations appears to be the main focus of violent action, whether individual or collective. In this respect, the central issue highlighted by this study is that of the representation and politicization of a non-violent and effective demand for the security and dignity of Muslim communities.

Four approaches, listed below, should be prioritized in order to prevent and counter the sometimes growing appeal of jihadist narratives. The common feature of these is considering the context which has enabled the legitimization of a politico-religious identity of militarized rejection capable of violence against those who are portrayed as enemies of Islam.

2. Re-politicize the voices of Muslims carrying the demands of their society, whether we like those voices or not.

This is a question of allowing an area of moral, media, and political legitimacy for actors in direct contact with their societies in order to establish and consolidate alternative channels for debate and deliberation on the crises in which Muslim communities are involved. The purpose here is not to establish a normative judgement of the obligatory discourse presented by its non-violent representatives. Rather, the intention is to favour any position outside the violent sphere in opposition to

analyses identifying a continuum of the different modalities of political and militant Islam in which radicalization begins with any anti-establishment discourse. Clearly, an analysis of the different ways in which certain individuals or Muslim groups have become violent highlights the need to diversify the scope of grievances and even disputes. The shift to violence can be explained in the case of jihadism by the impossibility of translating legitimate demands from a given Muslim social body (whether one's own or one that is identified with) into non-violent political actions. A complaint raised by any given actor must be subject to political treatment. Just because it comes from a person or a movement whose values we do not like does not mean political debate should not take place. At the same time, democratic governments, media, and international organizations need to encourage any democratic movement which competes with movements having a strong social base among the religious. These must not, however, have a monopoly on the representation of popular aspirations. In short, any actor who refuses and denounces violence must be encouraged.

3. Reflect on the root causes of the legitimization of violent engagement: the issue of justice.

The preceding point works only if a broader reflection is undertaken regarding the causes of the lack of justice in Muslim societies, whose situation can hardly be summed up as a struggle between followers of violence and those who reject it, between radicals and moderates. The notion of justice is inclusive and requires, in addition to giving a political space to actors capable of expressing politically grievances of various kinds, imagining an overall political order wherein people potentially attracted by jihadist discourse (most often the younger generations) would no longer feel victimized. This means acknowledging past mistakes committed on both sides and ending at an international level support for camps which continue to use violence against innocent Muslim populations. Otherwise, the jihadist violence will appear to be more legitimate counter-violence endowed with the seal of approval of religion by seeming to fight a sacred battle, although it operates first and foremost under a political logic. Thus the jihadization of conflicts could be avoided. The principle of justice is also related to the use of force and insulting tactics. Generally, the clerics who present themselves as "moderate" will become marginalized if their society (or at least a large part of it) feels attacked and humiliated. It is therefore up to actors (state or otherwise) to exercise goodwill and impartiality in order to separate the oppressed community from the vanguard proposing to defend or avenge it. When human beings come to favour divine justice or even a millenarian ethic which seeks to speed the end of the world, it is because no human justice is seriously conceivable in situations where violence is justified by the suffering of certain Muslim populations. Domestically, it is necessary to avoid making heroes of jihadists through exceptional punishment. Rather, it is urgent to separate them from the community of which they are supposed to be the defenders by revealing the reality of their practices and actions. In short, it is a question of identifying the intellectual, moral, and political reasoning that can lead others to a positive view of jihadism and to join a movement advocating a violent and radical ideology. These are two different things and require two different types of action.

4. Recognize the need for de-escalation.

Given that discursive constructions play a central role in increasing the tension of political protest dynamics, it is urgent to prevent semantic, symbolic, and rhetorical constructions based on a primary and ideological division of the world (them vs us) as well as calls for hatred and violence. Here, religious discourse (Salafist or otherwise) as well as political, media and intellectual discourse must be examined very closely. Any words and positioning leading to polarization and the justification of violence must be contained. Here, religious mobilizations within Islam, regardless of whether they are Salafist or not, must be the subject of a prevention policy in order to stop all calls for hatred and violence. Any targeting of a specific population must be rejected and severely punished by

law. This is not peculiar to Salafism, since any social group (religious or otherwise) can enter into a process of rising tensions, but neither does this mean that religious communities are not capable of justifying violence that is once again a matter of the politicization and militarization of social identity. To effectively prevent violent discourse, it is necessary, as stated above, to legitimize non-violent words and mobilizations which bear the grievances of the people who are oppressed or attacked and therefore potentially more inclined to assimilate violent messages. This offers them an alternative to violence.

5. Implement individual reintegration.

The last approach concerns the need for the individual reintegration of people involved in jihadism, or political violence more generally. Exceptional legal or political mechanisms must be avoided in order to reinforce the fairness of jihadists being treated like everyone else. Beyond the imperative of supporting democracy in all societies of the world, the prevention of political violence must also mean public actions (the state being theoretically the sole guarantor of the common good) aimed at the social, economic, and political integration of individuals. It is therefore a matter of favouring any dynamic which allows identification with a non-violent group and a system of morality where, on the one hand, problems cannot be resolved by violence, and, on the other hand, humiliation and socio-economic suffering are perceived as everyone's business. Everyone has the right to a fair and just distribution of the material and symbolic resources of society; otherwise they can be more easily pulled into a movement of dispute or even radical protest against the established order.

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CHAPTER 4

Independentism and the End of Violence

Leader: Adel Bakawan

Contributors: Azza Ahmed Abdel Aziz, Jean-Nicolas Bach, Bahman Nariman, Pierre Blanc, Xavier Guignard, Inès Hassen, Omed Hussein, Nicola Ashraf Namiq Shalli, Soran Mahmood, Jean-Luc Racine, Ayshwarya Rajith Sriskanda Rajah

INTRODUCTION

When the focus of analysis of political violence is on independence and, hence, state formation, a paradox becomes apparent: while violence is intrinsically linked to state formation in Europe and elsewhere, involving players at the local and international levels, and to the regional system in which that particular form of political organization, the state, took shape¹, this type of violence was outlawed in the post-Second World War world order. This paradox is not insignificant: states remain the only model of political organization recognized by international organizations, yet these states are constantly reinventing themselves and pursuing their state-building ends within this dominant model where violence is inherent². At the same time the international system itself considers such conflicts to be illegitimate, at least in theory. In the international system, such as it is, states or coalitions that have the means to do so can conduct “legitimate” wars (thus creating disorder within the international system and in the targeted regions), while the most “weak” states that do not have sufficient financial or political resources are most often forced to comply with the international norm of peace.

In the context of thinking of war as a normal process in the formation of states, the prohibition of war by the international community has, according to some authors, created situations of counter-productive tensions, preventing military and political victories and fuelling latent conflicts. This is one of the theses defended by Ayoob (1995), who also points out the profound inequality of the global distribution of resources by country, which is the underlying assumption in the production and application of these international standards. Taking this logic to the extreme, Lutwak (1999) calls for the world to “give war a chance”.

The outlawing of violence also generates tensions at the very heart of the state, since normative innovations now allow the same international community with its unevenly distributed resources to interfere, through various forms of legitimization, in different regimes’ affairs to prevent them from committing atrocities against their own populations such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Here we find the ambiguity inherent in the recognition of the right of “peoples”

1. The classic literature has very well documented the intrinsically violent relationship of state formation in Western Europe or elsewhere (Bourdieu 1993; Bayart 1998).

2. While this model is dominant, it is of course not unique. It is important to bear in mind, as the members of this research group did, the experiences of national construction in India and Ethiopia in particular. Nevertheless, we are not aware of any separatist movements that proposed for their future political identity a model other than the nation-state model within larger political entities (e.g., the European Union).

to self-determination as it appears in the Charter and in some resolutions of the United Nations—it is simultaneously interventionist and limited by respect for the sovereignty and integrity of states. Without entering into this specific debate, we must take into consideration the significance of international norms and actors in the link between separatism and (ending) violence that is our focus here.

This context, drawn in broad strokes, makes it possible to grasp some of the major issues that drive the relationship between independence and (ending) political violence. This extremely complex relationship obviously leaves many questions open that cannot be addressed here. Nevertheless, we can briefly discuss a particular aspect of this relationship on the basis of a question arising from the ideas above: if we consider political violence as inherent to the formation of the state, and if we consider the violent forms of mobilization used by pro-independence activists to carry out their project, does contemporary, immediate history allow us to consider independence as a credible solution to achieve peace? In other words, under what conditions can independentism bring an end to violence?

The link between independentism and the end of violence calls for a detour into exploring what we mean by violence and independence, which we do in the first section (examining the origins of violence, along with a schematic typology of independence movements, the political contexts that gave rise to them, and the developments that they themselves have brought about). The second and third sections will then allow us to return to the heart of the problem investigated here (i.e., under what conditions does independence appear to be an outcome of violence?), thus returning to the modes of ending violence historically observed through more or less institutionalized independentism, followed by the question of the redeployment of violence after separation.

WHICH VIOLENCE, WHICH SEPARATISMS?

The political events of 2017-2018 called attention to the breadth of the independence phenomenon, highlighting cases such as that of the Kurds following the Iraqi blockade imposed in response to the referendum organized by the regional government, the Catalan crisis, and the war in Yemen, which could lead once again to a division of the country. But these highly current issues must not make us forget the large number of recent independence movements, as illustrated by Cabestan and Pavkovic (2013) in their book dealing with the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia; separatism in the South Caucasus, Chechnya, Kosovo, the Basque Country, India, Sri Lanka, and Burma; and issues related to China in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. A broader overview would add to this list, in addition to the other cases addressed by our group (Iraqi Kurdistan, South Sudan, Palestine): the Kurds of Turkey and Syria; the renewal of the post-Brexit Irish question; the possible reunification of Cyprus; Scotland; Flanders; Corsica; Quebec; and, on the other side of the world, Aceh in Indonesia; Papua New Guinea dreaming of following the example of East Timor; New Caledonia—not to mention the return of the separatist temptation to Biafra, the memory of Katanga, and the Sahrawi question in Western Sahara. Latin America, hit by many forms of violence, certainly has separatist movements of various types, but paradoxically these movements have never had a comparable weight to those in Europe, Asia, or Africa.

Our purpose here is not to add to the debates on the differences between secessionism and independentism, which are not equivalent, although the boundaries between the two concepts are often blurred, as Cabestan and Pavkovic point out (2013: introduction and chapter 1). A separatist movement may wish to create a new federal state in a federation without secession, but this type will not be addressed in this essay, which focuses on the typology of separatisms seeking a clear secession, with or without success, taking into account historical contexts, geopolitical parameters that go beyond the binary categorization of dominant/secessionist state actors, and the types of

interventions (violent or non-violent, political, diplomatic, mediatory) that are identifiable in these contexts.

What Violence Are We Talking About?

Discussing the articulation between independence and the emergence of political violence requires first of all getting rid of the false evidence that the violence accompanying separation processes is aimed at separation from the outset. The cases of Somaliland, South Sudan, and Bangladesh show that violence could emerge with the opposite purpose, namely, to claim better access to state resources by elites interacting with the state but perceiving their territory as marginalized (e.g., John Garang’s “New Sudan” project, or the Somali National Movement’s “Better Alternative” in Somaliland). Some cases even show how violent separatist claims can change course toward a conquest of the state by the same violent means, requiring redefinition of the discourse and symbols of the struggle, and more broadly of its modes of legitimization in order to pursue broad mobilization. This was the case, in particular, for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in northern Ethiopia³, which very quickly (after only a few years) abandoned the independence ambitions of its 1976 Manifesto, and a similar evolution is once again fuelling Palestinian political thinking in the face of the failure of the Oslo Agreements.

The feeling of marginalization within the empire, colony, or state itself—and thus in interaction with it—is essential to understanding the processes leading to the option of violence, whether led by state agents or separatists⁴. The separatists’ feeling of marginalization is then combined with a feeling of oppression, itself superimposed on the idea of a political, ethnic, and/or religious minority, and above all with a feeling of social injustice, as Hechter (1982) clearly demonstrated in the case of the United Kingdom. Such an overlay favours the politicization of an “us versus them” opposition and mobilization against the “oppressor”. The management of diversity within imperial and state structures and the sometimes violent tension between integration and differentiation that results from it are well-known phenomena⁵. It is often the inability to negotiate fair access to the resources of the “central” state that leads to separatist claims and the continuation of violence (sometimes in other modes), as in the cases mentioned above.

The origins and expressions of violence cannot be perceived in a linear way or as opposing blocs with stable ambitions. Independence movements that choose violence are most often driven by complex processes that can be understood only according to the trajectories of the individual actors, their ideological framework, the local and international context, and of course the evolution of their relationship with the state. If we accept that the drivers of political violence relate to the particular circumstances of a given separatist situation, we can fully support the proposal of Crettiez and Mucchielli (2010) to identify the singularity of an emergence of political violence in terms of three levels of analysis: the macro level (structural, cultural, institutional factors), the meso level (situational, communicational, organizational factors), and the micro level (violent careers, psychological and cognitive factors), bearing in mind that these levels of analysis are linked to each other and with the international and transnational levels.

Without going into the details of all the independence situations mentioned above, a sketch of the typology of separatist movements can be structured around a few major questions.

3. In power in Ethiopia since 1991, as part of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front.

4. See Aleksis Ylönen’s work on South Sudan.

5. Regarding imperial structures, see Burbank & Cooper (2008). For classic takes on states’ formation in Europe, see Rokkan & Urwin (1983).

Main parameters and standard situations

What types of historical situations?

The historical context provides a very general initial framework of types of independence. One classic secessionism is that of anti-colonial movements. A very large number of contemporary states took this route, starting with the United States of America in the 18th century and most Latin American states in the 19th century, followed by the great wave of independence in Asia and Africa after the Second World War. A second type of is the deliberate dismantling of the empires defeated in the First World War: the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Yet a third type can be seen in the many newly independent states were again shaken by history, both in the Middle East and in the great post-communist redrawing of borders.

The dissolution of the USSR by Moscow gave birth to the independent states of Central Asia, but also caused serious unrest in the Caucasus long after 1991. The break-up of the Yugoslav Federation (1990-2006) was violent in many cases (Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo). In contrast, the division of Czechoslovakia into two states was the result of a peaceful divorce that is rather exceptional.

Post-communist developments in the Caucasus and the Balkans have illustrated another major driver of separatists and irredentists: ethnic revivalism (Treisman 1997), which is linked to the question of ethno-federalism (B. Smith 2013). When it fails to allow a *modus vivendi* that transcends ethno-linguistic affiliations, separatism gathers strength.

Religious affiliations are another factor, surfacing in the crystallization of identities following the collapse of colonial and Soviet empires: partition between India and Pakistan; Chechnya with a Muslim majority; Biafra with a large Christian population; Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanian population with a Muslim majority rejects Serbian Orthodox domination; Tamil Eelam, where separatist Tamils (Hindu or Christian) confront Buddhist Sri Lanka; Muslim Kashmir; anti-Indian Sikh Khalistan; and so on. Many of these movements provide challenges to post-colonial explanations, but care must be taken not to give undue weight to the religious factor. As a general rule, separatist movements have multiple causes, going well beyond confessional issues. A striking example is Bangladesh, created through the secession of a Muslim country from another Muslim state, Pakistan, which had separated itself from India in the name of a two-nation concept, one Hindu and the other Muslim. The clear failure of ethno-federalism in Pakistan after 1947 transformed a Bangladeshi autonomist movement into a separatist insurgency. Indian military support to the insurgents made it possible for them to win (Sisson & Leo 1990).

What geopolitical parameters?

The case of Bangladesh, like so many others, also illustrates the role of the geopolitical context. Are there “simple” independentisms, defined by a purely binary relationship between the dominant state and the independence movement that wants to separate from it? No doubt there are, but very often one of the neighbouring states plays a role, offering sanctuary to insurgents, helping to train them, or providing them with supplies, as Pakistan has done with anti-Indian Kashmiri insurgents. Also to be taken into account is the diaspora, and the room for manoeuvre an independence movement has abroad. Sikh independence fighters based in the United Kingdom or Canada were able to make a major contribution to the pro-Khalistan movement to detach Punjab from India in the 1980s. It was a failure, but a certain irredentism persists today in Canadian networks.

However, similar historical or geopolitical contexts do not obscure the specificities of each separatist movement. The break-up of colonial empires has seen independence movements take

various forms: a largely non-violent protest movement in British India; a war of liberation in Algeria; negotiations between France and its West African colonies generally moving smoothly toward independence (as New Caledonia had the chance to do—but didn't—in its 2018 referendum).

The break-up of the communist federations illustrates the complexity of model cases. While the dissolving USSR and the new post-communist Russia were unable to prevent the break-up of Yugoslavia or the intervention of a UN-mandated NATO force, the Kosovo issue was marked by the return of tension between Western countries and Moscow. The latter, seeking to support its Serbian ally and satisfy Russian nationalist slavophiles, vetoed in 2007 a desire for Kosovo independence that had been supported by the United States and the European Union (Antonenko 2007).

The nature of the State

Intuitively, the nature of the state might seem to determine the type of response to separatist challenges. The Chinese case is exemplary here: in Tibet as in Xinjiang, the People's Republic employs an iron fist in repressing "extremism, terrorism, separatism", which it defines as "the three forces of evil"; at the same time, it treats independence activists as terrorists, and authorizes migration aimed at changing the ethnic composition of the "autonomous regions". With regard to Taiwan, which enjoys American protection, politics is of a different order, and takes into account economic interests. Vladimir Putin's repressive policy in Chechnya, after coming to power in 1999, illustrates the coercive capacity of a strong power, after the weakening that occurred during the Yeltsin years, during which the Chechen separatists almost won.

However, military regimes do not always succeed in defeating separatist irredentists, especially when they are multiple, as illustrated by the history of Burma and its ethnic secessionist movements (Kachin, Karen, Mon, Shan, etc.), leaving aside the singular tragedy of the Rohingyas. Negotiations opened by the civilian government in 2017 with different groups failed, with the army remaining the main force against any secession.

"Strong" regimes can also sometimes live with separatism when accepting secession reinforces their power in a region that matters to them. A rare example is the independence of South Sudan and its acceptance by the Islamist regime in Khartoum, though at the risk of creating a "rump state" (Franck & Vezzadini 2016; Azza 2017). London's decision to grant India independence was based on a different logic, discussed as early as the 1930s and accelerated by the effects of the Second World War.

Stateless nations

While the Kurds are supposed to represent the stereotype of stateless peoples, living under the tutelage of multiple state guardians in the space they inhabit, they are not the only ones: the Balochs (under Pakistani and Iranian tutelage), and the Basques (under Spanish and French tutelage), offer other examples of identity nationalist movements. Despite their ethno-linguistic unity, the difference in status within each state and the strategies specific to each movement within its geopolitical context sometimes give the fragment a certain autonomy in relation to the ethnic whole: the referendum held in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2017 dissociated the Kurds of Iraq from their comrades in Iran, Syria, and Turkey, without any effect whatsoever.

Another path open to stateless peoples is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), founded in 1991. It brings together some 40 movements around the world, including South American indigenous peoples (Awa, Mapuche), governments in exile (Tibet), and groups such as the Crimean Tatars and the Hmong of Laos. They are united by a charter, whose principles include the right to self-determination, respect for human rights, democracy, and non-violence (UNPO 2014). As a strategy, this organization provides members with a means to be heard in a

variety of UN structures, including the Human Rights Council and the Minorities Forum, without necessarily advancing the cause of independence. Nonetheless, this international pressure group carries the peaceful voice of an irredentism that survives despite hegemonic political structures.

Types of militant crystallizations

Separatist movements have given rise to organizations that have chosen very different strategies. One important criterion concerns their use or non-use of violence, while another is the degree of political autonomy enjoyed by the peoples concerned. Non-violent movements can emerge within or from areas without real autonomy, such as the Tibetan government in exile. The room for manoeuvre of Scottish nationalists, who hold power within the structure of the United Kingdom, is quite different.

Armed insurrections are also of various types. The power and centralization of the Tamil Eelam Tigers did not prevent them from being crushed by the Sri Lankan army, while the more disparate and less powerful Kashmiri separatists still hold out in the context of a wider asymmetric conflict between Pakistan and India. The persistence of armed conflicts, repression by a central power, and the international context can also transform a movement following internal divisions. In Mindanao, Philippines, for example, a separatist movement that was basically ethno-religious and economic, was joined in 1991 by the radical Islamism of the Abu Sayyaf group, considered close to Al Qaeda.

The use of terrorism is obviously not the monopoly of radical Islamists: the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), created in 1976, also partly made this choice, as did Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque Country. The abandonment of armed struggle by ETA in 2011 after 40 years, followed by the self-dissolution of the movement in 2018, illustrates the uncertainties of the terrorist option, which is sometimes presented as the last resort against a state that refuses to compromise. The Marxist inspiration of the founders of ETA and elements of the FLNC also brings to mind the far-left European terrorist movements of the 1970s: the German Red Army Faction or the Italian Red Brigades, which reflected a political agenda that was not separatist but revolutionary and internationalist. The Palestinian case is a salient example of a national movement that regularly places the use of violence at the centre of its tactical and strategic debates (Dot Pouillard, 2016).

EMERGING FROM VIOLENCE THROUGH SEPARATISM: WHAT ARE THE WAYS OUT OF CONFLICT?

Right to self-determination and referendums

The ambiguities of the right to self-determination

Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations affirms the right of peoples to self-determination, but this does not amount to an absolute right to independence. While Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 affirms the same principle of “equal rights and self-determination of all peoples”, and calls for a rapid end to colonialism, it also states (art. 6) that “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Resolution 61/295 of 13 September 2007 reiterates the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, but restricts it by specifying (art. 4) that they “have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs”. The right to self-determination therefore appears to be subject to interpretation and even restrictions. This also raises the question of the definition of a people, indigenous or not. For UN Member States, the right to self-determination, clear in a colonial context, cannot become an absolute right to secession in a post-colonial context. The permanent members of the Security

Council, led by China and Russia, can use their veto, but all post-colonial states in Africa, for example, share the same fear of secession, and intend to preserve their colonial borders, which rarely correspond to the ethno-linguistic map of peoples.

A factor that also plays a role is extreme repressive violence by the “dominant” state, which reinforces the moral rights of separatists and even insurgents. Bangladesh set a precedent in this regard, which underlines that, beyond the right to self-determination, the international community’s viewpoint also matters in all its forms: public opinion, the United Nations, the positions taken by the great powers. As well as the right to self-determination, therefore, there is also the “recognition by the other” found in declarations of independence, which are often unilateral (Sur 2017). The practice of referendums is a perfect illustration of this.

Typology of referendums

Several types of referendums can be identified in the context of independence. First, there are those that are suggested by the United Nations on disputed territories but that prove impossible to organize because the parties have not reached an agreement and do not even respect the defined preconditions. This is the case of India and Pakistan in Kashmir (Racine 2012). Similarly, UN resolutions on the Palestinian question, which are also longstanding, have not had any more effect.

The most effective referendums are those accepted by the dominant state, and conducted in the presence of international observers. This was the case in Timor Leste with the 1999 referendum, which was facilitated by the United Nations 24 years after the Indonesian military occupation in response to the declaration of independence. This was also the case in South Sudan, where American, European, African Union and Arab League observers monitored the 2011 referendum. The referendum on Scottish independence in 2014 was accepted by both sides, but those favouring Scottish independence were defeated. Today, they are calling for a new post-Brexit referendum, the majority of Scots having voted against leaving the European Union.

An effective referendum can also ratify a political decision that accepts secession. After the Evian agreements with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) concluded in 1962, Charles de Gaulle organized a referendum in France to validate independence, and won it, while the Algerians approved the referendum subsequently organized by the GPRA. Negotiations and double referendums thus put an end to an extremely deadly conflict (Perville 2012).

On the other hand, referendums organized and won by regional authorities but rejected by the dominant state often lead only to a deadlock, whether independence has been proclaimed (Catalonia) or not (Kurdistan). Such deadlocks may also be attributable to the central authorities’ rejecting dialogue with the winners of the referendum. Central government inflexibility is a dangerous gamble in divided societies, as it risks strengthening the separatists and generating new violent factions. In Spain, the loyalty of European countries to Madrid prevailed over the support of the various European separatist movements for their Catalan counterparts (Corsica, Scotland, Flanders, Valle d’Aosta, Tyrol, etc.) (Loyer 2017; Kourliandsky 2017).

Another type of referendum is one quickly organized by the dominant power to ratify a military option, whether it crushed secession (the referendum in Chechnya in 2003), or allowed it (in Crimea in 2014). In both cases, these Russian initiatives produced similar official results: very high turnout, and 96 percent of votes to stay in Russia or to join it. Subsequently, a UN draft resolution invalidating the Crimean referendum ran up against a Russian veto.

Other Modes of Managing Separatisms

The military crushing of an armed separatist movement is not the easiest option to implement.

The Sri Lankan army achieved this in 2009, but not without changing its counter-insurgency strategy (Hashim 2013), as the West had never supported the separatist cause (Rajah 2014). The Russian military also succeeded in doing so in Chechnya in 2000, nine years after the declaration of independence, while failing to put an end to rural guerrillas, disrupting Chechen society, and shifting nationalist separatism towards Islamism (Galeotti 2014).

Another option, most often chosen by India in its north-eastern states, is to send in the army under the authority of an emergency law, while seeking to divide the separatists and bring some of them back into the electoral game. Some of the weakened militants may continue the struggle, but the regions concerned (Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur) remain under control and enter the parliamentary domain (Racine 2013).

Upstream, negotiations between separatists and central power can calm the situation, by offering separatists a particular status with different degrees of autonomy and local government. The British devolution of certain powers has characterized its dealings with Scotland, while France—rejecting any federalism—nonetheless conceded limited powers to Corsica. Such approaches to conflict prevention, or to leaving conflict behind, can work but do not guarantee the end of separatism.

The exhaustion of terrorist action is another way that violence may come to an end, as illustrated by the Basque case and the self-dissolution of ETA.

The UN and international mediators

Beyond the ambiguity of the right to self-determination stated in UN principles, the UN should ideally play a central role in the management of separatist conflicts. It has in fact been involved in many crises, but has not always resolved them. Its role in the 1999 referendum in Timor Leste, organized and monitored by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), is an example of a success story, enabled by the “green light” given by Jakarta. The latter reversed its policy 24 years after the Indonesian military occupation that had followed the proclamation of independence of the former Portuguese colony. The United Nations then managed the transition before full independence in 2002. However, impunity for the authors of Indonesian war crimes has fuelled criticism of the UN’s role (Akara 2009).

The limitations of the UN are well known, as the organization depends both on local power relations and the interplay of major member states. Its resolutions, under Chapter 6, are *de facto* recommendations only: they have not been able to resolve either the Kashmiri or the Palestinian questions. Peacekeeping operations by a number of UN missions have been involved in several secessionist crises, including Western Sahara, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Darfur, and South Sudan. “Success is never guaranteed,” the UN itself concedes, “because UN Peacekeeping almost by definition goes to the most physically and politically difficult environments”⁶. Even leaving aside obvious failures, the case of Kosovo—where military intervention was authorized by a UN resolution under Chapter 7—has raised multiple controversies with respect to the interpretation of international law (Orakhelashvili 2008).

With or without the United Nations, the outcome of the work of international mediators is sometimes decisive but also sometimes disappointing, the latter evidenced by the failure of the Oslo agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. It is necessary that both parties formally accept mediation. In the dispute over Kashmir, India has refused to accept such mediation, arguing that the Simla Agreement signed in 1972 with Pakistan recognizes the bilateral nature of the dispute. At best, Delhi will accept behind the scenes “facilitators”, but without any impact so

6. UN, What is peacekeeping? United Nations Peacekeeping, available online: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping> (accessed 28 March 2019).

far. Peace negotiations are not exempt from political calculations that accompany the organization and holding of referendums. Thus, multilateral negotiations that allow independence movements to move away from their one-on-one relationship with the central state seem to have more of a chance at achieving a lasting peace.

Despite its perils, the path of diplomacy and mediation must always be tried as peaceful alternatives to violence (Tenenbaum 2013). Whether the result is a lasting positive peace, or a “negative” peace — which marks only the end of an open conflict but which is not always lasting — we know that it is sometimes more difficult to win peace than to win the war. This is also true once independence is achieved.

AFTER SEPARATISM: PEACE AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF VIOLENCE

After independence: success or failure of state-building

Positive peace or negative peace: the route out of violence and the type of conflict resolution utilized are important for the future of the new state. Amicable divorce, which saw the birth of the Czech Republic and Slovakia out of the former Czechoslovakia in 1992, is a model, but not very reproducible. Ambiguous status, due to the lack of unanimous recognition (e.g., in Kosovo, Crimea), does not prevent relative normalisation, but always carries the risk of a relapse into violence. Crushed uprisings carry the same risk, but the new conditions that emerge determine the future of the irredentist movements or of resurgent discontent. For example, it is difficult to judge the future of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement, revived by the Ibo ethnic diaspora in London in 2014; although non-violent, it was immediately labelled terrorist by Nigeria. The Irish question, resolved in 1998 by the famous Good Friday Agreement that was ratified by a double referendum, could take a new turn as a result of Brexit. Absolute failures are also evident. Illustrations include Eritrea, an example of “failed totalitarianism” (Jeangène-Vilmer & Gouery 2015), or South Sudan, plunged since 2013 into a civil war that has generated two million internally displaced persons and two million exiles (Human Rights Watch 2018).

Independence as a redeployment of violence

Independence is regularly presented by its supporters as a solution ensuring peace. This argument can of course be put forward in order to put an end to long and painful conflicts, and to receive support from the international community (Kosovo, South Sudan, Eritrea, among other examples). The separatist path can also be presented as the way to end a situation of oppression, as in Palestine, Tibet, or Western Sahara. Alternatively, the separatist option can be used to influence public opinion and legitimize a *de facto* situation (Chechnya or Crimea vis-à-vis Russia, for example), or to weaken a neighbouring state (Somaliland supported by Ethiopia at the expense of a united Somalia).

Certain separatist experiences show some success, as the aftermath of separation did not lead to a resurgence of conflict. However, separation does not systematically reduce conflicts, which can persist in different forms. This is particularly the case with new states, which can pursue nuisance strategies by armed groups against their neighbour. It is also worth noting the extreme case of resurgence in the large-scale conflict between Eritrea (independent since 1993) and Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000. Eritrea in particular has been in conflict with each of its neighbours since its independence in 1993.

Moreover, behind peaceful appearances, it is not uncommon to see a redeployment of violence within states, whether within the “amputated” state or the new state. Here again, the question

arises of the violence inherent in the formation of the state, particularly when it comes to adapting to a new situation that requires new modes of wealth extraction, and sometimes new modes of redistribution within the new states. In some cases, these states have been suddenly deprived of abundant resource regions, as in the case of Sudan, which lost two-thirds of its oil production with the independence of the South in 2011.

The redeployment of violence against populations within new states is also to the result of how conflicts were conducted and the violent socialization patterns associated with them. The separatist act in itself does not systematically pacify political minds and modes of action. Moreover, conflicts lead to socialization in violence that is not without effect on political “cultures” and may manifest itself in mistrust or even paranoia, the idea of permanent conflict, or the sanctification of martyrdom and war. Finally, it should be noted that these particular modes of socialization do not necessarily facilitate the development of an open and fair political scene within the new regimes. The networks of former guerrillas remain active, as do the resentments that lead to the establishment of authoritarian regimes that are not inclined to negotiate.

Separatism is therefore not enough to address the logic of political, economic, and social marginalization within the new states created as its result. Since the construction of a national idea in a conflict constantly requires new enemies, pacifying this national construction requires the promotion of new symbols and new heroes and the de-politicization of national histories. It requires efforts to renew elites, in particular because the reproduction of authoritarian practices passes through them. In short, separatism in itself cannot bring about the conditions needed for living together.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This brief overview highlights both the universal dimension of the separatist question, the multiple configurations in which it manifests, and the diversity of the historical contexts in which it unfolds. The proposed typology is only a sketch, but it allows us to suggest some conclusions and even some recommendations, which must be epistemological before they can be political.

1. A first conclusion answers the question raised in the introduction, showing that separatism in itself can in no way be considered an outcome that by its nature allows a systematic end to violence. The multiplicity of situations, the actors involved, the volatility of post-violence contexts, the maintenance of situations where “between-conflict” (*entre-conflits*), to use Debos’ expression), rather than post-conflict, prevails (Debos 2013), or the intrinsically violent nature of state structures, suggest that under no circumstances should separatism be considered as a simple solution for ending violence and imposing peace, as shown by the evolution of South Sudan. The redeployment of violence in domestic politics also reveals such failures in a somewhat different sense, as illustrated by the case of Eritrea.
2. A second recommendation calls for caution against overly ethnic or religious interpretations of separatist movements. The degree of popular support for a separatist/secessionist movement also includes economic and political frustrations: ethnicity or religious affiliation may intensify a movement but should not be reduced to being considered its cause⁷.
3. A third recommendation is to identify responsibilities in the evolution of a movement. For example, the refusal of sufficient concessions by the dominant government often leads to radicalization, which can end, as in Mindanao, in armed Islamism.
4. Our fourth recommendation is to question the effectiveness of violence, whether terrorist or insurrectional, and the effectiveness of state repression. Without concessions on both sides, there is a risk of stalemate, or an unsustainable “negative peace”. Non-violence can also be an

7. However, there is an emerging hierarchy of identity (Baczko & Dorransoro 2017).

option, which is more suited to the negotiation processes, and does not exclude political power relations. But the dominant power must still be willing to listen.

5. Another set of criteria, which we consider essential, concerns the international dimension of separatist/secessionist conflicts. It questions the analyses of the “international community”: Who defines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a secessionism, except in quasi-genocidal cases? International law, as defined by the UN, is not unambiguous: Is there a need for clarification? If so, how? Also to be considered are the forms of struggle for independence, the degree of popular support, support from neighbouring states, the power of the dominant country, the economic interests at stake (e.g., mining, energy resources, multinational firms), international opinion, and media attention.
6. Finally, it is important to learn from the experience of post-conflict situations and their methods (peacekeeping forces, negotiations, mediation) as well as causes of success and of failure. But the main recommendation, both epistemological and political, is to emphasize the specificity of each conflict, the objective parameters that define it, and the passions that it nourishes (including in collective memories). It is the specific genesis of each situation that also explains how, once violence has ended, one can either fall back into it or have the assets to facilitate state-building and to win positive peace—the only lasting one.

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CHAPTER 5

Public Policies against Violence

Leader: Sandrine Lefranc

Contributors: Nathalie Duclos, Véronique Dudouet, Sarah Gensburger, Eduardo Pizarro, Ricardo Peñaranda

INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC POLICIES AGAINST VIOLENCE?

“Public policies against violence”—an expression proposed by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)—refers here to all policies, standards, programs, and operations put in place at different scales to put a lasting end to mass political violence (war, civil war, repression, genocide). “Mass political violence” can be defined as unilateral or bilateral violence, attributable to states or to other large groups with less defined outlines, committed against individuals and groups and defined as necessary on the basis of cultural, religious, or ethnic identities, or for political purposes, or during political competition processes. The expression “public policies against violence” is uncommon in the expert and scientific literature. It therefore needs to be clarified. Public action refers to “the action taken by a public authority (alone or in partnership) to address a situation perceived as problematic” (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2012: 5). It is therefore a question of working on *the very idea of a political action against political violence*, as well as on how violence is characterized as a problem, knowing that the characterization of this violence is an integral part of the conflict process (Hacking 1991; Sommier 2008). Is it possible, and if so, under what conditions, to pursue a proactive policy of voluntarist conflict resolution with a view to establishing a lasting peace? What is the “problem” to be solved, and to what extent is the characterization of this violence—which is inevitably political—conflictive? In addition to these two questions, there is a third issue: that of the public authority that drives the policy. In the part of political science that studies public policy, the state occupies a central place, although it never works alone, and the heterogeneity of public administrations is central to this type of analysis. This centrality of the state is less rigid when the policy direction is “against violence”, since open political conflicts pit violent states against their populations, other states or armed groups, and often weaken states. Violent or weakened states may not be the perpetrators but the targets of actions by international, public, and private authorities. This chapter argues for an “ordinary” sociological approach to policies aimed at resolving or preventing violent conflict—a critical approach, attentive to the actors involved and the historical contexts in which these policies are formulated.

STATUS OF PUBLIC POLICIES AGAINST VIOLENCE

Public policies against violence are numerous and diversified, even disparate. The table below gives an overview of the situation.

Table 1. — Overview of public policies against violence

Type	Possible forms	Examples
Armed means to ensure a truce		
Military intervention		NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999)
Military Interposition		UN Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Peaceful means of securing a truce		
Peace agreement (with varying horizons and varying ambitions), with facilitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Classical diplomacy - "Citizen" or "alternative" diplomacy (intervention of "private" persons, association representatives, former politicians, churchmen, etc.) 	<p>Arias Plan for Central America (1986); peace agreements in Mali and Colombia involving States (Algeria and Cuba respectively), NGOs (Intermediate, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, CMI, Bergnot Foundation, Sant'Egidio), and IOs (CEDAO) including the UN (DPA, Mediation Support Unit Standby team)</p> <p>Yemen, Tunisia, Central African Republic</p>
National dialogues		
Verification of truce/ceasefire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civilian teams (local, governmental, international or mixed) to monitor ceasefire agreements - Inter-State - Non-governmental or mixed 	<p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OSCE Mission in Ukraine, UN Mission in Georgia - International monitoring team in Mindanao, which includes international NGOs such as HDC or Conciliation Resources but also States (Malaysia, Norway) and IO (EU) - Role of civil intervention NGOs such as Nonviolent Peaceforce or Peace Bridges International
Peaceful ways to stabilize a ("negative") peace, in the short term		
Organization of a governmental coalition, with facilitation	Negotiations, multi-party conferences	Transitions in South Africa (1993), Sudan, Nepal, Burundi
Organization of the first democratic elections	Temporary power-sharing mechanisms, first government of national unity	UN or International IDEA programmes
Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR) of armed groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government commissions for DDR - Technical support and international verification/monitoring 	<p>Mandates of the UN and other inter-governmental organizations (IOM, EU).</p> <p>Example: Aceh Monitoring Mission 2006-2008 (joint DDR mission between the UN and 5 ASEAN countries plus Norway and Switzerland)</p>
Judicial and legislative management of past violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Judicial prosecution/amnesties - Alternative means of investigation (e.g. truth commissions) - Administrative purification (vetting, purges) or professional reintegration 	Establishment of national or international truth commissions (intervention in El Salvador and Guatemala by the UN or the International Center for Transitional Justice)
Non-violent ways to build a "positive", long-term peace		
1. At the national level		
Territorial reorganization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decentralisation, federalism, separation - Electoral or constitutional reform 	Facilitation of the Dayton Agreements for the former Yugoslavia (1995), South Sudan (2005), Aceh (2006), Kosovo
Democratization, minority representation	Representation quotas (Bosnia, Northern Ireland)	
Structural reform of institutions, the judiciary, security forces ("governance")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reform of the security sector (purification, right-sizing, professionalization, ethnic or gender quotas, integration of former irregular forces, human rights training...) - Law and judicial system reforms (integration of international human rights law, new criminal offences, military justice reform, etc.) - Institutionalization of international criminal justice and harmonization with national justice systems 	<p>UN and EU mandates in support security sector reform (SSR): Palestine, DRC, Afghanistan, Mali.</p> <p>Technical support from NGOs: DCAF or Saferworld for SSR, Max Planck, IDEA, Interpeace for Governance Reform</p>

<p>Other mechanisms for dealing with past violence</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of judicial and security forces in the «culture of human rights» (training, code of ethics, etc.) - Mechanisms for the professional retraining of categories of actors or victims (refugees, guerrillas, security forces) - Exhumation and re-inhumation policies, therapeutic and integration rituals - Commemorations, monuments 	<p>UN police training in Kosovo, programs integrating human rights into the education and vocational training of public officials.</p>
<p>Action on the causes of conflict through economic development</p>	<p>Prevention of the conflict consequences of development policies ("do no harm")</p> <p>Equitable development, which should indirectly promote coexistence between groups</p> <p>Cooperative development, which should directly promote coexistence between groups through exchanges within the framework of development programs</p>	<p>Reorientation of humanitarian and development NGO programs since the 1990s</p> <p>Role of IOs such as the World Bank or UNDP, and foreign states (German GIZ)</p> <p>Programmes of the American NGO Conflict Management Group Mercy Corps in former Yugoslavia</p>
<p>2. At the local level: reconciliation "from below"</p>	<p>Storytelling</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rewriting history - Dissemination of a historical account and analysis of current events (truth commissions and other forums, media, textbooks, etc.) - Valorisation of co-habitation of stories ("dissensus") <p>Dialogues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encouraging dialogue (on conflict; through arts and sports; between categories of actors and victims – women, youth, religious groups, ethnic groups, etc.) - Promotion of "pivotal groups" linking the warring groups: Multi-ethnic churches, women's groups, economic associations - Development of common areas and neutral spaces (e. g. daycare centres) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National educational policies, programs of the international NGO Search for Common Ground, the Georg Eckhart Institute, the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina <p>Programmes of Search for Common Ground</p> <p>Civil Peace Service Teams funded by Germany¹</p>
<p>3. At the international level: prevention of mass political violence</p>	<p>Values</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Valorisation of peaceful provisions and liberal (tolerance) values; e. g. funding of relevant civil society organizations, informative and leisure media, negotiations with extremists ("spoilers"), training of civil servants - Training in conflict resolution - Valorisation of democratic regulation of political conflicts <p>Conventions against genocide, torture, enforced disappearances, war crimes; reparations</p> <p>Understanding of violent processes, both general (<i>war or genocide studies</i>) and local (anthropology and other social sciences)</p> <p>Early warning and quality measurement programs for political processes (e.g. quality indicators for democracies)</p>	<p>Programmes of the American government agency USAID, and the British NGO Conciliation Resource</p> <p>Jurisdictional and standard-setting organizations of IOs (UN, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, etc.)</p> <p>Basic and applied research</p> <p>E.g.: Earlywarningproject.com criteria of George Stanton or UNHCHR</p>
<p>Adoption of international standards</p> <p>Research development</p>	<p>Conventions against genocide, torture, enforced disappearances, war crimes; reparations</p> <p>Understanding of violent processes, both general (<i>war or genocide studies</i>) and local (anthropology and other social sciences)</p> <p>Early warning and quality measurement programs for political processes (e.g. quality indicators for democracies)</p>	<p>Jurisdictional and standard-setting organizations of IOs (UN, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, etc.)</p> <p>Basic and applied research</p> <p>E.g.: Earlywarningproject.com criteria of George Stanton or UNHCHR</p>

Table source: from Lefranc in S. Lefranc (2006), Introduction, "Créer du lien social", *Après le conflit, la réconciliation?*, Paris, M. Houdiard, adapted by Véronique Dudouet.

1. <https://www.zivilier-friedensdienst.org/en>.

AN INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM AGAINST VIOLENCE

All of the mechanisms and policies listed in the preceding table are now based on international standards—conventions, customary law, decisions of judicial organizations, reports of the United Nations Secretary-General, declarations, and agendas, but also on the abundant and sometimes influential sources prepared by experts and endorsed by international organizations (e.g., the series “Rule-of-law tools for post-conflict States” of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights)¹. Standards can be found for all the “moments” presented in the table above². The chosen wordings change and may cause variations in practice (for example, when the right of interference is replaced by the “responsibility to protect”, or when justice is described as “transitional”). But these norms are generally formulated after the elaboration of policies. For example, states implemented memory policies relating to the Holocaust before international organizations ordered them to do so (in 2005 for the United Nations and the European Parliament, 2007 for UNESCO, 2014 for the African Union, compared to the interest of states and societies in the “memory” of the Second World War, which dates back to the 1970s). Transitional justice was codified by the United Nations only in the early 2000s, whereas the term had been used since the 1980s.

International organizations do not simply give names to situations and policies, albeit tardily. They intervene on a massive scale, and at different times, through observation missions following a peace agreement or more active intervention between belligerents (*peacekeeping*), facilitation of peace agreements (*peacemaking*), or even operations on a larger or smaller scale to build peace (*peacebuilding*) (see Cases 2 and 3 below). Globally, 39 percent of conflicts have been “ended” by negotiations supported by the international community (Wallenstein 2012). Since 1948, a total of 71 peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the United Nations. They have increased significantly since the 1990s. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, peacekeeping expenditures increased from 23 percent of the UN budget (\$3.6 billion) to 77 percent (\$12.1 billion/year) (Colletta & Cullen 2000: 2). Nearly 1,500 mediations were recorded between 1945 and 1995—and saw a fivefold increase between 1980 and 1990, including about 100 at the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General alone over the period (Tenenbaum 2010: 106-108), as well as 13 times more sanctions and nine times more DDR operations between 1991 and 2008. Almost two-thirds of post-1989 conflicts have been the subject of at least one mediation attempt. The same is true for peacekeeping operations, which saw a threefold increase between 1988 and 2008. The UN deploys more than 90,000 soldiers from 114 countries in 15 missions on 4 continents, forces that can use force only in self-defence (Hatto 2015).

Case 1. The United Nations Against Violence: Peace Missions

Since the end of the Cold War, the role of the United Nations has been rethought. Peace missions under UN authority have been able to increase in this post-bipolar context. While there were only 13 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) between 1945 and 1987, there were 20 between 1988 and 1994 (Bonnaure 1993; Tardy 2000). Between 1989 and 2000, 38 missions were deployed, of which only five were inter-state conflicts. The UN is involved in peace missions in half of the civil wars that exist today. This development is part of a more regular use of Chapter VII of the Charter.

1. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Amnesties_en.pdf.

2. Partial inventories such as <https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/peacebuilding.shtml> are provided by a number of international organizations.

The modalities of peace mission operations (PMOs) have also evolved, reflecting an adaptation to armed conflicts that have become almost exclusively intra-state. Classically, there are several “generations” of PMOs (David 2006: 308-309):

(1) During the Cold War (1948-1988), traditional peace operations were conducted by peacekeepers to reduce the risk of a resumption of hostilities, without a coercive mandate and with the consent of the protagonists. They were limited to a military component and aimed only at a negative peace, in the sense used by Johan Galtung.

(2) After 1989, missions, both military and civilian, became more ambitious, taking on political and economic dimensions in addition to security. For example, they may have a mandate to supervise elections, as in Namibia and Nicaragua in 1989, and may endeavour to provide humanitarian assistance. They sometimes deploy without the prior consent of the government or rival factions.

(3) Since 1994, a third generation of PMOs has emerged that fall under the category of peace enforcement in response to the challenge of “failed states”, such as Haiti in 1994 or East Timor and Kosovo in 1999.

This increase in power cannot hide the existence of obstacles such as the lack of a military capability of its own and therefore the dependence of the United Nations on troop-contributing countries, and an inability to react quickly. This leads to a trend toward the devolution of military operations to defence organizations such as NATO, and to major powers such as the United States.

The abundant literature (especially in the field of international relations) dedicated to these numerous “glocal” policies generally postulates that the need for proactive action against political violence is self-evident. However, to assume that it is “naturally” incumbent on a power (and its co-producers) to fight (ex ante, during, ex post) against political violence is tantamount to neglecting the fact that inaction is very frequent in history, with actors simply “turning the page”. Why would a political power, for whom violence is one of its main “instruments”, act against violence when it is the user? Amnesty for one or both sides has always been, and remains, the preferred option of the public authorities. Why would a winner want to report on its past and current uses of violence against its opponents? Why would a government and the historical actors in a conflict allocate time and resources to the costly evocation of past confrontations? How can a weak government prevent conflict? It is only recently that the injunction to act has taken the form of a compelling norm, to which the morality born of the Second World War is no stranger. Concern for the “memory” of violent conflicts is recent (Rousso 2016; Gensburger & Lefranc 2017), while pleas for forgetting are increasing (Rieff 2018).

MAKING PEACE: ADVANCES AND LIMITATIONS

Even those organizations that appear to have been born to serve peace, such as international organizations (the United Nations, the European Union, or the African Union), may not have the “vocation” of preventing or resolving violent conflicts. The principles of action of the international community are not very clear. Amnesty, which is said to have become unacceptable, is still a possibility under international law. We also know to what extent international action results in failure, with its legitimacy highly debated; many specialists in international relations who are nevertheless keen on peace and democracy have come to affirm that it is better to “let the conflict continue” than to fight violence ineffectively or often with perverse effects (Snyder & Vinjamuri 2003-2004; Westendorf 2015). Roland Paris and others have pointed to the ability of international peace operations to fuel or generate new conflicts (Paris 2004; Westendorf 2015: 4-5).

Case 2: Liberal Peace and its Critiques

A. Building liberal peace

In the wake of Kant's introductory reflection on democratic peace and the empirical work of Michael Doyle, adviser to Kofi Annan, showing that democracies, among themselves, do not wage war against each other, the UN has worked to establish liberal regimes and a market economy (Paris 2004). In addition to the UN, there is a plethora of actors promoting liberal peace:

- The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) promotes good governance, understood as the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in a participatory, transparent, and accountable manner, considering that “democracy, human rights and good governance are inseparable”. At the end of the 1990s, UNDP allocated 46 percent of its budget to promoting good governance.
- While the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) granted the same legitimacy to all regimes during the Cold War, whether democratic or not, the organization has considered since June 1990 that it is necessary to promote the development of pluralist democracies. In particular, it encourages the development of powers accountable to voters and an independent judiciary.
- The Bretton Woods institutions, in accordance with the Washington Consensus, promote economic policies of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.

B. Critiques of liberal peace missions

While supporting liberal peace, Roland Paris (2004) highlighted the destabilizing effects of liberalization that have begun very soon after the end of conflicts. The organization of elections, based on a principle of competition, and the liberalization of the economy, which erodes protective state mechanisms, seem unsuitable for countries that have just emerged from armed conflict and suffer from a lack of a tradition of peaceful conflict resolution. Moreover, these policies risk rekindling tensions and aggravating the precariousness of those who are most vulnerable to conflict. This is why Paris has recommended that, before liberalization, an institution-building strategy be implemented—in other words, that an effective administration be implemented throughout the country that will guarantee political stability. It is only after a certain period of time that liberalization can be undertaken. His recommendations include the following:

1. postponing elections until the creation of moderate political parties
2. adopting electoral procedures that promote moderation rather than extremism
3. encouraging the development of civil society organizations that transcend conflict divides and prohibiting those who advocate violence
4. regulating hate speech
5. promoting equitable development policies that moderate social tensions
6. developing security institutions and a professional and neutral bureaucracy

C. Critiques of state-building (SB) efforts

Several studies have shown that the main objective of PKOs, in response to a supposed “state failure”, has been to restore the monopoly of legitimate physical violence challenged by combatants. These interventions are thus based on the misconception that the institutional models and practices of Weberian states—which have evolved in developed economies—can be transferred to a post-conflict country. This approach is therefore *ethnocentric* (Bøås & Jennings 2005). Moreover, while *peacebuilding* policies are part of a liberal tradition, contemporary peace agreements are often highly illiberal in their content, intentions, and objectives (Selby 2013).

Moreover, “state failure” is taken into account only when states have the potential to have an impact on the security of Western countries. Consequently, the discourse on failed states cannot be divorced from the military doctrines of Western powers or their foreign policies and economic choices; rather, it legitimizes a form of political interference (Bøås & Jennings 2005). Indeed, the argument that international threats to peace and security are associated mainly with state fragility has a weak empirical basis. For example, transnational terrorist networks do not flourish only in unstable states.

Finally, state-building policies neglect the cultural and social differences that are so essential to the identity of states, nations, and their peoples, and do not take into account the different possible meanings of the state. This leads to seeing local appropriations of these policies only as the expression of obstacles, diversion, or sabotage by local actors. In short, the state’s historicity in the South is completely neglected (Bayart 1996).

The question of international voluntarism deserves to be raised all the more since our contemporaries are pushing this “proactive” logic very far. Of course, peacebuilding action is not new. But today, it is at the same time globalized, systematized, and even established as an expertise, a science taught in the political science and law curricula of universities on the east coast of the United States. “Transitional justice” is today one of the most fully developed translations of this formalization of putatively universal expertise in the prevention and resolution of political conflicts. Created recently as a pragmatic response to the dilemmas of transitions to peace and democracy, it has in some 30 years brought together under its label disparate practices, which experts present as complementary tools for a “holistic” policy. The definitions preferred by international organizations are indeed global and holistic, according to Thoms, Ron, and Paris, referring to UN preferences (2008: 17). They include as many “tools” as possible (criminal and administrative justice—both national and international—and its suspension, including through amnesties, commissions establishing a historical “truth” on human rights violations, reparations to victims in all their forms, “memory policies”, reforms of the institutions most involved in violent repression, including those linked to development policies, etc.).

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE

“Transitional justice” is defined by the United Nations as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations Security Council, 2004: para. 8). Academic definitions, as well as those proposed by specialist think tanks such as the International Center for Transitional Justice, and those adopted by the United Nations are in line with the same approach. While these definitions comprise what appear to be complementary political choices, these elements can also be contradictory.

It is therefore up to transitional justice, during the “extraordinary” and “hyper-politicized” periods (Teitel 2002) that open after a dictatorship or civil war, to manage the consequences of political crimes in such a way as to perpetuate peace, stabilize a government that is preferably democratic, and repair the damage suffered by the victims, but also to calm them down, prevent the recurrence of violence, and even promote a just order. In the eyes of experts, the urgency and acuity of this issue justify a political and moral rethinking aimed at immediate public action. The particularity of a twofold transition, toward democracy and peace at the same time, gives these specialists a unique opportunity to participate in the rewriting of the “social contract” of a society “torn apart” by political violence. Transitional justice seems to them to have a “revolutionary” potential, for recreating a social bond at the same time as inventing an alternative justice. This desire of scientists and

experts to participate in the rebuilding of “torn” societies is certainly commendable. But it needs to be questioned. The urgency to act can take precedence over observation and careful description of practices. Many international action programs have thus been based on inaccurate descriptions of conflicts, both locally and globally.

The paradigm of “new wars”, associated in particular with the name of Mary Kaldor (2001) but very widely welcomed in the field of international relations, is a good example. It suggests that battles between organized armies and soldiers that respect their enemy have supposedly given way to terrorist raids and massacres, with no clear beginning or end. The duration of these wars has thus become indefinite, and their perpetuation inevitable. At the same time, these “new wars” have become “savage”: led by “warlords” supported by lost souls (such as child soldiers), taking civilians as their main target rather than a territory to be conquered or an army to defeat. The “new wars” are deinstitutionalized (Holsti 1990; 1996), or “privatized” for the benefit of warlords and failed or “collapsed” states (Zartman 1995). Politics have been replaced by culture, ethnicity, and religion (Kaldor 2004); old hatreds have re-emerged. The major ideological conflicts of the Cold War, with universal scope, have given way to community, religious, or clan-based mobilizations. Economic globalization and the withdrawal of the major powers have driven economic recession and increased competition for rents from, for example, mining resources (Doyle & Sambanis 2006; Berdal & Malone 2000).

This hypothesis of war’s transformation is questionable and even erroneous (Kalyvas 2001; Marchal & Messiant 2003; Malesevic 2008). Civil wars (including during the Cold War) have always been, and remain, local (Derriennic 2012). The actors who clash were often already clashing when they joined in the Cold War; they simply did so with different resources. The “savages” sometimes speak politically and even wield the weapons of universalist ideologies, while the guerrillas of yesterday also knew how to serve their clienteles and clans. The Soviets armed anti-communist Arab governments against Israel, while the United States armed radical Islamists in Afghanistan. Civilians have already been the targets of organized state wars. Even the idea that they have increased in number is questionable, since the number of wars has been reduced by a factor of six since the 1950s, as have the annual number of victims caused by these conflicts (from 20,000 deaths to 6,000 in the 1990s, and half as many in the 21st century). Perceptions of “new wars” are wrong; what they think is new (globalization, violence against civilians, “identity politics” (Kaldor 2001: 6), war chaos, etc.) is not; what they see happening does not happen (the weakening of the state by an allegedly wrongly deregulatory liberalism, the end of state nationalism). It is important to achieve a better understanding of the historical dimension of conceptions of peace and war that are undergoing change under the pressure of new doctrines and security measures at the turn of the 21st century.

Case 3:

Towards a New Military Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century

A. “We won the war and lost the peace”

This phrase is continuously heard in both the US press and in specialized magazines to refer to military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya (and other states) in recent years. In all three cases, military success was emphatic.

In 1996, two professors from the National Defense University, James Wade and Harlan Ullman, produced a document intended for the Pentagon, in which they argued that the United States should adopt a military strategy based on *rapid dominance* over an opponent by applying overwhelmingly superior force and firepower to paralyze, demoralize, and disorient (shock and awe) the adversary,

that is, to break their will to fight. Yet none of these military victories that adopted this strategy has led to peace. On the contrary, the wars were soon rekindled with enormous force in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and similarly at a later date in Syria, reviving the nightmare of America's quagmire in Vietnam or of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This led to the fast collapse of the "rapid dominance" theory.

B. State-building

In 2007, in the face of the deterioration of the Iraq and Afghanistan situation, America's post-Cold War triumphalism and full conviction of its military superiority began to fall apart. In January of that year, George W. Bush announced in a television address, under the provisional title of *The New Way Forward*, a new military strategy for Iraq called *the surge*, which rather than focusing on new troops and more sophisticated weapons, placed the emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population. As Mary Kaldor shows (2001), the old current in the US military that proposed a special treatment for so-called small wars (Pareja 2009), whose voices were not listened to during the Vietnam War, had begun to play a role in the doctrinarian re-evaluation in the United States of how to tackle "new wars". The change began with the approval of the US Department of Defense Directive 3000-05 of 28 November 2005, which was inspired by General David Petraeus, former commander of the International Security Assistance Force. This rethink also occurred within NATO, whose military guidelines have started to focus on state building and gradual stabilization rather than on military confrontation.

C. From National Security to Multidimensional Security

There are currently several different proposals for dealing with the "new wars" (the term coined by Mary Kaldor). Conservative sectors in the United States and Europe based on the old notion of *national security*, which is essentially aimed at ensuring a state's security and defense, have proposed changing the "global war on terror" expression that President George W. Bush proclaimed following the attacks of 11 September 2001), whereas Georgetown University professor Bruce Hoffman has formulated the expression "global counter-insurgency" to refer primarily to the fight against Jihadism (in particular Salafi Jihadism) (Hoffman 2016). In an intercommunicated world, there are no longer local insurgencies.

Moreover, since the 1990s, a school of thought has been developing that essentially places the onus on *human security* as the linchpin for dealing with uncertainty and conflict in today's world. This notion became widespread after the publication in 1994 of the Human Development Report (which proposed the famous "Human Development Index") devised by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). According to this vision, the ultimate recipient of security is not the state but human beings. The report then distances itself from a concept of military-type security and identifies seven categories to ensure human security from a global perspective: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Mary Kaldor, who adheres to this vision, has long held that global security conceived as human security and not as the fight against terrorism should be the central objective of world politics in the coming years. This entails the strengthening of multi-lateral institutions capable of developing conflict prevention policies and reducing violence combined with the ability to stabilize and rebuild nations at war, a strengthening of "citizen diplomacy" through specialized organizations and NGOs as well as a profound change in military doctrines in order to adapt strategies to the characteristics and challenges posed by the "new wars". Peacebuilding and stabilization and normalization policies should be their primary cornerstones.

Finally, a fourth current that seeks to creatively integrate notions of national security and human security is the concept of *multidimensional security*. This notion emerged on the occasion of the plenary assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) held in Barbados in 2002, embodied

in the “Declaration of Bridgetown: The Multidimensional Approach to Hemispheric Security” (2002), which holds that threats to hemispheric security are diverse in nature and multidimensional in scope and that traditional concepts and approaches (such as national security and human security) should be expanded to encompass both traditional and new threats, which requires the inclusion of political, military, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects. The Canadian diplomat Adam Blackwell, a former secretary of the OAS multi-dimensional security office, has repeatedly argued that “responses to crime and violence must be long-term actions tending to address their underlying causes.”

Simply put, in order to “find a way out of violence” in today’s world, it is crucial to undertake a profound renewal of military doctrines based less on “enemy building” (Conesa 2011) and war hypotheses and more on the global response to inequality and poverty and the reconstruction of states in many parts of the world.

The haste of international organizations, experts, and even scientists to participate in the establishment of lasting peace and to rebuild societies better able to prevent the recurrence of conflicts, leads to other diagnostic errors. Proposals made with a view to building peace are based on a too-rapid description of what violence is all about. The orientations of the social sciences are too often deduced from a dichotomy between war and peace that we now know cannot be taken as a given (Richards 2005). Rather, the “in-betweens” are dominant. Studies of certain conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have usefully blurred the border between war and peace, showing in particular that violence belongs to ordinary forms of “economic regulation” and to routine political processes. Marielle Debos (2013) has shown how a man in arms can take turns as a soldier, guerrilla, customs officer—a “fungibility” that must be related to the process of state building, whether at peace or at war.

In this respect, Colombia and Guatemala are perfect examples of economic—in this case, agrarian—issues at stake and the political negotiations that the state has had to conduct with armed groups.

Colombia

Of the 8,074,272 “victims of the armed conflict” in Colombia, 7,134,646 are cases of displacement, according to figures from the National Registry of Victims (Registro Único de Víctimas 2017). These figures have no parallel in other instances of armed conflict in Latin America and, given the scale of displacement, highlight the issue of control over rural property as one of the central themes of the continent’s longest war.

Over the past three decades, escalating hostilities between the insurgency and the state, the paramilitary threat, and the expansion of drug trafficking have forced millions of farmers to abandon their land, which has come under the control of illegal armed groups or large landowners who seized this opportunity to expand their holdings (Reyes 2016).

Legislation for the protection of victims was first implemented in 1997. Law 387 of 1997, the first to serve the displaced population, was followed by Law 975, the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, which recognized the victims’ rights to reparations. Finally, Law 1448, the Victims and Land Restitution Law, was enacted in 2011, marking the start of an extensive process of restructuration of rural property, which is still under way.

The Victims Law is arguably the most ambitious reparations project ever undertaken as a result of an internal armed conflict. As of 1 January 1985, the law recognizes as victims those who have been directly affected by violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) carried out by armed groups or agents of the state, and the law also includes victims’ immediate family members. It is

committed to addressing victims' demands comprehensively, from economic, psychological and educational issues, to symbolic and memorial strategies.

As for the restitution of lands, the law introduced a legal procedure to restore and regularize lands belonging to victims of dispossession and forced abandonment since 1 January 1991. Two key obstacles have been identified in the implementation of this procedure. First, the procedure is time consuming, owing mainly to a lack of information—an estimated 70 percent of claimed lots lack title deeds, in addition to the technical constraints of the public entities in charge of registering and identifying rural properties. Second, the state is unable to provide full guarantees to owners and communities for whom property restitution rights are recognized. These shortcomings have fuelled debate about the state's ability to process the claims within the law's ten-year time frame (Londoño 2016). At present, the government acknowledges that, after six years, 110,964 applications have been filed involving 98,534 properties, half of which have been processed, resulting in the registration of 21,688 cases, of which 14,878 have been filed with judges, who have issued 3,727 rulings pertaining to 5,558 properties (Unidad 2018). These numbers are inadequate when considering some estimates that set the potential number of claims at over 350,000, amounting to 6.5 million hectares, compared to the 2 million hectares estimated by the government.

Despite shortcomings in its implementation and the opposition of political circles with close ties to large landowners, the government was able, through the implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Law, to anticipate the demands that the insurgency would make three years later at the negotiating table. Thus, for the government, the first item of the agreements reached in Havana, on "Comprehensive Rural Reform", entails the implementation of a policy to overcome rural underdevelopment and restore dispossessed populations' rights which had been introduced before the negotiations, and not as a result of the demands of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The agrarian agreement reached in Havana integrated two new programs into the ongoing land restitution program: one for the distribution and another for the regularization of property. The first calls for the creation of a 3 million-hectare Land Fund, extracted from property annulment procedures, forest reserves, and the recovery of illegally appropriated unused lots. The second seeks the regularization of 7 hectares of currently occupied uncultivated plots without property titles. Were these ambitious goals to be achieved over the next few years, they would undoubtedly constitute the greatest transfer in rural land ownership in Colombian history, even surpassing the revolutionary demands.

Guatemala

Guatemalan society and its economy have experienced, throughout the 20th century, a retreat into traditional forms of concentration of rural property and labour control. The traditional structures of oligarchical ownership and control only appeared threatened during the country's brief democratic experiment, known as the Guatemalan Revolution, from 1944 to 1954, a period during which nationalist segments of the middle class attempted to consolidate themselves, promoting a process of political and economic modernization, agrarian reform being one of its cornerstones. This short democratic experiment gave way to a counter-reform that favoured landowners and entrepreneurs, spurred colonization in the north of the country, and encouraged the creation of small subsistence farms through a policy of micro-parcelling (Comisión Económica para América Latina 2001). The economic model based on export agriculture established in the west of the country, managed by a small number of landowners and sustained by a steady supply of labour from the indigenous areas of the highlands, was consolidated.

Despite being at the centre of the economic and social debate, the issue of agrarian reform only reappeared decades later, in the 1990s, during negotiations between the government and

the armed opposition represented by the Guatemalan Revolutionary Union. During this time, Guatemala was witness to the bloodiest armed conflict of the second half of the 20th century in Latin America. The toll of war was bleak. Combining data obtained by the Historical Clarification Commission and the Interdiocesan Historical Memory Recovery Project, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Ball *et al.* 1999) came to the conclusion that in Guatemala, which at that time had 10 million inhabitants, there were between 119,300 and 145,000 deaths associated with the armed conflict between 1960 and 1996, nearly 80 percent of which occurred between 1979 and 1984, during which time most massacres also took place. The number of internally displaced persons is in excess of 1 million, and some 400,000 refugees fled abroad. In addition, the vast majority of violent actions—83 percent—were committed against the indigenous population, which made up 55 percent of the national population. The scale and genocidal nature of this violence make it unique among armed conflicts in Latin America (Bastos 2004).

Frustrations resulting from the failed democratic project of the 1950s, a favourable regional context due to the triumph of the revolution in Nicaragua, and the alignment between rebels and indigenous communities, brought about an insurgent movement that was never able to pose a real threat to state power, as had been the case in Nicaragua or El Salvador. The military capabilities of the insurgency were always limited, even after its unification as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UNRG) in October 1982 (Rouquie 1992). This might explain why the Guatemalan government did not attempt to implement land ownership reforms as was the case in El Salvador, or policies for the recognition of victims and land restitution as in Colombia, which ultimately facilitated political negotiations to bring an end to their respective wars.

The agrarian issue reappeared in negotiations between the UNRG and the government only in the mid-1990s, ten years after the end of the war, after three military campaigns razed the indigenous settlements in the highlands between 1980 and 1984. The Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects of the Agrarian Situation, signed in Mexico in May 1996, called for the creation of a land acquisition fund (FONTIERRAS) as a market-based strategy to solve the problem of distributive inequity, avoiding the subject of agrarian reform, which was thus left off the agenda. The Peace Accords and World Bank proposals agreed that a land market-based agrarian transformation should include stronger property, registration, and real estate rights; the implementation of taxes; improved funding mechanisms to facilitate land purchases; technical assistance and facilities for the appropriate allocation of land; complementary social and economic investment; and environmental protection (Garoz & Gauster 2002).

The Land Fund (FONTIERRAS) implemented in 1999 in accordance with the peace agreements and following World Bank recommendations, did not yield significant results, due mainly to a lack of political will and adequate funding. The 1995-2005 decade, which corresponds to the period of greatest economic liberalization in Guatemala, not only resulted in the entrenchment of the agrarian structure, but also helped cultivate conditions for the hegemony of large landowners to continue and expand.

Through these examples, it can be seen that studies of transitional justice processes too often fail to note the extent to which the “new” state is the direct heir of the violent state with its rules of law, its institutions, its social networks, and its public service. “Purges” are rare. These too-rapid conceptualizations of violent conflict and, symmetrically, “lasting” peace must be questioned all the more urgently as they take the form of prescriptions and advice for the reconstruction of societies in transition from war to peace. Among the notions conveyed by transitional justice is one that is rarely questioned: the idea that these societies “torn apart by violence”, and in a situation of transition to peace and democracy, must be rebuilt, reunified, reconciled. If, we are told, these societies have experienced collective violence, it is because their “social fabric” is weakened, their “social capital”

squandered, their norms flouted, and their members disoriented, traumatized, and deprived of moral landmarks. The structures of these “anomalous” societies should be restored, their laws rewritten, their members put back into contact: “nothing less than rethinking the modalities of the global transformation of a traumatized society, and thus laying the foundations for a new social contract” (Andrieu 2012: 27). The moment of renewal that will inevitably open once the violence has subsided will finally mobilize the best that social theories and philosophies have designed, and translate it into social engineering.

While moments of “massive” or “intense” political violence are not the phases of emptiness, chaos, and anomie that underpin such assumptions, post-war periods are not *tabula rasa* either. The aftermath of conflicts appears to be fairly well-ordered periods, formed by pre-existing social codes, in which states are certainly *particular* but not societally abnormal or pathological (Dobry 1986).

Ordinary Public Policies

The term “public policies against violence” has a more general meaning: it can be used both in war or post-war societies and in societies that are experiencing relative peace and are concerned primarily with criminal violence or more structural violence, such as gender violence. However, this polysemy encourages us to be attentive to the possible continuity between such policies against violence and public action in general. Indeed, there is no evidence that a power, when producing or co-producing public policies against political violence, uses specific means unrelated to measures taken against, for instance, gender violence, or unrelated to any other public policy). The specificity of public policies against violence should not be deduced *ex ante* from the exceptionalities that periods of violence are also assumed to be (Dobry 1986), or from an alleged abnormal or pathological state (as opposed to an allegedly normal state of societies in peace).

This continuity between post-conflict and ordinary public policies stems from a simple observation: policies aimed at suppressing open conflict, regulating political violence, and building peace are nowadays at the international level, closely intertwined with other forms of intervention. The actors in the intervention claim, on the one hand, a continuum between humanitarian interventions, peacebuilding policies, and development policies. Any public policy, both national and international, can be examined in terms of its ability to “do no harm” (Anderson 1999)—that is, not to provoke violence. The mechanisms for peace and conflict regulation through the rule of law and justice have also taken into account the social and economic needs of the population since the 1990s. In March 2010, the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued a “Guidance Note on the United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice.” Its Principle 9 calls on the UN to “strive to ensure transitional justice processes and mechanisms take account of the root causes of conflict and repressive rule, and address violations of all rights, including economic, social and cultural rights.” This requirement is reflected in particular in the implementation of reparation policies for victims of political violence. In addition to this desire to ensure consistency in the content of policies, there is also continuity in the production methods of these policies. All, for example, are constrained by the need for recurrent audits and evaluations: since the 1960s, public action has no longer been dissociable from evaluation in the United States and the United Kingdom, then in the Scandinavian countries, and 20 years later in the other Western democracies. In particular, the European Commission has made it a systematic regulatory requirement in the funding allocated to Member States from the 1990s onwards.

A sociology of the actors of public policies to end violence

This shift in perspective, which questions the continuity between peace policies and war or post-war policies, makes it possible to make the same analytical shift as that made in public policy theory, which has led to the development of a political sociology of public action on the basis of three breaks: with political voluntarism, with the postulate of the unity of the state, and with that of the rationality of decisions (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2012: 17ff). In this way, this field of analysis has shifted from “diagnosing the failure of public policies”—considered ineffective, inefficient, and ineffective—to “understanding their implementation”, and it now focuses on “the articulation between social regulation and political regulation” (*ibid.* 19). This displacement overcomes the limitations of a top-down approach often favoured in the study of international conflict resolution policies, which is generally associated with a problem-solving approach focused on assessing the outcome of public policy in terms of success or failure, based upon the proclaimed intentions of the “international community”. This approach does not escape subalternist criticism of ethnocentrism due to the situated nature of Western thought about peace in relation to societies in the South.

A relational approach makes it possible to taken into account how international actors in charge of peace policies interact with local actors, particularly in relation to the latter’s own agenda, which is nevertheless reconfigured because of the international presence—local actors can indeed try to use a peace agreement “as an instrument for advancing their agenda” (Kriger 2003, 11). To understand the dynamics of the deployment of international peace policies, it is necessary to situate the analysis at the interface of the international and local actors involved in the process, to try to think about “the embedding of the situation”, as the notion of “hybrid peace” invites us to do, for example (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2016). In this way, we succeed in overcoming the international/local dichotomy that is too often present in peacebuilding analyses, and we give ourselves the means to update the role of “brokers” (Bierschenk Chauveau & Olivier de Sardan 2000; 2002), that is, social actors located in a local arena who act as intermediaries to attract external resources, who act as an interface between project recipients and donors, and who are expected to represent the local population or express their needs in relation to external support and funding structures. These, in terms of post-conflict contexts, can be considered as peace intermediaries.

If policies against violence are policies like any other, which borrow aspects and techniques from public policies that are *a priori* unrelated to the conflict, it is also because of those who design, implement, evaluate, and circulate them: from one country to another, from one sector to another, from one period in history to another. From this point of view, post-conflict policies are a common form of public action. They never consist of a solitary action by governments or states, but are a co-production of the various social and political actors, various mobilizations. It is not so much the content of these policies as their appropriation that is decisive (Mac Ginty 2011).

We must therefore ask ourselves, as scientists taking the time to describe the situations, what do the actors in anti-violence policies do? These actors include governments, of course, and agents of international organizations, but also, and in a significant way, experts circulating between universities, think tanks, NGOs, international organizations, and governments. Observing these peacemakers provides a better understanding of what is being done in the context of policy (in the same way that there is a better understanding of what some administrations of contemporary states are doing from noting that their agents have had previous colonial experience). It also makes it possible to define the action of these PPVs beyond the content of the programs—in particular which political games they allow to be played; which political rapprochements or reconfigurations of social hierarchies they allow; and who appropriates them (are they powerful, numerous, socially situated?).

Demobilization policies through the prism of a sociology of actors

The interference dynamics of local actors during the implementation of programs have been widely highlighted. More often than not in the case of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policies, however, combatants have been seen as actors diverting programs and diverting international objectives. It is preferable to consider these phenomena as appropriations, to be linked to the post-war situation of shortage of goods. In fact, international policies represent opportunities. It has been very often observed that the number of ex-combatants applying for reintegration programs has been significantly higher than the estimates made by intelligence agencies or organizations implementing such programs. In Kosovo, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) established the number of ex-combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army to be 25,000, while the highest estimates had been only 10,000. This phenomenon occurs because international actors are closely dependent on combatants in the implementation of programs: the certification of combatants' "service records" requires the intermediation of commanders of armed groups, who are the only ones who can attest to the combatant history of those who apply for a DDR programs (Duclos 2018). As a result, commanders of armed groups can behave as "bosses" allocating resources to obligated people, and this allows them to have lasting allegiances with these groups. This process is symptomatic of the attachment of armed combatant groups with the territories where they have deployed. In his observations of the FARC combatants' weapons storage areas in Colombia in 2017, A.-M. Losonczy notes that they reflect the geography of the conflict and lend themselves to the sustainability of the organizational patterns of the war, as well as to the maintenance of the daily activities that existed during the armed conflict. One of the main assumptions of international actors—that is, the need to destroy the role of armed struggle organizations and post-war combatants by dismantling their structures, to detach societies from armed groups, to break the allegiances of regular troops to their leaders, in short, to "dissolve the combatant fact" (Duclos 2015), through programs of DDR—stumbles over the importance and tenacity of the links built between combatants and non-combatants as well as between regular troops and their officers.

The demobilization processes for armed opposition groups are very often accompanied by organizational reconversion into a political party. The transition from "bullets to ballots" and the participation of ex-combatants in post-conflict public institutions (parliament, government, administration, etc.) are essential components of the "demilitarisation of politics" (Lyons 2009) because they reflect willingness to recognize the legitimacy of the state and to comply with the institutional rules of the game through peaceful means.

Qualitative and quantitative research carried out in recent years on transitions from armed struggle to political action has highlighted certain internal factors that condition the electoral success of ex-combatants. First, some studies note that the institutionalization of armed groups tends to be accompanied by internal tensions between moderate and radical branches, between grassroots activists and political leaders returning from exile or prison, and between founding cadres and new generations. They therefore highlight the ability of leaders to maintain some degree of cohesion as a major factor for an effective political transition (Engeland & Rudolph 2008; Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz 2016). Other research shows that armed movements from pre-existing political parties, which have maintained a distinct political branch (or government-in-exile) throughout the conflict, or which have managed parallel governance structures in areas under their control, find it easier to build on this experience to build a cohesive party in the post-war environment (Dudouet *et al.* 2016; Berti 2013).

Many peace agreements explicitly mention the right of demobilized armed groups to form political parties (as in El Salvador, Nepal or Colombia), or assign them positions in legislative or executive bodies (for example through interim "national unity" governments as established in

Burundi, Nepal, South Africa, or Sudan). Research on power-sharing mechanisms in post-conflict countries highlights their effectiveness in ensuring that the interests of all major social sectors, including former warring groups, are represented within the political system (Hoove & Scholtbach 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie 2003).

Although most political reconversions take place within the framework of negotiated peace agreements, there are other scenarios, largely under-researched to date, that involve armed groups engaging in self-managed DDR processes and moving from armed to peaceful politics in the absence of formal negotiations or peace agreements with the state. Examples include the attempt at an unfinished political transition of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara, or the self-managed demobilization of the Islamist Group (Gamaa Islamiya) in Egypt in the late 1990s, before the formation of a political party following the 2011 revolution.

The lack of international legitimacy has also played a crucial role in the failure of some armed groups to transform themselves into viable political parties (Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz 2016). One of the factors at play is the impact of the US-led “war on terror” after September 11th on international discourse about armed opposition groups, affecting their interest and ability to transform themselves into peaceful political actors. Indeed, the policy of banning, proscribing, and isolating armed movements around the world has prevented them from expanding their political activities, as evidenced, for example, by the experience of the Kurdish organization Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) in Turkey (Muller 2008). As for the role of international organizations, their technical support for the political conversion of armed groups remains rather limited, and most DDR support programs focus mainly on the socio-economic reintegration of combatants or their integration into security bodies. Only a few NGOs and non-state foundations provide explicit support for capacity building of new political formations from former armed groups, through technical training in organizational development, legal financing, administrative skills, or good governance.

As already noted, DDR programs implemented by the United Nations and other international actors tend to underestimate the importance of maintaining chains of command and internal discipline during demobilization processes, as well as political conversion. Yet, many past and current experiences demonstrate the usefulness of combatant monitoring structures to enable them to make a cohesive and orderly transition. Thus, self-help programs run by associations of ex-combatants can facilitate socio-economic reintegration while providing a means for members to peacefully express their political demands and engage in societal debates. This was the case, for example, with the (co-)creation of independent women’s organizations by female veterans in Aceh (Indonesia) and El Salvador, which, among other activities, provided technical training to women who wished to pursue a political career (Dudouet *et al.* 2012). These examples also indicate that the political reintegration of combatants does not necessarily involve a collective transformation into a political party and access to formal state processes through electoral or power-sharing arrangements. Other channels of participation or influence in policy making and public debate may be considered, such as in NGOs, social movements, veterans’ associations, interest groups, journalism, or the public sector. These transversal sectors of political reconversion deserve to be the subject of comparative research, as well as the largely documented transitions from arms to the polls.

CONCLUSION: IF VIOLENT CONFLICTS ARE THE RESULT OF UNEQUAL PUBLIC POLICIES, WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES?

In the end, studying policies to overcome violence through an “ordinary” sociological approach to public and collective action serves to highlight their character as simple “social” policies. The evolution of transitional justice, which has clearly been striving since the late 1980s to aggregate and organize the various forms of public policies against violence, is a possible illustration.

Transitional justice expertise has contributed significantly to changing the way political violence is viewed, drawing attention not so much to combatants and activists as to perpetrators and, more importantly, to victims. Three measures should contribute to their recognition.

First, if international standards are followed, post-conflict policies must include, if not damages awarded at the end of a civil trial, then government-funded reparation measures. These reparations can take the form of restitution (of a stolen painting, occupied land, or seized housing); reintegration into employment following a repressive experience, dismissal, or exile; and/or compensation for damage to property, violence suffered, detention imposed, or even the theft of a child or “lost opportunities”. These are both material and symbolic reparations: for example, when a child of the “disappeared” murdered by a military dictatorship obtains the right not to serve in the army—in effect, a right not to be in contact with the executioner. Second, this recognition also takes a public form: when a head of state acknowledges people’s suffering (and sometimes expresses the nation’s thanks); when funeral plaques are affixed in a street; when a place of repression is marked; or when, this time on a collective scale, a previously repressed political party becomes legal again. Third, victims have become strong figures in transitional justice systems, as the opportunity to express themselves has become established. Transitional justice and memory policies have indeed established a kind of victims’ right to expression. Not only are they given privileged access to public narrative spaces, thus contributing to the writing of their history and even of a broader history, but they also have been granted rights (to the truth, for example) and the means to exercise them—especially in the context of the International Criminal Court. Transitional justice is first of all given as “justice for victims”. The victims of serious human rights violations and their relatives, once supposedly poor sufferers and passive beings, thus become actors and even activists (Lefranc & Mathieu 2009).

The mobilization of victims has certainly played an important role in the fight against impunity for political criminals. But this should not make us forget that the victim is a very recent figure on the public scene, particularly in criminal matters. Moreover, this sanctification of victims is not without ambiguities: it builds characters who do not exist (the pure, traumatized victim), to the detriment of people with multiple roles and identities (political activists, the poor, women, etc.), but also gives them expectations that are not necessarily their own, and in so doing strictly frames the speeches they are allowed to make. An illustration of this paradox: transitional justice silences victims at the same time as it makes them talk—but this will not prevent them from speaking out later about unpleasant things (Lefranc 2014). Transitional justice tends to criminalize political violence (mainly as human rights violations committed by individuals), but it also individualizes victims. But this legal, “therapeutic” policy has been challenged, and post-conflict policies have thus been brought closer to ordinary public policies, with a focus on housing, land, social benefits, etc. Violent conflicts that have affected specific communities are thus followed by reparations policies that target social or cultural groups. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights—a judicial body that has worked extensively to recognize and implement the principle of reparation—has contributed to this development. For example, in 2004, in the case of Guatemala (see above), it ordered the use of the Mayan languages of the victims, and ordered the state to carry out modernization programs in addition to public works financed from the national budget allocated to this region or municipality (e.g., sewer system, drinking water supply, bilingual teaching staff, etc.). The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission followed an identical line, advocating collective reparations for the benefit of more than 1,400 indigenous groups.

Reparation policies for victims may even merge with general social policies, when it is no longer the damage or suffering endured by victims that is measured, but their current social situation. The step has been taken, more broadly, to demand a complete transformation of post-violence public policies. While the transitional justice policies developed in the 1980s and 1990s were all

“patches” allowing a political compromise between “outgoing” and “incoming”, between “violent” and “peacemakers”, states are now required to carry out comprehensive institutional reform that constitutes “the foundation of sustainable justice” (United Nations, Economic and Social Council 2005). More generally, the agrarian land issue has been brought to the forefront of public policies against. The way in which policies are conducted is also highlighted. Informed experts (such as those of the Berghof Foundation) now recommend an inclusive, “holistic” approach (emphasizing complementarity and coherence of public policies in different fields), “from the top” as well as “from the bottom” (including even informal and traditional actors), to state reform

All ordinary public policies, and particularly those that distribute economic, social and political resources among inhabitants, can now be credited with having an impact on political violence. In this respect, the policies deployed today are largely “signals”, the direct effects of which cannot always be anticipated. Armed groups will be demobilized, but may form delinquent groups that can be mobilized at any time (Hoffman 2011). Soldiers and judges will be trained in the primacy of human rights (habeas corpus), but agents of violent states will remain in office. Perpetrators of political crimes will be denounced, and their names sometimes given by truth commissions, but they will rarely be tried and convicted. History will be rewritten, but misunderstood (often in terms of individual excesses) and quickly forgotten—no common narrative is required, after all. Victims will have the opportunity to express themselves, but within a strictly constrained framework and without always receiving the promised compensation.

While transitional justice policies appear not to be detrimental, their consequences in terms of democratization and human rights protection are uncertain and at best weak. Policies recommended by international organizations (governmental and non-governmental) can signal the importance of inequalities, but also divert attention from structural problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue to promote research whose primary purpose is not to make recommendations.
2. Challenge an exceptionalist approach to war and post-war processes, using ordinary social science approaches, taking into account the continuity between these periods (e.g., regarding state structures) and questioning the hypothesis of widespread population “trauma”, for example.
3. Consider the dynamics of co-production of public policies between various actors, mainly governments and target populations, and abandon top-down and mandated approaches.
4. See the actors targeted by international policies not just as obstacles and consider them as brokers.
5. Consider post-war contexts in terms of their continuity from the period of armed conflict and the period preceding the war.
6. Renounce a Manichean and binary vision that sees well-meaning interveners with good intentions versus local actors who are ill-intentioned and unwilling to achieve peace.

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CHAPTER 6

Reconciliation and Justice

Leader: Elisabeth Claverie

Contributors: Christophe Charles-Alfred, Sophie Daviaud, Marie-Christine Doran, Aida Kanafani-Zahar, Sara Liwerant, Anne-Marie Losonscy, Zakaria Rhani, Julie Saada, Marianne Saracco

INTRODUCTION

The work of our group focuses on the politics of “justice and reconciliation” implemented in post-violence contexts, following either armed conflicts or authoritative and repressively violent regimes. Both types of violence have been present in certain cases, for example, in Colombia. We analyse the three main types of post-violence justice using different theories of justice: the extra-judicial commissions based on the model of the truth and reconciliation commission (TRC); criminal, national, international, or hybrid solutions; and, amnesties (direct or indirect, total or partial, conditional or unconditional).

These formulas may be combined, added to, or successive, or may be mutually exclusive from one moment to the next. These different practices are now commonly described using the expression “transitional justice”, and are an integral part of greater political measures for transition governments, which are often aided by international organizations who act as conditional backers.

“TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION” COMMISSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Since the first truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa and South America were first set up some forty years ago, many other commissions have been established, and have completed or abandoned their mission, all over the world. The empirical cases presented in this group report show that the application of international humanitarian law, or of a right to truth, is far from automatic. It is more often the result of persistent rallying and long-term struggles by certain parts of civil society against a politics of silence and forgetfulness. Amnesties are, more often than not, presented as a solution by successor governments as the very condition of reconciliation, at the expense of measures, judicial or otherwise, designed to clearly establish the facts¹. This happens in societies which remain economically and socially polarized, and where access to power is more dissymmetric, as well as in more egalitarian and democratic societies.

Nevertheless, critics of these approaches from civil society argue that numerous TRC frameworks allow governments to circumvent legal proceedings (the prosecution and public sanction of accused persons through judicial investigations and fair trials), to control the scope of accusations and those who can be charged, to control the opportuneness of prosecutions. Finally, even if critics acknowledge the many kinds of innovations and positive qualities of these TRC frameworks, notably in South Africa and Latin America, they nevertheless denounce them as being only the implementation of a less violent justice unfettered by the violent elements that usually constitute a

1. For example, Ilan Lax's article, in the volume edited by Cassin, Cayla & Salazar (2004), opens with these same terms.

retributive criminal justice. The latter is effectively accused, in this context, of preserving elements of vengeance² and of overly polarizing the positions of the accused and the plaintiff. Whatever their qualities, TRCs are accused by their critics of functioning to elude or prevent legal proceedings that would publicly prosecute and punish the accused.

The democratic transition in Spain in 1975, followed by that in Latin America beginning in the mid-1980s allowed “transitology” (Jaffrelot 2000)—a theoretical corpus which has been influential enough to merit its own sub-discipline in political sciences—to make the ideas of “consensus among the elite” and “political stability” central pillars of the theories of transition to democracy. In a simplistic way, these theories, which opposed political stability, social peace, and national reconciliation on the one hand, and the possibility of criminal justice for crimes committed during the conflicts on the other hand (Doran 2010, 2016), enabled amnesty on the matter of serious rights violations to be considered as the only possible alternative that would achieve national reconciliation, and that would not “rekindle past hatred”. Certain advances in international law, such as the implementation in the 1990s of international criminal tribunals, which were established in the name of the fight against impunity (including that of highly placed leaders), may thus be seen as blows made against a fundamental generalized tendency to consider amnesty, in cases of serious human rights violations, as the only possible solution to secure the social consensus and political stability necessary to put an end to the violence and successfully manage post-conflict situations. From a normative point of view then, we have two typical visions of justice and its relationship to peace as an ending: amnesty vs criminal sanctions.

Let us look succinctly at some normative definitions of the different forms of justice, which have been distinguished for around twenty years now in political philosophy following on from the work of John Rawls. Of these, two main normative models of justice take centre stage—retributive justice and restorative justice. According to its legal definition, retributive justice rewards or punishes breaches of the law, crimes and misdemeanours, *depending on the criminal value of the acts*, without taking into account (first of all) circumstances, instead focusing on the perpetrator and the damage caused by their act. The circumstances and the context, including “extenuating circumstances”, may have an influence in increasing or decreasing the harshness of the sentence but are never an element of relativization for qualifying the act and establishing its severity. The guarantee of legitimacy and the fairness of retributive justice reside in the fact that these so-called incriminating acts are socially acknowledged as transgressions, and are defined and listed in advance in public laws. The judgement of these acts (the establishment of infringement) is carried out following a set public procedure guaranteed by law in democratic regimes. The emphasis is placed on punishing the guilty person, which is perceived to be an act of reparation for the law, the society, and the victims. The focus of the more contemporary form of restorative justice is social reparation, which considers that the act of transgression targeted social cohesion above all else. It endeavours to include the perpetrator of the crime or misdemeanour in the reparation that they owe to the victim, working in various ways with the victim and the community against whom the crime was committed. In these frameworks, the perpetrator must publicly acknowledge their responsibility for their actions and, in exchange, receives a guarantee of exoneration from criminal prosecution, and thus also from the risk of incarceration. These principles have been transposed to mass crimes through truth and reconciliation commissions by using the formula of “full public admission for exoneration from criminal prosecution” except for the most serious crimes, which may be prosecuted (this was the underlying principle of the South African commission).

After Spain had set the precedent, further truth and reconciliation commissions were slowly

2. See the critic of Olivier Cayla (2004) on the retributive character of so-called restorative justice and inversely, the arguments for the promotion of restorative justice in opposition to violent justice in the respective articles in Cassin, Cayla & Salazar (2004).

established in Latin America in the 1980s, followed by the South African commission in the 1990s. It was also in the 1990s, and at the end of a long process (which we do not have space to discuss here), that international criminal tribunals appeared—the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994. These *ad hoc* tribunals were followed by the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) and by hybrid tribunals in Cambodia and Sierra Leone. The first hearing of the South African TRC was held on 15 April 1996, and the first hearing of the ICTY—the Tadic trial—was held on 7 May 1996. Thus, the 1980s and 1990s saw much progress in the spread of international human rights standards, and of international law in general, resulting in a current proliferation of these forms throughout the world with the inclusion of international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) within the internal penal codes of states that have ratified the Rome Statute, and thus able to prosecute on behalf of the universal jurisdiction.

However, if we observe more closely the effective acts of these different politics of reconciliation, we realize that international law does not follow an easy or automatic path. Let us examine a series of empirical cases, starting with Latin America. In these different states (here, notably, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina), the process of reconciliation often immediately takes the form of amnesty measures that prevent any use of criminal prosecutions—that is, preventing any impartial investigation of what happened, and of perpetrators, individual responsibility, and the organization of crimes.

Colombia

In 2016, Colombia, after nearly sixty years of armed conflict and a succession of political regimes that used armed violence, raised the hopes of the whole world when, under the government of Juan Manuel Santos and after four years of negotiations, it reached an agreement that resulted in the signing of a peace agreement with the oldest guerrilla organization in Latin America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) (Pizarro 2016). Indeed, in the case of armed conflicts, negotiations for the surrender of armed groups are one of the major elements of post-conflict (militiamen accept disarmament only on condition of amnesty).

Colombia has been anxious to include advances in international law in its national legislation and its constitution, and has been strongly influenced by the “restorative” and extrajudicial (rather than the judicial) component of the spectrum of feasible frameworks for transitional justice. As is often the case, however, Colombia presents a mix case of agreements, as a large number of perpetrators who have not committed “crimes against humanity”, as defined in international humanitarian law and international criminal law, have benefited from amnesty measures implemented during paramilitary demobilization in 2006 and FARC-EP demobilization in 2017. Yet ordinary criminal justice has not ceased to function for those perpetrators who refuse to tell the truth during Justice and Peace trials, which is the judicial part of the process. Members of armed groups (rebels or otherwise) consistently and immediately request the assurance of protection from eventual criminal prosecution as a condition of their demobilization. In Colombia these frameworks allowed the *early release* of more than 2,800 members of paramilitary groups of the extreme right who were perpetrators of crimes against humanity within the framework of the Justice and Peace Law (Daviaud 2010: 264-322), the only criminal law part of the “Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition”. The peace agreement that was signed on 24 November 2016 after four years of difficult negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas defines the conditions, including territorial conditions, of the reincorporation of the combatants into civilian life following the process of surrendering arms under the supervision of UN observers responsible for assuring the FARC demilitarization operations. Drafted over a long period, this peace agreement

has included since 2015 the acceptance by the parties of the creation of an extra-judicial “Truth Commission”, responsible for “bringing the truth to light” and with the purpose of assuring coexistence and the non-repetition of violence. This commission had been guaranteed beforehand, in 2012, by a constitutional amendment that proposed a legal framework for peace, “allowing the government to establish instruments for transitional justice” (Rowen 2017). This agreement then led the parties to finalize an “agreement on the rights of victims”. The agreement foresaw that the main FARC rebel leaders would be judged by special tribunals and could be subject to “freedom depriving sentences”—not necessarily prison, but instead favouring restorative measures.

At the end of the bill proposed by the Uribe government on alternatives to criminal prosecution bill, the framework of paramilitary demobilization saw an important reshuffling due to the rallying of a coalition of different stakeholders in the process: members of parliament from different political leanings, national and international human rights NGOs, and the Constitutional Court (Daviaud 2010, chapter 7). Thus, the final version of the Justice and Peace Law foresees, in article 3, suspending criminal prosecution against perpetrators of massive human rights violations and replacing them with alternative sentences if the latter contribute “to national peace, to justice, and to reparations for victims”³. Furthermore, as Arango García (2013: 118) and Doran (2017b) have explained using the rules of temporal jurisdiction, the Justice and Peace measures apply only to crimes committed by the different armed groups and not to those committed by the Colombian state, which are certainly less abundant but nevertheless very problematic. The Colombian state now finds itself above the rule of law, even though numerous international human rights violations were committed by its agents—the *fuera pública* (public forces) and the police (special armed squads) during the conflict. Not acknowledging the mistakes of armed state agents was the norm until 2013, although there was no formal amnesty law designed to exonerate soldiers (Daviaud 2010, chapter 5). Felipe Arango García (2013: 118) has explained that the Colombian government has always defended the idea that serious human rights violations committed by soldiers were due to “non systematic army misconduct” in the performance of their duties. These violations were also committed without the knowledge of the government, a claim that has been strongly contested in countless reports by national and international organizations. This situation is partly explained by the nature of Colombian democracy, which is “low-intensity” (Avilés 2006) and in which social movements are traditionally considered as allies of Marxist guerrilla groups—a fact that explains why such a great number of civilians were victims at the hands of paramilitary and regular soldiers. In this context of intense combat against social conflict, which is reminiscent of anti-conflict Chilean democracy, not punishing those responsible for state violence during the conflict may act as a sign of encouragement for the forces of order to continue to consider social movements and citizens as enemies to eliminate.

Thus, the peace agreement is composed of several extrajudicial and coordinated judicial mechanisms, and includes several bodies. First is an extrajudicial commission “for the clarification of the truth, coexistence and non-repetition”, which has the objectives of listening to the victims, getting certain perpetrators of violations to tell the truth about what happened and getting them to acknowledge and admit their responsibility in committing criminal acts, for the purpose of establishing the historical framework of violence and the rights of the victims. A second component is a “Search Unit for Missing Persons”, as well as the identification of their remains; while a third is a reparations framework integral to the construction of peace, that is, a non-judicial framework for those who confess their crimes that organizes acts of reparation to the victims (acts of collective

3. Official Journal 45.980, LAW 975, 25/07/2005: “By which are enacted provisions for the reincorporation of members of organized armed groups outside the law, that contribute in an effective way to the attainment of national peace and enacts other provisions for humanitarian agreements”.

reconstruction, restitution of land, return of the displaced, psychosocial care, etc.). Finally, a fourth part, which is judicial, was created in 2015—“the special tribunal for peace”. This was to satisfy, in the language of the law, the victims’ rights to justice and to peace. At the end of investigations, the Colombian government is committed to prosecuting and judging the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (or armed conflict rights). This tribunal also has a temporal jurisdiction, limiting the violence to the period of armed conflict with FARC.

The Colombian peace agreement between the government and the FARC guerrillas has been subject to high tension and strong disagreement. Indeed, the process has incited and elicited states of tension in the political class; among soldiers, paramilitaries, and police forces; in the guerrilla ranks; and in the heart of civil society. It has reactivated and elicited in the public sphere conflicts of interest, conflicts of political culture, and territorial conflicts that were already old. Indeed, partisans of the agreements negotiated with FARC and supporters of a military solution against the rebel groups continue to confront each other in public life. Such contests have been reactivated with the election in August 2018 of a conservative, Ivan Duque, who, after two terms of the Santos government, now wants to review all of the agreements with FARC.

Chile and the force of amnesty

Chile, which is considered a model of democratic transition (Joignant 2005) and of “reconciliation democracy” (Doran 2016: 73ff.), constitutes an indispensable case for the analysis of the normalization and acceptance of amnesties for crimes committed during the dictatorship. In numerous other Latin American countries, it can be seen that the effects of amnesty justification and the will to not go back to the past have had noticeable effects on the perpetration of violence, notably the violence of state agents against the civilian population. Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia have all implemented a political justification for amnesties, founded on overlooking the harm done by the soldiers in favor of blaming the victims of the regime. The case of Chile perfectly illustrates the justifications used in numerous countries that have lived through dictatorships and state terror (Pion-Berlin 1989), notably all the countries of the Latin American Southern Cone—Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay. They also all cooperated with each other during the period of military regimes through the infamous Operation Condor, which allowed for the exchange not only of political prisoners and information, but also of torture and execution techniques.

The emblematic case of Chile illustrates the legal, political, and social consequences of an account justifying amnesty for military crimes, an account in which state violence is completely removed and in which victims are viewed as deserving of their lot. Indeed, in this country, which was subjected to a long dictatorship between 1973 and 1989, the amnesty law implemented by the dictatorship in 1978 is still in force. Although this has been offset by certain advances in international law carried through by the demand of populations (Doran, 2010), these advances have been strongly contested by various governments in spite of the return to democracy in 1990, with the exception of the first government of Michelle Bachelet in 2006. There is an almost permanent confrontation between social forces that together have taken part in the great “epic for justice” (Riesco 2001), which began in 1998 with the attempt at trying Pinochet in Spain and his defense by the government and political forces, including the centre-left, that defended the Chilean “reconciled democracy”. However, this protection of Pinochet ignited the outrage of civil society and elicited a popular demand for justice, which grew in scope in the 2000s.

While numerous transitologists (Bazzana 2000) have praised the reconciled democracy, it involved both not challenging the amnesty on crimes committed by the state, so as not to rekindle tensions, and banishing social conflicts, which were seen as bearers of instability and violence and, according to these views, had brought on the dictatorship. Taking the denial of justice as a target in

this restrained democracy, the confrontation between upholders of justice and upholders of “stable democracy” took on such a stature that numerous new political sectors on the left have proposed since 2011 a constitutional assembly to finally get rid of the constitution inherited from Pinochet, which was still in force in spite of reforms finally implemented in 2015 and “post-dictatorial” nature of the democracy (Doran 2016: 83ff.). While imposing on the population a “reconciliation” without any admission of guilt or request for forgiveness by the soldiers who committed crimes against humanity during the dictatorship, one of the most important consequences of the force of the amnesty in Chile was, in addition to blocking any possibility of justice, to impose a dominant account that justified state violence against the population. In the absence of armed guerrilla groups, Chilean soldiers justified the coup d’état and the bloody regime that ensued through the “excess of social demands” favoured by the elected socialist government of Salvador Allende’s *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity), as well as the political polarization and disagreement of that time. This argument was, of course, combined with the fear of communism during this period of the Cold War. In this account, which Alejandra Barahona de Britto characterizes as true “victim blaming”, the peaceful civilian population was thus made responsible for having provoked the reaction of the military.

This victim-blaming account, which was shared by the totality of the Chilean political elite that negotiated the transition and that excluded representatives of the people in the process of democratization (Bermeo 1999), notably the *pobladores* (inhabitants of the shantytowns who had been involved in the large *protestas* (protests) for democracy and who had paid with their lives), had a legal, political and social price. Thus, since the return to democracy following the first presidential elections in December 1989, successive Chilean governments have not stopped politically blocking any development in international law that would have challenged the amnesty law (Doran 2016, chapters 4-7). These political initiatives, which preserve the heritage of the amnesty in the name of a “fear of popular violence” and of victim blaming, were also prolonged by a legal architecture that favored impunity for state violence (UN Committee Against Torture 2014) and seriously harmed the civil and political rights of the population. Thus, in Chile, a set of laws inherited from the dictatorship has been reinforced democratically, for example, by the Anti-Terror Law, which continues to systematically violate the individual, civil, and political rights of Chile’s indigenous peoples, especially the Mapuche, by labeling them as terrorists (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2014). Sentences of several years handed out on the basis of nothing more than suspicion, systematic torture in Chilean prisons, as well as extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances since 2000 illustrate the effects of a system in which amnesty, on the one hand, and victim blaming, on the other, have allowed previous state violence to be legitimized and for such violence to still be carried out in other forms.

According to a report by the International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme) in 2012, Chile is among five Latin American countries that target social movements the most, a practice that has given rise to the phenomenon of the *criminalization* of social movements (Le Bonniec 2003, Peñafiel 2015, Doran 2017a). In an amnesty situation, the claim for justice by populations or by social groups who have an interest in acknowledging it, is a constant challenge. In a country like Chile, in which its supporters celebrated the amnesty as a sign of the “success” of the reconciliation process and of a democracy “without social conflicts”, the very formulation of a justice claim was a considerable challenge. It would take more than eight years before the accusation of an “illegitimate claim for justice” could be undermined by struggles against impunity, and a new and deeply revitalized democratic period could begin through the claiming of justice (Doran 2010, 2016).

Sociological studies of rallying have shown that the multiplication in the number of trials has been influenced less by international standards against impunity and more so by collective rallying

against impunity, which seems to be a determinate factor in Latin American territories, especially in Argentina, Peru, and Colombia. In these three countries, where TRCs were established as a way to end political violence, or where the creation of a TRC was foreseen in the peace agreements with FARC, everything happens as if transitional justice *no longer prevented the exercise of criminal justice*, but was a part of it. In this context, the issue of time seems to be essential. We can observe that the first Latin American countries to establish transitional justice frameworks (Argentina, Chile) were also those that, more than thirty years after the dictatorships ended, saw what Henri Rousso (2000) qualifies as a “second purge”—a reference to the trials brought against Nazis leaders in the 1960s for crimes against humanity. In the cases studied, following the development of transitional justice policies, “a response time” was necessary before those justice policies that were adopted during the transition, which were nothing short of “policies of injustice” (Lefranc 2002), could be challenged under the momentum of rallying by civil society upon the arrival of new governments.

Argentina

In Argentina, Alfonsín’s new democratic government made the demands and values of the human rights movement its own: the first three military juntas were judged, and a National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), with the purpose of carrying out investigations into crimes committed during the dictatorship, was created. The 1985 trial provoked a growing anxiety in the military as well as several kidnappings (in 1986 and 1987), which the government reacted to by pushing for the adoption of measures that would prevent further trials being held. After two further military insurrections, President Menem issued presidential pardons in 1989 to free soldiers convicted of human rights violations during the dictatorship, including junta ex-commandants and former guerrillas. However, Elizabeth Jelin (2006) has shown how, in spite of impunity laws, human rights movements in the country have shown a considerable degree of ingenuity in keeping claims for justice in the public sphere. There have been increasing numbers of lawsuits both abroad but also in Argentina itself: charges were filed in Spain by Judge Baltasar Garzón in April 1996 and charges for kidnapping minors were filed in December 1996 by the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, circumventing the amnesty laws, which did not cover crimes of appropriation that involved falsifying identities.

Furthermore, based on legal arguments developed during the previous years, “truth trials” began in 1998. A new turn in the struggle against impunity for the crimes during the dictatorship took place on 6 March 2001 when Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo declared the impunity laws to be “unconstitutional and void”. This sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2005 and marked the renewal of hundreds of legal proceedings.

With the arrival in power of Nestor Kirchner in 2003, a real window of opportunity opened up for movements against impunity. He managed to have the amnesty laws repealed by the Chamber of Deputies in 2003, and then by the Supreme Court in 2005. In addition, after nullifying the amnesty laws, Nestor Kirchner and his wife, Cristina, implemented a public policy that advocated trials by awarding considerable financing to federal courts that were responsible for judging the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, as well as to educational programs emphasizing the pedagogical value of the trials.

HYBRID LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Lebanon

In Lebanon, a society organized on a community model, the end of the war was organized through

the state negotiating the Taif Agreement. In its preamble, that agreement renewed the pact of communal life and the coexistence of different and diverse religious families. One of the major justifications for this was restraining the violence that had triggered cycles of family and community vengeance. It unequivocally acknowledged the multifaith makeup of the nation and that religious pluralism is one of its pillars. On the other hand, the agreement did not include any clauses concerning the war, a conflict that had claimed 500,000 victims (if the number includes those killed, injured, and handicapped, as well as the thousands who disappeared). Neither those who waged the war nor the human rights violations that took place were mentioned, with the agreement remaining silent on the matter of the victims, dead or alive. The mechanisms by which war crimes could be brought to light, and the diagnosis of the reasons which led to them, were not broached, neither was any reflection begun on how to avoid the repetition of human rights violations. The victims remained on the margins of national priorities. Thus, a “public acknowledgment” of the events of the war—that is, “stating the facts publicly”, and “admitting that they are not only a historical reality but that they were also mistakes”, to quote A. Garapon (2002)—did not take place. On the contrary, what the Taif justification system and its model of reconciliation responded to was, to borrow Paul Ricœur’s expression on the amnesty, a need for “emergency social therapy, under a sign of utility, not truth” (Ricœur 2000: 589).

The “General Amnesty Law for crimes committed before March 28th 1991 which were subject to specific conditions” of the agreement, was passed in 1991. Article 3 lists the crimes excluded from this law, which include “crimes received by the Justice Council before the expiration date of the law; murders and attempted murders of religious leaders, political leaders, Arab and foreign diplomats” (“Al-‘uqûbât” 2000). The jurist Nizar Saghiy  qualified these exceptions as “unacceptable distinctions”: “By establishing this distinction, the legislator seems to assign a higher value to the leader. Only the murder of a leader is deemed punishable while the collective massacres, the crimes against humanity, and the ordinary victims are forgotten” (Amnesty International 2007).

The government established official commissions on the disappeared without seeking consent on the results from families. The establishment of an independent commission, which would shed light on human rights violations, as well as the drafting of bills to ensure that these violations were not repeated have been the main demand made to public authorities over the years. In this way, the right to the truth is one of the main claims made by families of the disappeared and the human rights organizations that support them, as well as by numerous civilians committed to remembering the war.

The period between 2007 and 2008 was marked by deadly confrontations between soldiers from two factions formed the day after the murder of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and the need to “remember the war” of 1975 was openly considered as necessary to prevent a falling back into violence by several civil organizations that formed spontaneously in reaction against more violence. Various organizations and many members of the public share the vision that remembering deceased victims, establishing that violations of humans rights took place, and creating a space for surviving victims to tell their stories will all contribute to establishing a way to foster collective memory and bring together conflicting accounts. Since the end of the war, various Lebanese artists (filmmakers, photographers, writers, dramatists) have settled on the theme of memory in Lebanon as a way to explore identity. In this context, remembrance is a way of compensating for the silence of Taif on war crimes.

Socially and politically, the Taif Agreement may be viewed as “continuity without transition”. First, there is continuity in the socio-religious system, which is based on the religious community and its political leader, just as it was previously. Murders and attempted murders of political leaders of religious communities are excluded from the scope of the amnesty law, which, in the name of “national reconciliation”, grants ministerial terms to certain leaders who were leaders of militias

during the war. Second, there is an absence of transition because no way exists to shed light on the events of the war and bring justice to victims. No reflection has begun on how to avoid repeating these events. No structure or framework, such as an independent truth commission, has been established to shed light on violations, establish facts, or create a space for the surviving victims to speak out. Furthermore, the dual task of remembering and of writing history (by professional historians) remains to be done. This could help to bring together partial memories and, in so doing, create the foundations for a shared memory.

Morocco

As has already been seen, the histories and experiences of political reconciliation as a way to put an end to violence depend on several factors: the nature of the regimes in place; the nature of the ruptures and the political transitions; power relations; historical and geographical contexts; the degree of empowerment of civil society and of the victims of violations; the nature of victims' claims; and the nature of the violations and to what extent they were systematic.

In contrast to the Lebanese process, the Moroccan experience of reconciliation includes a truth commission. The experience began in the 1990s, mainly after media coverage of certain serious human rights violations, and at a moment when the democratic transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe were starting. For the first time, the regime found itself having to acknowledge its abuses and to undertake the dismantling of the system of exception, which had stiffened during the violent conflicts that had marked the Kingdom after independence. In the political language of Morocco, "turn the page" means a willingness to put an end to the political violence of the "Years of Lead".

The history of the reconciliation process is marked by the successive creation of two different commissions (Slymovics 2001, 2005, 2008; Linn 2011; Loudiy 2014; Rhani *et al.* 2016; Laouina 2016; Rhani 2017). First of all, the Independent Arbitration Commission was created in 1999 to identify and compensate former victims of forced disappearance and arbitrary detention. Due to its restricted definition of "victim"⁴, the commission did not consider other forms of individual reparation, such as medical care, psychological care, or social rehabilitation. Neither did the commission consider collective forms of reparation, such as commemoration, the identification of burial sites, the return of victims' remains to their families, and the rehabilitation of those indirectly affected by the violence and of victim regions.

As a result of these limitations, the policy of reparation was strongly contested by former victims and human rights activists, and the granting of a *de facto* amnesty to the torturers and the influencing of the compensation process by denying a right to appeal was heavily criticized. Opposition was consolidated by the creation of the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice (FMVJ), which advocated for a national reconciliation process that was both wider in scope and more inclusive, following the example set by truth commissions in Latin America and South Africa. Thinking beyond financial compensation, they wanted the process to consider both the collective and individual suffering of victims through tangible actions, including medical care, socio-economic integration, legal rehabilitation, the return of disappeared persons, as well as commemorative celebrations, the construction of memorials, and programs to address the historiography of the conflict.

The efforts of the FMVJ and of human rights organizations resulted in the creation of a new

4. The Independent Arbitration Commission decided to examine certain cases submitted for examination beyond its scope of inquiry, including: death following injury from bullets suffered during a determined incident; capital execution in application of a judicial sentence; incarceration in certain secret detention centres; requests for social rehabilitation; request for medical care and for the restitution of possessions and property.

commission in 2004: the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER). The IER program included carrying out investigations into human rights breaches that occurred between the independence of the country and the establishment of the Independent Arbitration Commission—which also coincided with the death of the previous king, Hassan II. In its examination of the previous commission, the IER highlighted three main limitations of the first attempt at reparations, notably the focus on legal proceedings and financial compensation for victims (Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2010). The IER thus tried to go beyond a strictly legal and financial conception, displaying a more comprehensive approach in which reparation processes are “a form of public institution of victims’ truths and survivors’ experiences”. Inspired by experiences of transitional justice in various countries, the IER reparations approach looked to take into account a group of measures that the state should take to favor equity and justice, to guarantee “non-repetition” and to “preserve memory”. In so doing, the notion of victim became redefined to include all physical and psychological violations endured collectively or individually. In this new perspective, a “victim” could be a dependant, a close family member or a member of the victim’s household, or a person who, in intervening to help a victim or prevent other violations from occurring, suffered physical, mental or material injury (Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2010). In addition to financial compensation for physical and moral injuries, reparation in the IER program also refers to medical and psychological rehabilitation, to social and legal reinsertion⁵—notably nullifying charges on police records⁶—and to forms of collective reparation. Together with the organization of public hearings for victims, these types of reparations have the ambition of transforming certain spaces that were the theatre of “serious violations” into socio-political projects and places of remembrance, notably museums. Despite not being a judicial body, the IER has indeed been able to carry out investigations, gather witness statements, build archives, and analyze a considerable quantity of depositions and reparations requests.

Despite its other goals, the IER has assigned an “extreme importance” to financial compensation, and considers it as the state effectively acknowledging the serious violations suffered by the victims. Although the collective reparations program is still only a proposal, social integration, resolving administrative problems, and certain aspects of medical rehabilitation may also be included within the scope of overall financial compensation. The first generally corresponds to material compensation—housing, access to transport, or sometimes their monetary equivalent. The second generally consists of settling the situation of persons suspended or dismissed from their jobs, either by counting the period of suspension in the administrative operation, or by reintegrating them into administrative life—granting them overall compensation and paying damages—or by compensating them if they choose not to return to their job, which is often the case. The third is connected to the nature of the consequences and whether they can be medically treated. If treatable, the victims are eventually offered medical coverage, but if they’re not, victims are compensated for any permanent partial handicap (*invalidité partielle permanente*, or IPP)⁷.

Thus, in spite of a comprehensive reparations project, the reparations approach implemented

5. Social reinsertion applies to several categories: notably, victims who, not having a previous social situation before the violation, find themselves, due to their age or state of health, incapable of successful social reintegration; victims who lost their jobs in the private sector; victims who were studying and were unable to obtain their diplomas during their period of incarceration; victims who, as schoolchildren or university students, were not able to complete their studies during their period of incarceration (Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2010).

6. Notably, victims of arbitrary detention and forced exile who, afterwards, were subject to legal proceedings and correctional or criminal judicial sentences, or persons who were subject to legal proceedings or sought without being convicted. Legal reparation also refers to stopping harassment at border posts and the restitution of the person’s passport (Instance Équité et Réconciliation 2010).

7. This approach measures the physical and psychological consequences of an accident, thus allowing the determination and compensation of damages that correspond to a medically assessed incapacity.

by the IER is still quantitative and material in certain aspects. This was true to such an extent that the decisions taken were contested by several victims and human rights organizations, as was the case with the first commission. They were especially criticized for being discriminative and exclusive: excluding certain persons from being compensated, not granting social rehabilitation to everyone, not granting compensation equally, and, especially, rejecting a considerable number of reparations cases deemed to fall outside the specified time period. Those affected feel that they are once more the victims of an injustice perpetrated by a process and a system that supposedly wishes to reconcile them and award them reparations.

Furthermore, the temporality of reconciliation does not concern only the specified time period for reparations but also the historical period, an issue that is addressed only in a restrictive manner by the IER. The commission's program, as we have seen, consists of carrying out investigations on breaches of human rights for the period from independence until the end of Hassan II's reign. The victims of violations before and after this period are excluded from any reconciliation process, the goal of which has proven to be less ethical and moral and more political—assuring a peaceful political transition between the two reigns.

Thus, political reparation is not an open process but an operation that is controlled and limited in both meaning and time. According to several victims that we interviewed, financial compensation and medical rehabilitation—the only tangible means of reparation established by the state—need to be complemented with other forms of compensation (e.g., looking for disappeared persons; the identification and reburial of the disappeared's remains; public apologies; the presentation of accounts and prosecution of those responsible; cultural and political actions of commemoration; and revaluation of places that were theatres of violence). Only this type of global and comprehensive approach to reconciliation and reparation could, in their opinion, give some semblance of an ending to the inconsiderate use of violence and force.

Indeed, the philosopher Loudiy (2014)—herself a victim of violence—sees the Moroccan experience of transitional justice as lacking coherence, rarely attaining the goals of justice—the truth has not been revealed, justice has not been rendered, and no other symbolic form of justice has been proposed. In other words, the regime did not consider lustration—which consists of dismissing those responsible for crimes from all state functions—as a means of symbolic justice, just as it refused to apologize to the Moroccan people for previous mistakes and past violations. In Loudiy's opinion, not establishing the right distance between torturers and victims is a sign of an attitude of tolerance towards the violence to which citizens were subjected as well as the suffering they endured, which additionally contributes to reiterating the violence and suffering. An appropriate legal distance demands another form of political distancing, a break with former practices of power: “no impartiality and distance without a break [with the past]”, as was so well expressed by one of my informants, for whom the Moroccan reconciliation is less about a willingness to break with the past than a logic of cooperation and staging in an attempt to clean up the image of a country that has been stained by human rights violations.

According to the victims of political violence, a real end to past and present violence is possible only through the expansion of a global culture of reparations and justice. Of course, such justice will never be capable of rectifying all the mistakes made, but its importance comes from the political and symbolic efficacy of prosecutions rather than the exhaustiveness of the prosecutions made (Borneman 2002, 2011; Loudiy 2014). What matters, in other words, is a sincere effort to establish and reinforce the independence of judicial powers, and thus to start to build citizens' trust in institutions. An end to the violence is possible only if the steps taken for transitional justice are made with a willingness to strive for more global justice. Reconciliation then becomes a corollary to a serious process of democratization.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The post-conflict frameworks in the DRC have been undertaken more recently and have raised a new set of questions. The Democratic Republic presents a (now more frequent) case of a convolution of frameworks in a situation where internal or internationalized armed conflicts, of varying intensity, have not ended, especially in the East of the country. Since 2003, four laws that enshrine amnesty in various legal documents (a decree law and three amnesty laws) have been passed—in 2003, 2009, and more recently, in 2014. However, all these laws exclude amnesty for the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (the so-called international crimes)—and so allowed the DRC to send several leaders of armed rebel groups to the International Criminal Court in the Hague⁸, on the basis of these main accusations. Nevertheless, the laws do include amnesty for other crimes, under the scope of different agreements made between the DRC government and different rebel movements. It is also very revealing to note that these amnesties are presented as necessary to reconciliation, tolerance, and peaceful cohabitation among Congolese populations. Even those political and social forces that did not take sides between the armed groups and the government are affected by the injunction to accept the amnesty in the name of tolerance and reconciliation. It should also be noted that certain amnesty laws, such as Law n°09/003 (7 May 2009) concerning amnesty for acts of war and insurrection committed in the Provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, are applicable to all perpetrators of violence living in the DRC territory and abroad. The 2014 amnesty law suspended prosecutions in progress, which further limits the claims made for justice with respect to breaches of law other than international crimes.

New forms of violence and the consideration of “grey zones” have led to a challenge to the dichotomy between war and peace. Thus, together with the more classic frameworks for ending violence—which, depending on the context and the period, may constitute amnesties made up of peace agreements and criminal trials (which may, as we have seen, be the product of long social, legal and political struggles)—another form has emerged, that of the truth and reconciliation commission. These three main frameworks are guided by their own institutional logic. Once the decision has been taken to use criminal proceedings (whether international/internationalized or by way of universal jurisdiction), the legal logic of criminal rationality leads to the search for individual criminal responsibility of the accused⁹ founded on the legal truth that emerges from the establishment of the facts. On the other hand, at the same time, the “post-conflict” engineering of organizations/NGOs promotes (often national) “reconciliation” goals, as a standard of construction for the establishment of facts, while the construction of memory policies implements transitional justice (Gensburger & Lefranc 2017; Rousso 2016, chapter 10). Finally, the negotiation for the end of violence through elaborate peace agreements is marked by transactions between the government and/or armed groups, for a new redistribution of powers and protection for the perpetrators of violence. These different logics in the fields of law and morality, and the political strategies of those involved, lead, on the one hand, to recourse to two models of justice—judicial and transitional—and, on the other hand, to the technologization of ending violence. These fragments of politics lead, paradoxically, to depoliticization effects on collectives undone by violence.

8. Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga, Matthieu Ngudjolo (acquitted), and Bosco N'taganda, armed militia leaders in Ituri, in the east of the Congo, were sent before the International Criminal Court by the DRC State (Kabila government) for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the 2000s (Claverie 2015).

9. The amnesty constitutes the legal form of a “right to forget”. As for criminal responsibility, the principle of individual responsibility of physical persons was adopted in the London Agreement, after legal discussions. According to a principle of the Nuremberg law, also founding principle of classical criminal law, the examination of criminal responsibility may lead to a declaration of criminal irresponsibility, acquittal, or a declaration of responsibility, leading to the determination of a punishment. On the principle of individual criminal responsibility of subordinates, see Liwerant (2000).

In the context of interstate and intra-ethnic conflicts between government and armed groups, the first consequence of ending violence generally concerns stopping acts of violence through negotiations, sometimes under the supervision of international organizations, to obtain a peace agreement¹⁰ or a ceasefire. Thus, we see various techniques and concepts being used by international organizations, including, primarily, the United Nations. On the African continent, the management and resolution of conflicts by the pan-African Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) went from the principle of non-intervention to non-indifference on genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes¹¹. "Peace", insofar as it concerns the process of exiting violence, is associated with the combination of the concepts of security and development, which led to the primacy of the "human security" principle at end of the Cold War. The example of the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security, and Cooperation for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region signed in Addis Ababa on 23 February 2013 reveals traces of the development-peace connection as well as the application of new methodologies greatly inspired by management techniques.

Given that "the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo continues to suffer from cycles of recurrent conflicts and persistent violence from national and foreign armed groups"¹², the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region (hereafter the Framework Agreement) was signed by 13 states, under the supervision of four international organizations. Considered as "the Agreement of hope"¹³, it prescribes tangible actions through three levels of commitments: those of the international community, those of the signatory countries, and those of the Democratic Republic of Congo¹⁴.

Under the Framework Agreement, the Democratic Republic of Congo has agreed to six commitments, which make this international agreement unique. Indeed, it envisages reforms covering almost the totality of the sectors that make up the state, focusing on all public, private, and intimate spaces: the "consolidation of the authority of the State", the "structural reform of State institutions", the "promotion of economic development", and even "national reconciliation" and "tolerance", via pursuing reforms in the security sector and decentralization processes. If regional¹⁵

10. Certain agreements anticipate amnesty frameworks, such as that for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decree Law N°03-001 of 15 April 2003, which accorded a provisory amnesty following the 2002 Global Inclusive Agreement for war events and breaches of politics and opinion. On the amnesty, see above.

11. The Protocol for the creation of a Peace and Security Council, adopted in Durban in July 2002, describes the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Resulting from the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union, the latter established a close collaboration with regional economic entities and regional mechanisms for prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts.

12. Paragraph 2 of the Framework Agreement of Addis Ababa.

13. This expression, coined by Mary Robinson, Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, has been widely adopted by both the Congolese and international stakeholders.

14. So that the Democratic Republic of Congo, its regional partners, and the international community may act in a "synchronized way" (article 6 of the Framework Agreement), articles 7 and 9 anticipate the establishment of a Regional Monitoring Mechanism (MSR) to review progress in the implementation of the regional commitments, and of a National Monitoring Mechanism (MNS) which will accompany national commitments. The latter was created on 13 May 2013 by Presidential Order.

15. The Region has subscribed to seven commitments:

- to not interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries
- to neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups
- to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries
- to strengthen regional cooperation
- to respect the legitimate concerns and interests of the neighbouring countries, in particular regarding security matters
- to neither harbour nor provide protection of any kind to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes of aggression, or persons falling under the United Nations sanctions regime
- to facilitate the administration of justice through judicial cooperation in the region.

and international community¹⁶ commitments are coherent, and even readable, in terms of the goal of the *consolidation of peace*, national commitments, on the other hand, appear “hybrid”. Focusing on state sector reforms favors a technical dimension rather than a political dimension of the peace agreement. This “decoupling” from peace, worded in paragraph 4 of the Framework Agreement as “putting an end to cycles of recurrent violence”, was reinforced by the choice of monitoring methods for national commitments. Indeed, following the signature of the agreement, the work to list the criteria for monitoring and evaluation of national commitments using benchmarking techniques led to the development of a “Matrix of criteria and indicators for monitoring and the implementation of national commitments of the Framework Agreement”, including 56 criteria comprising 379 indicators¹⁷. This “matrix”, as well as being the last instrument for prioritizing activities to be carried out¹⁸, constituted the reference for monitoring and evaluating the progress of national commitments. Thus, the proposition of “getting down to the underlying causes of the conflict” becomes an evaluation of state sector reform policies leading to stripping the Framework Agreement of its political dimension and goal.

The technologization of peace and the use of engineering techniques, relatively similar to those of the “development support” sector, lead to depoliticization effects. And in contexts laid out in dynamics of volatile alliances between actors and in which private and public are not always operating categories, building a “policy” demands asking what the “collective” is and how to build a consensus from dissensus. In addition, rights as arms of power, as much in its jurisdictional dimension as in its establishment one and the implementation of peace treaties, begs the question of what opposing powers are available. In addition, law as a weapon of power, as much in its jurisdictional dimension as in the establishment and implementation of peace treaties, raises the question of what opposing powers are available.

As for the legitimacy of a political project susceptible to bring a group together, social and legal fictions, and, more widely, the functional equivalents of “justice” and the modalities of such a narrative, are challenged. New spaces of “justice”, or any other category having a similar social function, may draw on the repertoires of different actors, authorities considered as legitimate, and ways in which discourse circulates, and this, when it concerns facing up to another political project founded on violence (Liwierant 2009).

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF A NETWORK

In the 1990s then 2000s, new courts appeared in the public space: international criminal jurisdictions, building on the legal and moral legacy of the Nuremberg Trials, but also on a long tradition

16. The five commitments of the international community are as follows:

- the Security Council would remain seized of the importance of supporting the long-term stability of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region;
- a renewed commitment by bilateral partners to remain engaged in supporting the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region;
- a renewed commitment to work towards the revitalization of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) and support the implementation of its economic development and regional integration agenda;
- a strategic review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO);
- appointment of a United Nations Special Envoy to support efforts to reach durable solutions.

Through Resolution 2098 of March 28th 2013, the Security Council approved the appointment by the UN Secretary General of a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and the DRC to support the peace process.

17. This Matrix was approved on 17 September 2014 by the Head of State of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the name of the President of the Management Committee for National Monitoring Mechanism and the Implementation of commitments undertaken in the name of the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the Democratic of Republic of Congo and the Region.

18. See the Summary Report of the National Seminar of appropriation and identification of priority actions for the operationalization of national commitments of the Framework Agreement of Addis Ababa finalized on 4 June 2015.

of activism and the work of criminal and international jurists in defining international crimes and the various elements that make up these three crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide). Thus, in 1993 the ICTY appeared (Hagan 2003; Bass 2000; Maison 2010; Claverie 2019), established by UN Security Council resolution to confront the reappearance in Europe of ethnic cleansing practices; then in 1994, the ICTR (Maison 2017) was established to publicly judge the perpetrators of the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda and the different levels of responsibility for this crime. These tribunals were founded on claims with respect to several principles of justice: “fight against impunity”, “accountability” (the principle under which criminals have to publicly acknowledge their crimes before a fair and impartial tribunal); and “fight against immunity” (the principle that political, military, and religious leaders be subject to the tribunal and not protected by the immunity associated with their position). However, the jurisdiction of these two tribunals applies only within the scope of a predefined space (the former Yugoslavia in one case, and Rwanda in the other) and within a specified time period. Their main mission was to carry out criminal prosecutions—that is, investigate what happened at the crime scenes and who was responsible, hold trials, judge fairly, and punish (Joinet 2002), all in the name of imposing individual responsibility on the perpetrators of crimes. Just as at Nuremberg, it is indeed the individual responsibility of the perpetrators (Milosevic, Katanga), and not the collective one of the groups—“the Germans”, “the Hutu”, “the Serbs”—that is envisaged. Nonetheless, this does not prevent tribunals from fulfilling the duty of demonstrating the different types of responsibility and participation, the hierarchical relations (e.g., commandant responsibility), the precise ways in which persons or entities (e.g., state, party, etc.) associated with each other so as to demonstrate how they acted together, the exact organization of (criminal) political projects, and the evolving organization of ethnic cleansing (i.e., using rallying techniques up to effective practices of killing and forced displacement). These two tribunals are extra-territorial, set up in a host state, which was not one in which the crimes were committed: Arusha in Tanzania to judge the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda; The Hague, in the Netherlands, to judge the crimes committed in the countries of former Yugoslavia. Finally, in 2002, the ICC, which is housed in The Hague, appeared. This Court, which has the jurisdiction to judge international crimes, is no longer an *ad hoc* tribunal but a *permanent* Court.

The ICC was founded by a treaty, the Rome Statute, which defines the crimes, the procedures, the jurisdiction, and the admissibility of cases. A fourth crime, the crime of aggression, was added to the three international crimes previously cited, and has been applicable since 17 July 2018. The Court was founded on the basis of an international conference, the Rome Conference, and only countries that have signed and ratified the treaty, which are called State Parties, can be prosecuted. The United States, China, Russia, and Israel, among other states, are not signatories. The treaty was signed in Rome on 17 July 1998 and came into force on 1 July 2002. The Court cannot judge, according to the inapplicability of *ex post facto* law, crimes and criminal situations anterior to the effective foundation of the Court in July 2002. The State Parties are committed to cooperating in all activities and finance the Court. Cases can be referred to the Court in three ways: 1) the UN Security Council requests the Court Prosecutor to file charges, 2) the Court Prosecutor directly refers a case to them, or 3) a state sends “a situation” to the Court. Finally, it should be added that while both *ad hoc* tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR, had the priority of referral over national tribunals, this is no longer the case for the ICC, which is a complementary court and admits only cases that national states cannot or do not want to judge. Furthermore, to accelerate the processing of cases, the Security Council encourages sending certain criminal cases back to national jurisdictions (Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia) under certain conditions for holding trials. The jurisdiction of these courts is also territorial, and can be exercised under the active personality principle (dependent on the nationality of the perpetrator) or passive personality principle (dependent on the nationality of the victim). It should be added that international criminal jurisdictions are intrinsically connected to

international peace and security agendas, either directly so, for the ICTY and the ICTR, or indirectly so, for the ICC. This is due to their connections with the UN Security Council, which created the ICTY and ICTR on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (“Action in the case of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression”). Reconciliation is thus conceived as a means of assuring and politically guaranteeing peace and international security.

The jurisdiction of these three courts will soon extend to other jurisdictions to prosecute the same types of crime, forming a network and an area for the spread of international humanitarian law as well as international criminal law. The personnel of these jurisdictions, who come from various states, include numerous young interns from law schools, who circulate among those states. What has thus appeared in a certain number of cases are so-called hybrid jurisdictions—that is, jurisdictions with both national and international components, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Finally, a number of states, notably signatory states to the Rome Statute, may now judge international crimes in their own territories, in the name of universal jurisdiction¹⁹. On the condition of having defined the crimes in their internal criminal laws and of judges having jurisdiction on this basis, they may now prosecute persons who are present in their territory and suspected of these crimes. This is the case, for example, in France, which added inside the Paris District Court a centre specializing in crimes against humanity, war crimes and misdemeanors, acts of torture, and forced disappearances. This centre has jurisdiction if the victims are French, but also when perpetrators who are French nationals are implicated, or when the perpetrators of the crimes are foreign nationals who are present or habitually resident in French territory and who have committed crimes abroad against foreign persons. In the past few years, the centre has judged Rwandan nationals in the *Cour d’assises* (Assize Court) in trials by jury.

Contrary to international courts, these internal state courts rule on the basis of internal laws. These jurisdictions act in the name of the principles “no peace without justice” and “access to at least the judicial truth,” and they act in this capacity in two directions and for two parties: the “international community”, founder of the ICC via the intermediary of the State Parties, and the affected populations. For the international community, they have a role in producing standards on issues of violence in armed conflicts (promotion of international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts, whatever the nature of the conflict, even and especially if it implicates state forces against a civilian population), and are now, through judicial rulings where hearings have been put online for certain armed conflicts, the major descriptors of organizational and political structures of violent enterprises carried out during “civil wars”, either by states or by other armed groups supported by external neighbors. They are one of the sources of objectification of what we have called “the new wars”, including asymmetric wars (armed groups against civilian populations).

If they have only an indirect role in reconciliation, the investigations that they carry out are a tangible step in the struggle against the denial of events by their perpetrators, and an assurance for the victims of these violations that they really happened. These jurisdictions then act toward the affected populations in various ways. First, they invite witnesses in their depositions to describe what they saw, heard, and experienced. Once corroborated through cross-examination (the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC, are ruled by Common Law, and practice cross-examination), their deposition will be included in a final account of events, and having gone through the ordeal of a trial, may be included in a political history of the situation that they lived through. Finally, in the ICC, victims

19. “Universal jurisdiction” designates the criminal jurisdiction of a national judge who may rule on a case without the crime having been committed in their state’s territory and without the victim or the perpetrator being a national of their state. However, the power of the International Criminal Court has no connection with the technical notion of “universal jurisdiction”. It is based on the Treaty of Rome and is applied through its different frameworks

of serious violations are collectively represented at trial by a lawyer appointed for the hearing. If the accused are found guilty, the victims have the right to compensation (often in the form of collective compensation). Thus these jurisdictions act through their investigations, the establishment and acknowledgement of facts, the precise determination of the guilt of the accused (who may be acquitted), and granting compensation.

Finally, several trials led by the ICC have addressed the issue of child soldiers and have highlighted the ambivalent nature of their status as victims: they were kidnaped, then mistreated and often forced to “participate in hostilities”—that is, to subject themselves to criminal activities, as per the standards of the court (e.g., the G. Katanga and Th. Lubanga trials, as well as the trial of Dominic Ongwen, second-in-command to Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army). The questions raised by their demobilization and social reintegration have been studied by a member of our group, Christophe Charles-Alfred, who shows the legal vacuum with regard to child soldiers who are from 15 to 18 years of age. Children are generally protected as minors in many states, but children recruitment by militias incriminate the leaders only if the children are under 15.

Trials in front of international criminal jurisdictions do not, by themselves, have an immediate and direct impact on the processes of reconciliation, nor, whatever the procedures and standards that produce it, is the truth immediately revealed. Nuremberg, for example, played only a progressive role in Germany in wider economic measures and denazification procedures. These were generally accepted, when they were accepted, only several generations later. The findings of Nuremberg have not prevented Nazi arguments being taken up again from time to time, including currently. Indeed, it is certain that the Eichmann Trial did not extinguish conspiracy theories or anti-Semitism. The political and psychic economy of indifference, on the one hand, or (at the other extreme of a spectrum of various attitudes) of denigration or claiming of repetition (Vidal-Naquet 1995), which form, for instance, the heart of certain ideologies, is reiterative. This supports the necessity for frameworks of standards that oppose, at least, an argumentative barrage, and for explicative frameworks of cause and effect that allow political collectives to be pre-emptive.

Indeed, we now know that these types of violence generate a great number of victims as well as a great number of perpetrators, whatever form the violence and confrontations take, and taking into account that international crimes are from the outset cases of “extreme violence” or community or collective confrontations. The perpetrators generally find that they were right to act the way they did or consider that, at best, they were only following the crowd, or they were seeking revenge, notably in ultra-nationalist conflicts. We obviously do not see sudden critical reversals by those accused of war crimes and their social support, or of their version of events. The reversals that would be produced through force of conviction would, it goes without saying, immediately establish the facts as if examined by a criminal court. The support received by the perpetrators from certain national groups remains, of course, unwavering in the long term, and their versions of events eventually become family accounts shared and passed on, going beyond the domestic sphere, and are taken up and retold collectively in certain spheres. This was seen in the former Yugoslavia in the long term, in accounts about who are, indeed, the true victims of the Second World War, or about the “real victims” of the Bosnian War. What may be subjectively true, and is opposed to individual responsibility, is collective victimization. But these frameworks of support for war criminals are not always silent, nor are their supporters unorganized, and elements of the successor regimes that sometimes support them, openly or underhand, are not always democratic. This is still the case in certain states of the former Yugoslavia, now withdrawn into the internal borders set by ethnic cleansing. If the trial/reconciliation connection were to be examined, it would be seen that its efficacy resides not in its immediate relationship with the present, and that the mediating role of the trials cannot be determined in the here and now. However, the trials are a crucial contribution to certain central elements for the implementation of reconciliation, or, maybe, of a change of regime that

sees itself as warriors, with the help of third parties.

CONCLUSION

At the normative level, transitional justice covers both political transformation processes and the study of them within the framework of a new domain of the theory of justice, combining philosophical theories of justice, criminal law, human rights, domestic politics, and international relations. The rise of transitional justice goes hand in hand with the idea that, when mass crimes or serious breaches of human rights have occurred, societies seeking to rebuild should not forget their own crimes, but lead the work of collective remembering, of justice, and of reparation, as they are the only one able to anticipate the repetition of crimes and to rebuild these societies on the basis of liberal standards. As part of the tradition of human rights that it is determined to promote, transitional justice begins with facing up to the fact that unforgivable crimes have been committed and that justice solutions should facilitate overcoming their effects. It is based on the demand for public awareness of the crimes and responsibilities, and the ideal of a reconciled society or one capable of guaranteeing at least a minimum of political and social stability for the individuals that make up that society (Saada & Nadeau 2013). Transitional processes are present in criminal trials as soon as they seek to punish criminals, but they also shed light on a violent past and work toward public remembrance, reparations, and the acknowledgment of victims. But these are not themselves guarantees of political transition, which requires measures for acknowledgment; reparation; social and institutional reconstruction; apologies; policies for remembrance, acknowledgment, and inclusion; and economic policies. Trials are also an element in putting an end to long-term conflict, and criminal justice is often sacrificed for the goal of an immediate peace, which then fails to manifest. Indeed, putting an end to violence should not be thought of and analyzed within a temporal linearity: in many cases, adopting amnesties in the name of restorative justice and to the detriment of criminal justice leads to a resurgence in violence, sometimes a long time after peace has been reached, or, in a lesser form, to expressions that highlight the lack of public acknowledgement. If the solutions adopted with the goal of putting an end to violence remain silent about certain crimes, social tensions will be revived, at the risk of once more falling into violence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. How and according to which criteria should the results of post-violence mechanisms (TRCs and criminal courts) be assessed given the complexity of the situations under examination? The assessment of a reconciliation scenario is a gradual process, which must comply with public auditing procedures provided by democratic mechanisms, as was for example the case when measuring the effects of denazification in Germany. Neither criminal trials nor TRC mechanisms can bring about a state of reconciliation on their own. They are nonetheless essential to a state's moral, political and memorial economy and must, through their powers and public apparatus of truth-seeking, remain strictly enforceable against any public policy of denial. Other frameworks - historical, educational, etc. - will serve to further refine these criteria and assess their relevance. The judicial and paralegal sectors, for their part, judge criminal cases according to the standards of criminal law.
2. With respect to criminal justice, fair trials must be ensured, at every stage of the proceedings (rights of the accused, of the defense). Rulings must establish criteria for liability and the facts determined on the basis of public criteria must be robust enough to withstand any attempt at public denial.
3. Try to identify, at the macro level, the inequalities and different forms of inequality that drive

- violence and impact efforts to withdraw from violence.
4. Improve our understanding (surveys) of victims' roles in the different transitional justice systems and the effects these systems have on them.
 5. Clarify and better define (through new case studies and failed implementations) the transitional landscapes and political and normative transformations that are introduced following mass crimes, severe human rights violations, or the withdrawal of totalitarian political regimes.
 6. Examine transitional justice within political transitions (how it affects political transitions).
 7. Critical examination of justice-oriented judicial mechanisms (retributive judicial institutions and injunctions for reconciliation), and their tensions with criminal law theory.
 8. Better identify the issues underlying the tensions between criminalists and internationalists, the mandates of criminal and international law, promote signatory states' commitment to the Rome Statute as regards criminal law, and the application of universal jurisdiction in states which have ratified it.

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CHAPTER 6

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CHAPTER 7

The Uses and Abuses of Memory

Leader: Scott Straus

Contributors: Catherine Besteman, Bridget Conley, Paco Ferrandiz, Molly Minden, Scott Straus, Ron Suny, Natan Sznajder, and Baskara Wardaya

INTRODUCTION

Memorializing large-scale violence can contribute to exiting violence; it can also sustain the destructive dynamics that initially sparked violence.

Large-scale violence scars the human, physical, and social landscape; these literal and figurative scars imbue the past with contemporary meaning and sometimes urgency. In many settings, states, civil society actors, and individuals respond through memorialization. These “memory projects” aim to provide a sense of healing, catharsis, and remembrance for survivors and their loved ones.

However, public memorialization of social and political violence is never that simple. Public memory projects do more than serve as monuments to the dead. Symbolically powerful constructions that narrate the past, they convey parables of good and bad, reflecting and extending into politics and power relations. Memory work is a contentious and fraught arena, not an innocent, pre-political monument to victims.

Memory work can, but does not necessarily, communicate to the victims that society and the state acknowledge their losses, and thereby can impart a promise of “never again”. Memorialization can issue a stark socio-political warning about the potential for and dangers of abuse of power. Memory projects can craft a common narrative about a contentious past, by helping groups see experiences outside of their personal or communal narratives, and provide a key to a peaceful future. Furthermore, memory projects can present opportunities for dialogue about the past as a springboard for discussions about the present and future. Thus, while memorials will invariably be contentious, when they model peaceable forms of interaction and debate about painful past experiences, they can contribute to transforming the conditions that previously generated violence and division.

Yet memory projects can also produce friction, division, and polarization. By reifying certain narratives and casting social groups into fixed roles as victims and perpetrators, memory projects can aggravate social cleavages. When imbricated with the state, these projects can reinforce power, serving to marginalize and dispossess, rather than heal and bring together.

In other contexts, memory projects mirror the status quo, masking and substituting for other forms of politics. In this way, memory projects form a token gesture, displacing discussions of fundamental structural change to address the debilitating legacies of violence, such as deep socio-economic inequalities or other forms of deprivation. In these ways, memory projects can sow the seeds for future violence.

In short, memory is not an innocent terrain in which the sole imperative is to muster the will and funds; it works in myriad ways after violence, in particular after mass violence. Context matters tremendously: the social and political contributions of memory projects in one context can be

completely different in another, and change over time.

Cognizant of this diverse terrain and sensitive to contextual specificity, we asked: what are the characteristics of memory projects that contribute to creating a non-violent, democratic public space that allows for contestation and disagreement in peaceable ways? We arrived at six attributes of an “ethics of memory” that productively contribute to exiting violence that form our recommendations.

MEMORY’S CONTRADICTIONS

We begin with the Valley of the Fallen in Spain. This monumental memorial 60 kilometers outside Madrid encapsulates the tensions of an unresolved past, even in a country internationally celebrated for its “successful” transition in the 1970s from dictatorship to democracy. On 1 April 1940, just one year after winning the Civil War, Spain’s new dictator, Francisco Franco, signed a decree to build the memorial, “to perpetuate the memory of those who fell in our Glorious Crusade”. Conceived as a “grandiose temple,” Franco envisioned that, “over the centuries, prayers will be said for those who fell on the path for God and their Fatherland”. The building of the monument involved nineteen years, two architects, and the boring of a granite mountain to excavate a breath-taking basilica that is second in length and size only to St Peter’s in Rome. The scale of the monument intentionally renders any future efforts to adjust its presence or even its shape extremely difficult: it fixes into a mountainside a stunningly dramatic honorific for the military dictatorship.

Before the inauguration, an estimated 34,000 corpses of the war dead, mostly, but not exclusively, those who fought for Franco, were exhumed and reburied in crypts behind the monument’s walls. One of the first corpses to arrive was that of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Spanish fascist party, Falange, who was placed in front of the main altar. Franco’s body was buried behind the altar on 22 November 1975. Although Franco’s political heirs claim that the Valley is a monument to reconciliation, the juxtaposition of these bodies at the heart of the monument creates a politically charged funerary axis that forms Spain’s main Francoist stronghold.

During the transition to democracy, the meaning of the site was challenged from multiple directions—but none constituted a satisfying outcome for critics of the dictatorship. There was a process of *touristification* of the site, transforming it from an active political imposition to simply another grand structure from Spanish history. It was incorporated in the Imperial Route, which also includes the nearby Monastery of El Escorial, site of the Royal Pantheon.

Starting in 2000, a counterhegemonic memory project known in Spain as the “recovery of historical memory” refocused attention on the civilian losses of the war, previously actively repressed by Franco’s regime. This “recovery” of memory focused on the exhumation of mass graves of the 150,000 civilians executed by Franco’s paramilitaries. These efforts increased tensions around the Valley, especially when it was discovered that bodies of executed Republican civilians had been transferred during Franco’s time to the monument without their relatives’ knowledge. The anti-fascist counterhegemonic movement understood these remains as actively victimized: first, victims of mass killing, then post-mortem kidnapping by their own killers, and, finally, held as hostages in the monument for the sake of a fake “reconciliation” that glorified the killers. All the attempts at unburying the bodies of Republicans from the monument have been systematically blocked by right-wing parties and the Benedictine religious order that maintains the monument.

In 2011, the socialist government appointed a commission of experts to provide ideas on how to democratize and make the monument more inclusive, to no avail. One crucial recommendation was the dismantling of the monument’s Francoist funerary hierarchy, including Franco’s unburial. Yet the harsh resistance by the political right to any minimal change in the Valley has transformed it into a highly divisive site that prevents Civil War tensions from dissipating.

CORE CONCEPTS: MASS VIOLENCE AND MEMORY

Our discussions as a working group focused on public, intentional projects designed to memorialize mass violence, and addressed how they might contribute to an exit from violence. Each component of this focus requires clarification.

Mass violence is defined as “large-scale,” “systematic,” and “widespread” violence targeted against civilians, inclusive of, but not limited to, legal categories of “crimes against humanity” or “genocide.” While there is no numerical threshold, the ideas of large-scale, systematic, and widespread imply that the violence affects a significant percentage of a target group. We can think of mass violence then as an interconnected pattern of deliberate harm; such violence is “supra-local,” or recurring across territory, as well as sustained over time (Straus 2015). It is deliberate and intentional: the product of organization, mobilization, and planning, often by states and their affiliates, but non-state actors are not ruled out. In practice, most of the cases that ground this chapter are forms of “group-selective” violence in which specific population categories are targeted for violence, but this is not an exclusive criterion.

We do not primarily address structural violence that reflects deep inequalities and deprivation baked into an economic or political system. However, in developing our collective understanding of how memory works, we draw on a larger literature that is not uniquely focused on mass violence per se. A key theory-generating case is South Africa, which was a pioneer around questions of memory and reconciliation after the country emerged from apartheid. As a system of structural violence and racial discrimination, apartheid was brutal and deeply destructive.

There is no singular definition of memory as related to public memory projects about past large-scale violence. Definitional clarity can be difficult because memory practices are notable for how they cross various categorical borders. Most scholars understand memory as not simply recalling the past, but interpreting it, often including a call to prevent past violence from recurring. Projects therefore concern the intersection of moral and political knowledge. They are public in two primary ways: they concern past violence that has social and political meaning, and they aim to engage a contemporary social body. In this manner, they provide a contrast to strictly personal memory.

Memorial practices also often cross national borders. While projects are conceived and constructed in local circumstances, they are often informed by and in conversation with global memory forms and debates.

Another border that is crossed is generational: memory projects engage issues of accountability and responsibility, particularly intergenerational responsibility. Often members of subsequent generations who have not experienced firsthand the events of the past are encouraged to develop an affective relationship with them, including a sense of responsibility or even guilt.

Our interest is not ultimately to propose a new definition of memory, but to examine how memory activists, artists, politicians, and people concerned about the past and the future try to make sense of their worlds through memory projects, and how this process might contribute to “exiting violence.”

MEMORY AND POWER

Power constructs memory in multiple ways. Fiona Ross’s (2003) research on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission demonstrates that men who testified before the commission mostly spoke about their own experiences of victimization, whereas women who testified predominantly spoke about the violence experienced by the men in their lives while remaining silent about their own victimization. The structure of the commission—a project to enable truth-telling and institutionalize memory of apartheid-era violence—enabled certain expressions of memory while disabling

others.

Further, memory politics can silence certain stories, while privileging others that form “master” or hegemonic narratives of the past (Stern 2004; Jelin 2003). Through silencing, privileging, and narrowing complex narratives, powerful actors attempt to monopolize public memory, allowing only a version of the past that bolsters their rationalizing narrative and actively silences other voices.

One member of our group, Baskara Wardaya, references a “political wall of taboo” in Indonesia to describe how forces aligned with the state actors who perpetrated anti-communist mass violence in 1965 conspire to limit discourse about the past to only those narratives that justify the violence. Any attempt to include other perspectives, including the victims’ narratives, has been suppressed by military and civilian forces. In this case, memorializing victims’ experiences is a risky endeavor that challenges powerful actors. The same is true for the experience of indigenous communities in Guatemala, or ethnic minorities in Somalia, whose claims to particularly egregious forms of violence are sometimes contested by other Somali groups. As Wardaya notes, counter-memory is perceived as “dangerous” and efforts to acknowledge it can be brutally repressed.

In contemporary Rwanda, the state has gone to great lengths to memorialize the “genocide of the Tutsis” of 1994, which was halted by the triumph of the current regime. Genocide memorialization in the form of a museum, massacre sites, and official periods of mourning, among other efforts, is limited by the state to only the narrative of suffering that bolsters its position. Thus, there is no formal acknowledgement of mass violence experienced by Hutus in the Democratic Republic of Congo or in Rwanda itself. Those who point to the existence of these victims of violence are often labeled genocide “deniers”, and can be imprisoned or worse. In this instance, the impulse to remember is presented by authorities as an apolitical and ethical response to genocide. The discourse of memory is then deployed to disarm political challengers. Likewise in relation to Israel, Holocaust remembrance is sometimes brandished to ward off criticism of state policies.

Memory can also become embroiled in constructs of group identity, and embedded within nationalism. In the case of memory of the Ottoman genocide of the Armenians, Turkish official rejection of genocidal memory argues that it is at odds with national identity. Thus, the government has refused steadfastly to acknowledge “genocide” as a reference to the systematic expulsion and murder of Armenians and other minorities in 1915, in a deliberate attempt to preserve the founding myth of the Turkish Republic as emerging from World War I in a heroic war of liberation.

For Armenians, historical suffering is foundational to their idea of who they are. Armenians, in Turkey, Armenia, and the diaspora, struggle for acknowledgement and recognition of the deportations and mass killing that eliminated most Armenians and Assyrians from Anatolia. Battling identities over history have further complicated contemporary politics in recent years, as the Armenian genocide has been seen as the precursor of and model for the current Turkish state violence against the Kurds. This layering of memories elides the history of Kurdish participation in the Armenian genocide as perpetrators, and allies them with Armenians as victims.

Not only national politics but also other institutional practices can determine the acceptable limits of memory narratives. For instance, researchers studying the international refugee resettlement process describe how the institutions that manage the interview process for determining who should be offered resettlement opportunities require that refugees conform their stories of violence and persecution to a particular narrative structure. The structure must demonstrate the applicant’s history of individual persecution and must demonstrate an ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, and chronological consistency that conforms to the interviewer’s (often limited or poor) understanding of the context of violence from which the applicant has fled (Blommaert 2009). The parameters for narrating memories of violence defined within the refugee resettlement process thus consolidate certain versions of memory as legitimate. For example, Somali applicants in Kenyan refugee camps seeking resettlement in the United States through the special resettlement program extended to

Somali Bantus had to demonstrate that their experience of violence in Somalia conformed to the definition of Somali Bantus as a persecuted minority group united by language, ethnicity, geographical area of origin, and kinship. Even though the ethnic category of Somali Bantu is a recent invention created in the wake of Somalia's state collapse to encompass minority Somalis from diverse backgrounds, the requirements for resettlement demanded that applicants remember their experiences of violence as Somali Bantus, consolidating an ethnically based memory (Besteman 2016). In this sense, the refugee resettlement process is one kind of memory project.

These examples are emblematic of how memory is embroiled with power and politics. Understanding that memory is political, however, does not mean that it cannot contribute to an exit from violence.

VIOLENCE AND AMBIGUOUS ENDINGS

What constitutes an “exit” from violence? This is a complicated question from any perspective, and it is further complicated in relation to memory, which directs attention to how violence resonates long after it “ends”.

We define an “exit” from mass violence in terms of building a durable peace that is a bulwark against a return to mass violence. Broadly, our group argues that an exit from violence does not necessarily imply a specific type of polity, such as a liberal, multi-party democracy. Yet we consider a public space that is democratic as key to an exit from violence. We refer to small-d “democratic”—that is, a space that allows for contestation and disagreement in peaceable ways.

In some cases, exiting violence has meant flight and the creation of a permanent diaspora. In other cases, an exit from mass violence might take the form of a transition to other forms of violence, such as structural oppression, criminal violence, or terrorist violence. For example, while the mass violence against ethnic minorities in southern Somalia precipitated by the collapse of the Somali government may have ended, contemporary control of the region by the terrorist group Al Shabaab has meant the imposition of a new regime of violence. Or, in the case of the 1965 mass violence in Indonesia, allowing only the perpetrators' narrative to be told while staunchly suppressing the voices of the survivors and witnesses of the violence allows for ongoing structural violence.

Our understanding of how memory might contribute to an exit from violence is informed by recognition that legacies of mass violence are conscious and unconscious. Such legacies can be insidious: manifesting as fear, silence, insularity, trauma, and new forms of abuse. Engaging with these effects are what memory and counter-memory projects seek to channel through deliberately constructed interventions.

In many cases, the past is present in unplanned ways. Survivors may face lifelong physical ailments as the result of wounds of war, torture, or rape, for instance. Large-scale violence is also frequently accompanied by large-scale theft of resources.

The past can also be present “as silences, compulsions, or repetitions” (Jelín 2003: 5), or as haunted memories, “irruptions of the past that return autonomously, like ghosts” (Brendese 2014: 6). “Trauma” and “embodiment” are forms of unintentional memories. “Trauma” was originally used to describe a blow to the tissues of the body, then to the structure of the mind, and now the word has become one of modern culture's master concepts to describe a wide range of negative experiences. The social saliency of trauma as a concept, as Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman note in their critical history of the term, was reinforced when the medical-scientific community adopted it in 1980. In that year, post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) was incorporated as a disorder into the American Psychiatric Association's signature publication: the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-III) (Fassin & Rechtman 2009: 77). Of particular influence on this process was the treatment of American veterans of the war in Vietnam—people

who had participated in and witnessed terrible violence, but certainly not as civilian victims of asymmetric assaults.

In its simplest form, trauma describes the condition of individuals who experience a shocking event and have difficulty overcoming it. Survivors and even perpetrators or witnesses to violence can suffer the effects of “trauma” and specifically “post-traumatic stress disorder”. These are clinical terms that include a wide array of emotional and psychological symptoms, including depression, anxiety, anger, paranoia, and guilt, as well as nightmares, panic attacks, lethargy, insomnia, and other manifestations of psychological pain.

One member of our group, Catherine Besteman, writes eloquently of the ways in which memories of violence haunt individuals, families, and communities in the Somali diaspora. For some, memories of assaults and dislocations experienced in the wake of the collapse of the Somali government manifest as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. Possible links between memories of violence and the high incidence of autism in some Somali diaspora communities are being investigated.

Trauma has gained traction as a theoretical paradigm for understanding the legacy of large-scale violence. It stands for an event that is overwhelming, defies representation and is structured as a rupture in time, whereby, uninvited, the past intrudes on the present. Over time, the category of the traumatized victim broadened in meaning and is at times applied to entire social groups. This expansion has prompted widespread criticism of its social deployment (Fassin & Rechtman 2009; Kansteiner 2004a and 2004b; Leys 2000; Sime 2013), including for how it can medicalize socio-political problems, and for the curative model often associated with it—that unpleasant memories are repressed and only truth will set you free (Baer & Sznajder 2015).

Another framework through which to imagine involuntary memories is the idea of “embodiment”, how memories are carried in the body even when individuals are not consciously interpreting them. Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus”, meant to capture how social and cultural norms are embodied, can help us understand how people may carry memories in their physical behaviors, in distinction to psychic explanations like “trauma”. This embodiment can occur through ritual commemorations, inculcated over time, but also in individuals or groups as a response to recent experiences of violence.

Depending on how violence ends and how the impacts of violence are addressed by a broader community, behaviors learned through the imposition of violence can linger long afterwards. Survivors of violence may be afraid, or simply unable, to acknowledge their past. They might dissimulate or avoid topics altogether. Not talking for some was a method of survival during violence; people survived through hiding and being clandestine. After violence ends, those patterns of silence might continue and manifest in multiple ways. In some cases, even being a witness to someone else’s violence increases one’s own vulnerability to violence. Afterwards, such patterns of obfuscation may live on in the form of coded language and the omission of details.

Another type of silencing after mass violence on citizens can be de-politicization. There is a body of literature that suggests apathy and lack of engagement can become mechanisms for coping after mass violence, although this is not always the case¹. Survivors might fear public exposure (Jelín 2003: 81) and in general may be hostage to a culture of fear.

Lastly, after mass violence the dead cannot speak. What they witnessed and experienced leave a silence in the historical record. Memory projects sometimes emerge to give voice to the voiceless,

1. This does not have to be the case. Indeed, during and after war, women may assume positions of agency in the household, economy, and politics that were previously unattainable for them (Berry 2018). Some studies note that child soldiers, once feared as a potential source of disruption in peaceful societies, on the whole are more likely to be civic activists than their non-soldier peers (Annan *et al.* 2011).

to commemorate what those who have perished cannot attest to. Among Armenian scholars there has been a discussion of the impossibility of “representing” the genocide in literature or historical writing.

Mass violence also has geographical implications: destroyed buildings, icons, and sacred spaces. Violence can also take the form of pollution or land mines or other forms of danger in the land. But invariably, one of the most wide-ranging consequences of mass violence is displacement of people across sometimes vast geographical distances. Violence scatters and disrupts communities.

Memory projects in the diaspora are forged through circumstances particular to the contexts of flight and the recreation of communities in exile. While Armenians have long been a transnational people, existing both in their original “homeland” and in diaspora, the genocide of 1915 led to the emptying of eastern Anatolia, historic Armenia, of Armenians and the emergence of large diasporic communities in the Middle East, France, the United States, and elsewhere.

A focus on memory instructs us not to confuse ending physical attacks or even systems of oppression with necessarily “exiting” violence. Through the spectrum of memory, we can better understand how violence has long-term, transformative effects.

MEMORY PROJECTS

Memory projects take on potential meaning as a way to grapple with some of the above effects, and can—again we note that this is not necessarily the case—move from ending to exit. Intentional memory projects can be characterized, in Jelín’s terms, as when “human beings are actively involved in the processes of symbolic transformation and elaboration of meanings of the past” (Jelín 2003: 5). This requires a level of intention to interpret and process events such that one can construct, transmit, or contest a memory.

In its deliberations, our group made a broad distinction between “non-official” and “official” memory projects. While there will be overlap between official and unofficial projects—ordinary citizens and civil society will often get involved in shaping state projects—we maintain a broad distinction between those that governments approve, fund, and otherwise endorse and those that do not entail state involvement.

Unofficial Memory Projects

The broad category of unofficial memory projects includes initiatives and interventions that are accessible to the public, that seek to memorialize past violence, and that are not primarily sponsored or financed by the state (whether they are condoned by or in opposition to state policies).

Perhaps the most flexible of these forms are efforts to capture and disseminate individual survivor stories. In many post-violence circumstances, survivors narrate their stories in print, in speeches, or in other forms of expression, such as dance or other types of performance. Beyond testimonies, there is an enormous range of artistic production that seeks to acknowledge, pay homage, and publicize past violence. This can include books, paintings and murals, sculpture, dramatic performances, radio shows, and film. Such interventions can allow people to hear silenced voices (Wardaya 2013).

Civil society organizations may also play a key role in advancing memory projects. Survivors and their families may form associations, and those associations often organize annual marches or events in which past violence is memorialized. Civil society organizations might establish structured dialogues, in public or private, between victim groups and survivor groups. Some organizations might also develop and maintain an online presence or memorial to the past—a virtual museum of

sorts. Lastly, survivor organizations might also organize public sites of conscience or other public spaces that formally acknowledge the past.

Case Study: Red Terror Martyrs Memorial Museum

One example of a memorial site created by survivors and families of survivors is the Red Terror Martyrs Memorial Museum (RTMMM), in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Following the 1991 defeat of the military regime headed by Col. Hailemariam Mengistu, survivors of the Red Terror (1976-1978) and families members of those killed formed an association to create a memorial to those who died. Their work, which was neither supported nor hindered by the post-Mengistu state, took years of effort to define the common goal, gain permission from the state for use of land in Addis Ababa, raise funds to support the project, and then create the building, collections and exhibition. Like curators of exhibitions in all memorial museums, the founders of the RTMMM carefully considered each word of every caption and hundreds of images and artifacts in order to convey a narrative.

The museum commemorates violence from 1976 to 1978 committed by the military dictatorship against the urban-based political opposition. Thus, the museum documents a history that does not belong to the current government, which tolerates, but does not support, the museum.

The RTMMM reflects challenges common to many memorial sites, especially in a context where the project is created by survivors and families of victims. In this case, the narrative simplifies historical events, opting to engage in ways that provoke empathy with victims but that do not support critical evaluation of history. In focusing on the perspective of the primary victims of the Red Terror, the exhibition glosses over violence between and within the various opposition political parties, but it nonetheless provides a compelling historical presentation on how the military came to dominate the country's government following the 1974 revolution and turned its overwhelming lethal force against the population.

At the RTMMM, as in many other cases, the challenge of finding an appropriate final resting place for human remains, and the inability to identify or locate all of the people presumed dead, prompted creation of a memorial site. One outcome of large-scale violence is that frequently bodies are undiscovered, unidentified or, in the eyes of loved ones and survivors, improperly tended to. The remains in the RTMMM are of people who suffered together, bonded through secular revolution, not identity. Hence, there is no properly consecrated ground that might contain the remnants of young protesters who could have been Ethiopian Orthodox, or of another Christian faith, Muslim, or non-religious. For the museum's founders, the lack of a single, religious ground that could unify the dead was a crucial factor in their decision to create a secularized sacred ground in the form of a museum. A constructed memorial site can provide a response to these challenges, by creating a place to mourn when no gravesite exists, or a sacred secular site when an appropriate place cannot otherwise be found. This was the case with the RTMMM. A controversial decision in any context, many memorial museums struggle with how to incorporate human remains into their structures while being respectful of traditional burial rites.

The RTMMM made another choice common to many memorial museums: its docents are all family members of victims or survivors of torture and prison. Their eyewitness accounts provide an indelible introduction to the human losses of a period otherwise presented within a strongly political and collectivized narrative. The goal of the museum, the staff argues, is to teach the current generation to solve problems by looking for non-violent solutions. Museum staff are cautious not to instruct on the contemporary implications of the museum's position against the use of violence for political ends—this, they leave up to the visitors.

Other examples abound. In Indonesia academics, human rights activists and survivors of the 1965 mass violence have collaborated to produce the so-called *museum bergerak* or mobile

museum. In it, they exhibit artifacts, written and audio-visual testimonies of the former victims, along with alternative narratives of what happened in 1965 in different locations in the country. The exhibition was intended to provide space for the former victims to tell their stories as well as to educate the public about different factors that led to the 1965 mass violence and its impact.

Work by artists can also draw on memory as a way to confront the past in a provocative way. For instance, Bosnian photographer Tarik Samarah posted his images from exhumations of mass graves near Srebrenica across Bosnia's Serb Republic, where many people actively denied the genocide, with the simple exhortation "To Remember".

Another provocative installation was undertaken by German artist Gunther Demnig. His *Stolpersteine* (literally, stumbling blocks) consisted of plaques engraved with names and birthdays of Holocaust victims installed into sidewalks in front of the last-known residence of the victims, such that passersby might notice the mini-memorials. While few "trip" over the implanted stones, the term "stumbling blocks" implies a catching off-guard, or an "unsettling", as people walk by. This was not an "official" memory project, in that Demnig did not ask permission of government officials, nor did many government officials offer support to the project in its early years. Instead, this project demonstrates the way in which memory can evolve and spread akin to a process of a social movement (Blatt 2012: 64). Demnig's idea caught on, and eventually the artist allowed the public to participate by paying to sponsor a plaque for €120. Many people have not only engaged in this way but have researched the history of the victim for whom they sponsored the plaque. In selecting what information to include on the plaque—such as calling an individual a "resistance fighter"—people also craft a narrative about (patterns) of individual victims of the Holocaust. People engage in this for a variety of reasons: to separate themselves from the perpetrators and for a sense of catharsis or relief from *Betroffenheit* ("a sense of dismay paired with compassion"), for example (Apel 2014: 185). And yet critics note that the "stumbling blocks" may also have a perverse impact—providing catharsis and freeing participants in the projects from the weight of their history and therefore their responsibility both for the past and for preventing such atrocities in the future (Apel 2014).

Official Projects

State-sponsored projects introduce yet another layer of complexity to how we can understand the contributions of memory. The forms of state memory projects are multiple: mandates to teach a historical topic; naming of streets or public places; and formal memorials, such as an eternal flame, plaques, or public statues in squares as an acknowledgment of the past. In Argentina, there is a "memory park" in which there are plaques, road signs, and statues that memorialize key events and people in that country's Dirty War. In Argentina, Cambodia, Rwanda, Poland, and elsewhere, former torture centers or killing sites have been converted into memorials. Visitors can enter the physical space where torture or murder took place and, often through written materials and guided tours, learn about what had transpired in that location.

Memorial museums are another key way that states often intervene. The genre is distinguished among museums by its aim to "commemorate victims of State, socially determined and ideologically motivated crimes" (International Committee of Memorial Museums in Remembrance of the Victims of Public Crimes). Connecting historical sites and survivor or victim communities, memorial museums often explore history through discrete places and people, query how states justify and enact violence, and provoke connections to political engagement today. Memorial museums are often created by states, frequently in partnership with non-state actors, and many such sites provide extensive documentation and information about past violence; some museums also dedicate themselves to the preservation and archiving of evidence of the past. As museums, these

sites are intended to be permanent, open to the public, with both a memorial and pedagogical—and sometimes political—mission. Major museums such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Yad Vashem (Israel), the Gisozi Memorial (Rwanda), the Tuol Sleng Genocide Memorial Museum in Cambodia, Villa Grimaldi (Chile), Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum (Poland), ESMA Site Museum (Argentina), and others dedicate themselves in this way.

Even state-funded or -supported memorial sites have multiple stakeholders, whose interests may conflict and change over time. *El Ojo que Llora* (“The Eye That Cries”) in Peru serves as a key example of the struggles over memory and the relationship of those struggles to present-day violence. Following the decades-long internal armed conflict between the armed organizations—*Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) and the *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* (MRTA)—and the military government in Peru, which left around 70,000 dead, several memory initiatives emerged. The *Ojo que Llora*, designed by the artist Lika Mutal, was built in 2005, two years after the Peruvian Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (CVR) handed in its report. The project is government funded but also is the product of input and change from survivors, families, artists, civil society organizations, and the regional court of human rights in Latin America.

The memorial aims to commemorate the “victims” of this pre-2003 period of violence, a word that sparked broad contestation about who qualified as such. A large stone—that Mutal had brought to Lima from the pre-Inca archeological site Cerro de Lacco—sits in the center of tens of thousands of smaller stones, many carved with the name of a “victim” of the period of violence. This center stone also contains a fountain, symbolizing the “eye” from which the monument takes its name; the smaller surrounding stones form a labyrinth.

The labyrinth evokes a spiritual process of reflection and invites visitors to contemplate as they pace toward the center. The combination of the center crying eye and the tens of thousands of inscribed stones embraces a plurality of narratives and experiences about the conflict—through re-remembering in the sense of giving body again to those who have been dismembered or disappeared—and conveys an overarching story of mass violence and mourning (Drinot 2009: 17). The structure of the monument attempts to balance individual experiences with a national story through including stone tributes to individuals that mark the path to a central symbol of unified mourning. Yet while the structure provides a framework, it does not dictate how individuals and communities necessarily engage with that framework. Some can visit to trace the names of their loved ones and remember their lives; others are triggered and re-traumatized through the exposure to such memories; still others have attempted to destroy the monument through smashing the stones of those they perceive not to be victims.

In 2007, many Peruvians reported not even knowing about this national monument, and a court ruling over memory catapulted the monument into the national news. *El Ojo que Llora* in turn served as a continued catalyst for and site of contestation. When the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the Peruvian government was responsible for a 1992 raid on the Miguel Castro Castro penitentiary in Lima—in which security forces killed 41 people and bombed and gassed visiting family members—it required that the government add 41 stones to the *Ojo que Llora* monument, each stone painted with the name of one of those who died in the government attack. Yet many Peruvians in and beyond government offices considered those 41 dead to be *Sendero* terrorists who had destroyed lives, families, and entire communities with their brutal tactics. While members of *Sendero Luminoso* had already been included as victims in the monument, the court ruling converted *El Ojo que Llora* monument into a battlefield of memory; the monument anchored a debate about who qualified as a victim, and therefore about not only what events occurred but also how to interpret those events.

The memory project has continued as a focal point for on-going political battles. It has been vandalized several times in relation to evolving political events. While the monument had always

mourned the violence of the country, the new form of engagement with the monument—through vandalism— shifted the associations with the site from one of primarily grief and sadness to one of contestation and battle. While vandals attempted to harm the memorial, the acts and responses to them transformed the meanings of the monument from one of grief to one symbolizing both sadness and continued violence.

In 2013, ten years after the CVR handed in its final report, the Ministry of Culture declared the monument part of the country's "cultural heritage". The Peruvian anti-corruption attorney, and the ex-president of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were both present, among others, at the ceremony. Even as contestation about the memory project continued and even grew (and perhaps because the contestation continued and grew), the site began to take on meaning as a national symbol.

Finally, *El Ojo que Lloro* helps illustrate the relationship between memory and forgetting in memory projects. Over time, the sun erased most of the victims' names inscribed on the rocks, an unintended symbol of the force of forgetting over time and the way in which (re)cultivating memory requires an active agent (Hite 2012). Those who wanted to hold onto the names repainted them, requiring an active reproduction of memory. Yet even as these individual names fade, what is left is not an erasure: rather, the stones become part of the Peruvian landscape. The narrative may become less about individual suffering—and relatedly the need for individual prosecutions—but the monument continues to evoke the past and to be relevant to ongoing issues. Memorials, in short, should not be considered static emblems of the past that help tie up loose ends, but rather as physical interventions onto a socio-political horizon that can produce both intended and unintended outcomes.

HOW MEMORY PROJECTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO AN EXIT FROM VIOLENCE

Memory of large-scale violence itself is not a choice. The legacy of violence intrudes on people, families, places, and societies in multiple ways. The question that we prioritize here is: what to do with this memory—or, more accurately, with the diverse memories of periods of violence? How is memory constructed in public, social, and political ways? How do memory projects come about, and what do they come to mean? As our examples show, this is a complex process. In this section, we underscore the main purposes or possible advantages of such projects. What are they supposed to accomplish? What are their possibilities, in particular as they pertain to an exit from violence? What follows is a broad outline in answer to these questions.

1. Creating a space for mourning. While we problematize the idea that public memorialization can be limited to the goal of mourning, we note that it can play an important role in creating a space for this purpose. Mass violence touches large segments of society and often includes destruction of cultural or communal sites. Dedicating space to honor these losses can be an important component of "exiting" violence. By naming the dead, it enables them to be recognized and mourned. Memorial sites can provide a "house" for the grief of survivors and family members of those killed, especially in contexts where bodies are missing or unidentifiable.

2. Restoring agency and pride, breaking silences. Beyond mourning, memorial projects can also represent an attempt to repair social relations with those who were intentionally harmed. Violence demeans and disempowers victims; it imposes a loss of agency through torture, death, and humiliation. Memory projects can counter this disempowerment and silencing by giving voice to the experience of victimization, acknowledging the past, and allowing for a counter-narrative and the recapturing of the experience. Historicizing violence can also help individuals transfer their private

pain to the public sphere and to understand that their pain is part of a pattern.

3. Conveying norms, with the goal of preventing future violence. Memory projects can help to narrate what happened, and who is responsible for what happened. Implicitly and explicitly, memory projects signal what behaviors are illegitimate and can no longer be tolerated. In so doing, such projects imply that such violence should not be repeated. The concept of “never again”—however vaguely it is proposed in many instances—encapsulates this purpose. Memory projects are fundamentally designed to promote ideals, often ones rooted in human rights (Levy & Sznajder 2010). As public officials explained in reference to one exhibit on the Holocaust, such projects are ramparts against forgetting that educate and that counter intolerance and hatred of the other (Gensburger 2017).

4. Sites of political engagement and participation, memory projects provide arenas for a social dialogue about history and a shared future. This was the case in Spain and in Peru, where projects encouraged citizens to engage with their past, ask questions about what happened, and reflect on what the future might hold. This is no guarantee that the outcome will satisfy all or even most; but the point is to provide an opportunity. Memory projects can also be sites of nonviolent contestation and inclusion, allowing for multiple perspectives around a shared social experience of violence. In so doing, they can cultivate empathy and recognition for the other—or at least investment in the process of engagement.

5. Promoting accountability for the past, with the goal of ending impunity. Memory projects can signal accountability for past crimes. Here memory has a clear affiliation with forms of justice after mass violence. Our chapter thus has much in common with that of the working group on justice. If impunity requires a certain level of amnesia and forgetting, then the flip side is that a public memory project can help promote accountability. Legal proceedings are also designed to do this, but with the specialized vocabulary, circumscribed professional procedures, and a limited time horizon associated with such proceedings, the public is often marginalized. Memorials are intended for a public audience and endure over time, inviting new participants to engage with their narratives.

HOW MEMORY PROJECTS CAN UNDERMINE AN EXIT FROM VIOLENCE

While memory projects can serve as sources of healing, accountability, mutual understanding, and democratic dialogue, they can also militate *against* an exit from violence.

1. Memory projects can reinforce and reify divisions and cleavages. Violence fractures society: memory projects can mirror this process, contributing to separate histories and polarization. Memory projects invariably produce historical narratives that ascribe ethical meaning to history, often dividing the people involved in violence into normative categories that are extended to whole groups of people in society. They can participate in a form of collective guilt or posit a collective righteousness through victimization. Thus, the work of creating memorial projects can itself be a continuation of conflict, where each side tries to assert its position through construction of markers of its own suffering. Thus, in the Balkans, following the conflicts that ran from 1991 to 1999 in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, there have been new battles over memorial sites, including disputes over which older memorials should remain honored (e.g., those from World Wars I and II), the antagonistic positioning of memorials to the recent wars, and the proliferation of markers of one’s own suffering and heroes to the exclusion of others. In such circumstances, memory projects reflect and present in physical form the very

divisions that stoked the conflicts. In this way, they can contribute to hatred under the sign of innocence and victimization. They can justify a return of violence and repression if previous victims become perpetrators.

2. Memory projects can alienate survivors. Those in power are often interested in a particular version of history that justifies their practices and privileges. These political interests often are in tension with the actual experience of survivors and victims. Even when they are not in tension, the very act of constructing public memory requires a move from the individual/personal to the state and public. This means that individuals can lose power over defining the story and come into tension with those who want to instrumentalize memory. In some instances, concern about this issue has led survivor groups to argue against memorialization efforts, as did the *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina (Hamber and Wilson 2002: 45).

Sometimes survivors do want to speak, but silence is important for others, and indeed there can be agency and power in forgetting (Rieff 2016).

3. Memory can be a powerful tool for political actors. Throughout our discussions and in this chapter, we have drawn attention to cases whereby powerful actors have monopolized memorial discourses and bent them to their own interests. Memory has long been a reservoir for nationalist claims, as we noted several times, particularly in relation to the Valley of the Fallen in Spain. Selective memorialization can distort history. For example, in Turkey, there is a monument to the events of 1915, as well as an official state monument and museums in Igdir. But rather than acknowledging genocide or the large-scale victimization of Armenians, these memory projects commemorate the Muslims killed by Armenians. In the major military museum in Istanbul the same official narrative is displayed in a room that includes the bloodied shirt of Talat Paşa, the principal organizer of the Armenian genocide, who was assassinated by an Armenian after World War I.

Even when the past grievances are based on the experience of a primary “victim” group, as in Rwanda, memorialization can serve the interests of new powers. When past grievances are called into the present as a way to shield powerful political actors from scrutiny, memory does not serve to exit violence, but helps reinforce asymmetries that often prompt violence.

4. Memory projects can depoliticize. Memory projects can, but should not, substitute for politics, and can in fact inhibit politics. In many ways, exiting violence in the long run is about mutual understanding, compromise, and moderation. By contrast, memory projects can encourage absolutist claims through promoting a normative sense of victimhood, thereby thwarting efforts at compromise.

5. Memory projects do not represent real power or change. You can have a memorial but also the persistence of intense inequality and bad social, economic, and health outcomes, as in South Africa. In those circumstances, memory projects must be accompanied by material changes in power relations. Without social restructuring, memory projects memorialize but fail to enact a new set of social relationships that actually combat violence or remaining inequalities in control over resources, political representation, and status hierarchies. The South Africa case shows that even a project as ambitious and inclusive as that country’s TRC and efforts at memorialization fail to end violence if the structural conditions that enabled violence in the first place (here, white supremacy and a capitalist system dependent upon extremely cheap and exploitable black labor) are not fundamentally altered. Memory projects must be accompanied by projects of socio-economic (and not just sociopolitical) transformation. In Australia, the living conditions of most aboriginal populations is quite poor yet their claim to the land is routinely recognized.

LESSONS LEARNED

Violence never concludes neatly; it is a productive force that alters the scenes where it is enacted and is inscribed in individuals, space, architecture, society, economics, and politics in multiple and complex ways. Memory in this context is, broadly, how individuals and collectives intentionally recall and interpret or unintentionally embody past violence. On the one hand, memory is inescapable after mass violence; violence haunts people and groups.

But it may not always follow that speaking about or publicly memorializing such violence, especially in state-sponsored forms, is the best response. Natan Sznaider made this point again and again in our discussions. Does taking responsibility for committed crimes in the past really stabilize democracy in the future? How can we know that memory causes more humaneness? Could forgetting and silence possibly be a better strategy for exiting violence? Forgetting and amnesties constitute the implied and often explicit background for issues of restitution, the politics of memory, and other reactions to the public outing of historical injustices. It confronts us with difficult questions. Should we privilege memory over forgetting, punishment over amnesty, resentment over forgiveness? Should amnesties privilege former victims or absolve the perpetrators?

Forgetting, memory, and justice, then, stand in an uncertain and perplexing relationship. Clearly, to do justice is to remember, to preserve and guard in memory, the injury, the victim, and the perpetrator. This can and should not be denied. Yet peace and a life in common also may call for the forgetting of past evils, if exiting from violence is the goal.

Memory is a terrain of struggle and contestation. People who see themselves as victims, survivors, and their kin—or their rescuers—often mobilize to render public stories of violence. These categories are themselves often disputed. In many cases, there are forces to keep their experiences out of public awareness, to actively silence them, or to control how the story is told. Memory is also often presented as an ethical political parable, a tool to tell a story of good and bad, to consolidate nationalism and to justify policies. As such, memory can be divisive and tendentious, a way into conflict rather than an escape from it.

Recognizing the problems and risks, as well as potential contributions, of memory projects, our group sought to clarify what alters the balance between these possibilities. We developed what we broadly called an “ethics of memory”: six attributes of memory projects that contribute to exiting violence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Self-reflective of the politics of memory.** Memory and power are intertwined. In many cases, official memories reify one set of experiences and polarize the society—often asserting that memorialization is an ethical act rather than recognizing its political character. Those who are responsible for memory projects should reflect on how their work is imbricated with power. At the same time, memory projects should be cognizant of their limits. Memory leaves much undone and untouched—structural violence, deep inequality, material deprivation, and ongoing political exclusion require other tools. Advocates for memory projects should be aware of their power and their limits.
2. **Provide a respectful space in which to acknowledge and support mourning for those who suffered from past violence.** Memory projects can create space for mourning and acknowledging individual losses, and thereby honor experiences and violence that were previously invisible and facilitate personal and social resolution.

3. **Break silences.** Memory projects make important interventions in cases where large-scale violence was previously unacknowledged or its memory actively suppressed. In these contexts, memory contributes to exiting violence by allowing diverse narratives of past violence to emerge.
4. **Encourage democratic discussion.** In many cases, after conflicts end, memory projects reconstitute fault lines and lead to mutual misunderstanding. Memory projects need not form a dialogue of the deaf but can aspire to creating spaces for learning and dialogue, while recognizing past victimization. This is a choice: memory projects can be democratic and reflexive in their intellectual orientation rather than dogmatic.
5. **Aim for mutual recognition.** Memory projects can honor multiple experiences. As Viet Thanh Nguyen writes, it is possible to seek an ethics of memory, that “strives both to remember one’s own and others, while at the same time drawing attention to the life cycle of memories and their industrial production, how they are fashioned and forgotten, how they evolve and change” (2016: 12).
6. **Recognize changes over time.** The meaning and value of a memory project changes over time. Victims become survivors and citizens. Even if the wounds never heal, memory work should not impose fixed categories on people or groups. Over time, memory work can help transform the dialectic of victim and perpetrator, diffusing rather than consolidating former animosities.

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CHAPTER 8

Reconstructing The Self

Leader: Richard Rechtman

Contributors: Lotte Buch-Segal, Emilie Medeiros, Valérie Robin-Azevedo

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1990s, in the aftermath of several extremely violent conflicts (the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, the wars in former Yugoslavia, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and many more), a new social and political need has emerged for individuals belonging to populations affected by such violence. Indeed, these conflicts were particularly devastating for civilian populations, which has cruelly raised the issue of psychological reparation for the victims, and sometimes for the perpetrators of atrocities as well. How is it possible to ensure the peaceful coexistence of people and communities who have been so totally and violently divided? How is it possible to prevent reopening wounds on both sides in the face of the impossibility, for everyone, of being satisfied only through a discourse of reconciliation? In other words, how can populations prevent the desire for revenge from fuelling the feeling, often common among victims, that justice does not necessarily diminish hatred?

This is precisely why the idea has emerged that psychological wounds—that is, the traumas from war and violence—must be treated first before populations formerly in conflict can be expected to be able and live together again, since they cannot be asked to forgive or forget what they have endured. It is for this reason that the psychological reconstruction of individuals and social groups in the aftermath of conflicts has gradually emerged as one of the essential components of the political and judicial strategies aimed at ending violence.

Analysing this new aspiration requires placing it in the broader process of political reconfigurations of individuality and the repertoire of collective actions that they mobilize¹ and from which it has emerged. Indeed, if it now occupies an essential place alongside other approaches to restoring a peaceful social order, such as justice and memory, it is also because, in other theatres of public action, the consideration of individual aspirations and individual wounds had just acquired undeniable political recognition.

In our case, the aim of psychological reconstruction in post-conflict situations first appeared as weaknesses in other processes, which require a sort of decentralization from the person and from his or her singular expectations, in favour of a reification of a hypothetical collective destiny. This is the case with justice, including international justice. Thanks to its development and implementation in places that were previously resistant to international laws, it has become the obvious operator of a collective official confirmation of the end of violence, even though violence might persist in some instances. Justice has also become the place where a possible collective reparation can be tested, for a final reckoning, one could say, from which the second process, a memory-related process, could begin. However, if memory processes involve the possibility of rewriting a collective history

1. From the consideration of suffering at work, to the reparation of psychological victims of attacks and disasters, to all the contemporary mobilisations that focus on individual damage awaiting collective reparation.

that states that no one will be forgotten (neither losers nor winners), they, by definition, are incompatible with singular trajectories.

These are precisely the most frequent complaints and expectations expressed by victims. Most deplore the fact that justice has neglected them, ignored them, or, even worse, mistreated them. They also may condemn the collective history as being written by those who have not experienced it, in order to eliminate the genuine witnesses.

These are some of the reasons why more and more initiatives and apparatuses have emerged that can take into account (or, more accurately, account for) the destiny of each individual. The individual approach to singular injuries was therefore supposed to allow everyone to be reintegrated into the great collective history.

We call these operations “self-rebuilding”. It is necessary to distinguish between two different registers, each of them refocused on specific objects, but nevertheless placing subjectivity, or, more precisely, placing the effect on subjectivation, at the core of their *modus operandi*.

The Self-Restoration Apparatuses

Self-restoration apparatuses are focused on providing psychological care for the consequences of (suffered or inflicted) violence, whether it is trauma (post-traumatic stress disorder, PTSD) related to sexual violence and forced childbirth, torture, child soldiers, and so on, or the so-called therapeutic apparatuses involving both perpetrators and victims.

Psychological restoration here involves the idea of subjective reparation of a singular trauma that nevertheless characterizes a possible collective destiny.

The apparatuses for restoring the social space between the dead and the living

Most processes of extreme violence, including genocide, aim to make the deceased disappear, transforming them into simple corpses. Examples of this include the abandonment of bodies, the use of mass graves, the prohibition of funeral rites, and the disappearance of opponents, all of which deliberately deprive the living of their dead. The challenge here is not only to kill in large numbers but also, if not above all, to make it impossible to maintain cultural and ritual nexus between the dead and the living. Indeed, depriving the living of their obligations toward their deceased is part of the ambition and practical modalities of mass violence.

Here, the apparatuses for self-rebuilding is carried out through the repositioning of the dead body in the space of the deceased. Whether it is through the restitution of bodies to the families, the search for DNA traces, or exhumations of mass graves to allow for nominal burials, all these approaches attach the individual restoration of funeral rites to the function of collective reparation.

In the case of both self-restoration and restoration related to the dead, the aim is to specify the nature of these different apparatuses and to question the norms they are supposed to produce. Without claiming to be exhaustive, this chapter will study several cases that are typical, in our opinion, of the implementation of these apparatuses, while privileging the discourse of the users of these apparatuses.

RECONSTRUCTING THE SELF AS POLITICAL ACTION RESOURCE

It should be noted at the outset that the idea of self-rebuilding as a resource for political action is not an obvious one. Indeed, without certain recent operating concepts, such as psychological trauma, resilience, or collective grief, the idea of refocusing on the subjective destinies of each person would necessarily have a pathological or pathologizing meaning, which often happens when

concepts from psychopathology or psychiatry are used to characterize social conditions.

However, the imperative of reconstruction is first thought of as the opposite of the pathologic—in other words, it is now considered “psychologically normal” that people who are victims of violence show signs of intense psychological suffering. Even if this psychological suffering can be diagnosed by psychiatry as part of a characteristic condition (such as PTSD²), such labelling radically departs from the pejorative connotation of mental illness. On the other hand, it is thanks to the psychiatric identification of the devastating effect of violence on the psychological level that it has become possible to imagine its reversal in a sort of collective therapy for ending violence. Therefore, three things seem necessary in order to guarantee the success of these new endeavours of restoring “oneself”. First, there must be a consensus on the use of concepts from the previously depathologized psychological and psychiatric clinic (“trauma” being the standard). This transformation must then be based on a new conception of the person as a social actor characterized by his/her psyche, his/her emotions, and his/her torments (more than his/her reasoning). Finally, there is a need for testing apparatuses—that is, reception facilities, professionals, care procedures, and targeted groups that can either spontaneously present themselves or be identified beforehand and then referred to these apparatuses. In other words, there is a need for screening agents in addition to repair professionals.

THE SELF-RESTORATION APPARATUSES

The child soldiers apparatus in the Nepal People’s War (1996-2006)

The analysis of the relationship between early age involvement in armed groups and subjectivity has been predominantly researched through the cultural category “child soldiers” (Medeiros 2014). This approach is aligned with A. Kleinman’s concept of a category fallacy (1977). The category “child soldiers” is grounded on the following assumptions: 1) the armed group experience has a detrimental (psychological) effect on children and young people; 2) culture does not have an effect on the first assumption—so that labelling the child soldier experience as a trauma frames it as universally negative. These assumptions contribute to the framing of the lens used by both academics and policy-makers. Studies have therefore predominantly focused on demonstrating the negative impact of this experience of war or on the way this impact could be mitigated (Kohrt et al. 2008). In recent years though, a handful of researchers have questioned the portrayal of these subjects as innocent victims subjected to external forces and subsequent trauma. Research taking this approach started to question the assumed causal relationship between participation in armed conflict and psychological impact or trauma, often drawing attention to the influence of cultural context on how individuals responded and adapted (Blattman & Annan 2010; Klasen *et al.* 2010; Medeiros *et al.* in press).

However, these assumptions persist. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policies and services designed for Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAG) in Nepal were driven by similar assumptions: the experience had lasting significance for young people’s social and emotional health; and they had been kidnapped and were forcibly held captive by the armed group that their families did not ideologically support. Their experience of war stays illegitimate since they could not hold valid positions in their lives as they could not be considered as true social-political actors. An additional assumption was that the involvement of children with politics at an early age was (psychologically) harmful, so the significance of political activism and the *Mâobâdi* in the youngsters’ everyday life at the local level was overlooked. A tension exists

2. The PTSD exists in the North American psychiatric classification since the DSM-III.

between the normativity produced by the apparatus (Agamben 2000) attached to global notions of mental health and children in war, and child soldiers in particular, and many of these young Nepalese's resistance through their political activism.

The following sections will explore, first, the resistance to this normativity through an exploration of intra-psychical effects and trauma among informants and, second, the significance of structural violence in understanding the implication of their armed group experience in these young people's subjective functioning. In fact, there was limited evidence for a psychical impact in the form of trauma or other distress related to their armed group experience; instead, political activism was often central to their subjective experience of the war and in attempting to navigate the structural violence of their environment of return.

Trauma and intra-psychical impact

In Emilie Medeiros's ethnography of Nepalese child soldiers, their war experience did not appear as a prominent determinant of these young people's well-being. A related "trauma" or an intra-psychical impact was absent from the multiple layers of data gathered. When prompted, interviewed, or during informal exchanges about their emotional worlds, the majority of informants did not share any current psychological difficulty related to their experience or exposure to violence when underground. As Parbati, 20, from the untouchable caste, explained whilst cooking:

I used to feel enraged about [police threats in the schools] and that helped to give me the courage to fight in the PLA [People's Liberation Army]... Even in the PLA, I used to have nightmares about that, that they will finish us... After I left I sometimes thought about it and had these nightmares, especially as my best friend was killed just next to me... but these days I don't think about it that much and I don't have these dreams any longer.

Far from the assumptions underlying the child soldier discourse and the related policies, the psychological positions of many informants indicated positive adaptation overall when they returned home. Signs of psychological distress were often absent, and no particular emotional reactions were observed in response to triggers associated with their armed group experience (e.g., related political programs in the community or on radio; related discussions with neighbours, family, or friends). The observations of these young people's subjective worlds suggest that there is limited interaction with the notion of trauma or distress resulting (directly) from their armed group experience: as it did not capture their subjective experiences after this experience of war. Their distress, when occurring, seemed to be related to other dimensions of their various experiences during the war (prior to and after their Maoist involvement) and to dynamics shaping their daily lives upon their return, from their relationship to their families to their ability to navigate structural violence.

Political activism and structural violence

For many young people who went underground, their psychological position after the war was vitally intertwined with political activism and the heroic discourse that dominated Nepalese society after the Maoist group was democratically elected to lead the government in April 2008. A "New Nepal" was soon to come and this validated some of their sorrows. The Maoist armed group offered them an opportunity to challenge ingrained structural violence and the monarchist government that has always ignored the needs of minorities, low castes, and rural Nepalese. The ideals the Maoists promoted also proposed an alternative trajectory to global values of modernity, enabling their protection from the gross human rights violations that the government perpetrated against

their communities.

Many informants therefore asserted their agency, being vehemently opposed to the normativity imposed by the apparatus associated with the idea of child soldiers. They had strong and articulated positions with regards to their subjective experience of the armed group. Durga, 18, who had been involved when he was 14 and was now heading the political party in his region of origin, demonstrated this when reacting to a media piece that involved him:

I feel very upset when people really just want to say bad things about *the party*! What they said [about my views] is not what I had told them. I had explained them in details the reasons for my involvement and how I had come to make the choice to join the revolution. Nobody forced me! I had described them my personal experiences and the murder of my brother. But then they say things about me that are completely different from what I had told them and that are completely wrong! It is not at all what I had said. They don't respect my vision of things. They still want to think that, in the end, I was made to join the party forcefully! I really don't like that!

From the globalized child soldiers discourse to the Kathmandu-based government and NGO perspectives, policies and interventions carried out the fundamental belief that this population did not have the ability to be legitimate actors in the conflict. This effectively invalidated these young people's identity and the reconstruction of their war experience they needed to hold onto during this period of their life. Ganesh, 20, who was detained and tortured from the age of 13 for 18 months until the end of the insurgency, illustrated this:

When I entered politics I learned different types of things. It was a happy moment for me to be involved in the party. It is a truly important aspect of my life as I could contribute to my country and a greater Nepal. When I read in the newspaper about them, I feel this excitement again ... but the outsider to the group cannot understand! It was like a dream (elated emotion) a common project to fight for a better society, a New Nepal! ... When we were together, the dream was not for me but for all of us. It was about fighting inequalities and changing the country.

The recognition of Ganesh's political identity was central to his war experiences in terms of his attraction, adhesion, and subsequent longing for the affiliation to the armed group as a Maoist combatant and when he became a detainee. His agency transpires in his resistance to the "child soldiers" and the "terrorist" apparatus that is organized around his identity as a political activist. Indeed, it offered him the opportunity to be at the forefront of this social scene with prestige and social recognition, in a fundamentally unequal society where politics shapes daily life.

Furthermore, our capital informants accessed through their *party* involvement further strengthened their well-being by validating the legitimacy of their involvement in the war. The young people felt that their previous actions, sorrows and sacrifices were worthwhile as Bhawana, 25, commented:

[Involvement] is sacrifice [balidân] indeed, like the example of Nona. She became a *shahid* [martyr] in the battle. She sacrificed her life there, but I couldn't make such a sacrifice... If you sacrifice, your popularity increases. Even if there is sorrow in the family, everybody in the society and community recognises you as the daughter of Mr or Mrs who sacrificed for the country. [pause] I was popular in the society until I stopped working for the party. Now that work doesn't have any meaning or value. But if I had been able to sacrifice, everybody would

have respected me now.

However, the apparatus of acknowledgement could hold for them only when enmeshed with the social, professional, and/or economic capital that this experience could bring to their lives. The Maoist-led government resigned in 2009, and the young people transitioned to a stage where they became important breadwinners for their families (their parents and/or own children) in a social and economic landscape that remained as challenging as ever. This explained why some youngsters argued that it is precisely because they were in this young life-stage that they could sacrifice of their person for a wider collective good. In 2015-16, the government pushed to finalize the implementation of the politics of reintegration (DDR) of former combatants that could provide access to professional trainings and a financial package. The initiative was part of a peacebuilding effort to include the former armed group members, mostly combatants, who had not been enrolled in the various UN-managed cantonments sites after the end of the war. Going through remaining political Maoist cadres, this was the last opportunity for the former armed group to recognize the involvement and sacrifices of its (former) members. Yet this process was rigged by power, corruption, and patronage practices, and most subjects who might have been entitled to such support were never put forward by the Maoist group. The lack of acknowledgement fuelled further anger and disillusion, contributing in many cases to further despair and leading youths to question the value of their engagement with the armed group.

Post-insurgency, young Rolpalese were faced with structural violence that remained as deep as ever, with limited opportunities and infrastructure, compounding their losses. Informants' predominant anxieties therefore gradually shifted toward surviving within this challenging environment rather than on their conflict experiences. For a majority, this constant anxiety and feeling of helplessness crystallized around the idiom *dikka* (boredom, lethargy):

People experience *dikka* when there are no facilities, no electricity in the village, no opportunities... It is difficult and people don't feel like working and going to the fields... I started to feel it when I returned from the *Mâobâdi*. I feel it every time when I am at home so then I just feel I should go abroad to earn money.

Accessing various forms of capital was crucial to enabling young people to perform their social duties (as husband, father, or older son of the family) while navigating the violence of their social-economic landscapes. This was a central concern for most informants when they returned from their life underground to often impoverished families. Migrating for labour in the Gulf countries was the only trajectory for young people to offer their family a chance to escape from their financial straits. Migration experiences became entangled with abusive work schemes, spiralling family loans, and dilemmas as family breadwinners, but going abroad remained the only way out, which led several to despair and at times to contemplate suicide. This case forces us to recognize that sometimes a way out of structural violence and injustice may involve a turn to violence, which requires us to think about what "exiting violence" might mean in particular contexts.

Moving to a similar context with as strong a normativity around political activism, namely, occupied Palestine, we will in the following section focus on the crucial time when the revolutionary spirit dampens, allowing for important insights into the potential, and failure, of acknowledging people's investment in political activism and in the broader picture, and on what this case tells us about the role of violence in taking up, being involved in and leaving or being excluded from political activism.

Political Activism and the Temporality of the Trauma Apparatus in Palestine

The presence of trauma in Palestine has been documented, analyzed and criticized across the social sciences (Segal 2016a and 2016b; Feldman 2015; Fassin & Rechtman 2009; Fischer 2007). Since the mid-1990s, Palestinian and international psychiatrists have documented the soaring rates of PTSD, anxiety, and depression that in some studies are as high as 54 percent in the adult Palestinian population (Madianos *et al.* 2012). Subsequently, discursive and ethnographic studies have critically investigated how psychology and notions of trauma are part of the local vernacular of mental well-being due to both Palestine's time as a British colony and the sheer amount of psychosocial interventions that continue to form a big part of international humanitarian assistance in the Palestinian Territory (Segal 2016a and 2016b; Feldman 2015; Kirmayer *et al.* 2010; Fassin & Rechtman 2009; Fischer 2007). What these studies have revealed is the ambiguity around humanitarian aid when phrased in languages of trauma, in a context where standing tall against Israel's military occupation is part of the normativity undergirding of what we might consider the Palestinian apparatus of resistance (Feldman 2015; Kirmayer *et al.* 2010; Agamben 2009: 2). In one sense, the omnipresence of trauma in discourse and lived experience has meant that the Palestinians are able to acknowledge that violent events such as imprisonment, torture, or incidental bursts of military aggression might have unwanted psychological effects. Given that psychosocial services have been in place in Palestine for 30 years, there is less stigma attached to mental illness than earlier and most notably in comparison with other countries in the Middle East (Segal 2016a; Mittermaier 2014). Meanwhile there are other and more ambiguous ways in which the language of trauma has been absorbed into ways of understanding the deep effects of the occupation upon the well-being of the Palestinian population. The following section will focus on two among these modes of absorbing the occupation's effects into Palestinian social life: first, therapy and the problem of the future, and, second, the problem of irreversible psychological effects of violence.

Glorified pasts and failed futures

Lotte Buch Segal's investigations on families of incarcerated Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank have demonstrated how the more than 700,000 Palestinians who have been imprisoned in Israel since the inception of Israel's military occupation means that every family is marked by incarceration in the form of a current or former detained family member (Segal 2015, 2016a, and 2016b). Less unequivocal are the particular ways in which incarceration has marked a particular individual and his or her family. The reason for such particularity is that the texture of such marks is closely imbricated with how Israeli jurisdiction concerning Palestinian subjects have changed over time. We therefore zoom in on the time from the First Intifada (uprising) from 1987 to the signing of the Oslo Interim Agreements in 1993 throughout the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. The argument pursued in this section is that the penal justice toward Palestinians changed in this period to the extent that the experience of imprisonment during the Second Intifada left scars that are irreversible, compared to experiences in the earlier years. Let us unfold this ethnographically.

From Segal's work among Palestinian men and women who have been incarcerated in Israel for their political activism, we learn that those who were imprisoned during the First Intifada speak about their time in prison as a combination of torture, hardship and, significantly, the time of their life (Segal 2016a and 2016b; Meari 2014; Nashif 2008). The coexistence of such allegedly different registers of experience rests on the strong sense of communal political pedagogy that suffused and helped sustain the community of Palestinian prisoners during the First Intifada. As Nashif and Meari have described it, this pedagogy meant that undergoing torture became one of the marks of sacrificing oneself to the Palestinian resistance struggle—indeed, both Meari and Nashif name

such experiences as a specific revolutionary subjectivity (Nashif 2008; Meari 2014). Anyone who had themselves or had relatives who had participated in the First Intifada would proudly mention that they too were imprisoned and that they were tortured. Although brutal, participation in this golden era of Palestinian resistance was thus a mark Palestinians proudly wore. Importantly, those forms of collective acknowledgement took place in a context where every single prisoner was given a job in the Palestinian National Authority, and if that were not possible, a lifelong pension. Thus, the heroic discourse was part of a larger institutional apparatus that worked to honour and compensate former prisoners and to include them in the coming into being of the Palestinian state. This changed after the signing of the Oslo Accords, which involved a changed jurisdiction for the Palestinian occupied territories, also in terms of penal justice (Kelly 2006 and 2008; Allen 2012; Segal 2016a and 2016b).

In order to understand how entrenched in Palestinian subjectivities Israel's occupation was, we look at Israeli practices of securitization (Segal 2013; Holbraad & Pedersen 2013). Whereas administrative detention was widespread during the First intifada, the years after Oslo testified to the use of longer sentences. Moreover, the families of the detainees had formerly been able to visit their relatives because the prisons were less securitized. Yet the decisive factor to a curbed relationship between detainees and their families was the tripartite division of the Palestinian territory into Area A (administered by the Palestinian Authority), Area B (administered by both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli state), and finally, Area C (administered by Israel only). As has been described by both Tobias Kelly (2006) and Amahl Bishara (2015), Palestinian mobility is severely restricted—an individual who resides in Area A is not allowed to go to Area C unless they have been given a special permit, for instance in the case of urgent hospital treatment. Among Buch Segal's interlocutors, some had not seen their husbands for more than five or ten years, nor did they always know which prison they were incarcerated in due to the practices of securitization, that make up the building blocks of Israeli penal justice (Segal 2013; Matar & Baker 2011). This turned the period of imprisonment for both inmates and relatives into an experience that was altogether different than was the case during the First Intifada.

Also, the formal documentation of acts of torture in Israeli detention of Palestinian prisoners meant that physical torture was minimized, only to give way to what Darius Rejali has termed "stealth torture", namely, torture that leaves no marks but targets the detainee's psyche in ways that reveal themselves only over time (Rejali 2007). A husband of an interlocutor sadly exemplifies the wide-ranging effects of this: upon his release after seven years in an Israeli prison, he refused to leave the bedroom save for mealtimes and took up drinking, which led him to act violently toward his wife and children. Whereas his wife recognized that the time in an Israeli prison had not been pleasant, she blamed the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli state—while the First Intifada prisoners had been welcomed back as heroes and given jobs in the Palestinian administration, this practice had changed with the general decline in the Palestinian economy after the Second Intifada. The discourse of heroism was still in place, but the other elements of the apparatus of acknowledgement had slowly disintegrated due to the tightening grip of Israel's occupation. Whereas this particular man was clearly tormented by his past in prison, his pain was also, at least according to his wife and children, the failure to see a viable future materialize for himself and his family. The Palestinian psychologists and counsellors who took part in Buch Segal's study acknowledged this particular challenge: they could facilitate the way in which their clients understood and narrated their past, yet none of them could change the bleak future that has become Palestinian society, without a state today and none in near sight. In an article comparing how people living in compromised circumstances in Sierra Leone and Palestine imagine the future, Jefferson and Segal conclude that these people regard the future with foreboding rather than hopeful orientation (Jefferson & Segal 2019).

Concluding this section on the apparatus of acknowledgement of political resistance in Palestine, we wish to underline that such ambivalence rests not only on the intricate apparatus created by Israeli colonial policy and practice and Palestinian responses hereto, but also on the ways in which this apparatus makes it difficult to acknowledge permanent damage to Palestinian hearts and minds.

Discussion—the value of political life in reconstruction of the self

If we juxtapose the insights from Nepal and Palestine, one thing in particular spring to mind, namely, the importance of Nepali and Palestinian interlocutors being acknowledged as political actors by the apparatus in place to do so in the respective contexts. Complicating the striving for and perhaps even the wish to offer such acknowledgement is the place of violence in political activism across the two sites. Whereas the productive force of violence has been studied in the social sciences for a long time, violence as a form of political activism still places a particular kind of pressure on social scientific analysis. How do we as researchers think about the fact that sometimes, even often, disagreement about what constitutes political activism and terrorism, respectively, means that acknowledgement of political actions is necessarily held back? A radical instance of this might be historian Faisal Devji's argument that global Jihad constitutes a form of humanitarianism from the point of view of Muslims who consider themselves victims of globalization, secularism, and Christianity (Devji 2011). As the late anthropologist Saba Mahmood astutely observed, empathy is rallied in different ways in very diverse contexts and is often interlaced with calls to violence against a common enemy, whether it be in the context of trying to keep the Muslim other out of fortress Europe in the wake of the refugee crisis (Fassin), or of Western states being seen to have oppressed people in and beyond the Middle East in the name of Christian civilization (Asad 2007).

In order to bring this intricate discussion to bear on forms of reconstructing the self in the process of exiting violence, we consider whether Fassin's proposal to understand the difference between the value of life and the worth of life is a useful perspective. In an insightful chapter that asks how political life might be as important as the singular, biological life that is held sacred and must be saved at any cost according to a Western biomedical paradigm, Fassin argues that we need to understand that sometimes political life is what is at stake, and that sometimes that life is worth the cost of biological life. The cases from Nepal and Palestine are in different ways about the aspiration of having one's political life valued. Bringing the notion of political life into this chapter's final recommendations on reconstruction the self is, we argue, of crucial significance, and it might help us think differently about the difficulties at leaving political activism, even when it is violent, behind.

THE APPARATUSES FOR RESTORING THE SOCIAL SPACE BETWEEN THE DEAD AND THE LIVING

The transition mechanism of post-conflict periods at the turn of the new millennium consists of standardized procedures, grouped under the category of "transitional justice", which are now being deployed on a global scale. The stated normative objective of transitional justice is to assist in the process of pacification and democratization of countries in political transition. Such justice also constitutes performative rhetoric that legitimizes the implementation of various expertise and is expressed in a full range of reparational, economic, and symbolic public policies (Lefranc 2008). It thus abides by the recommendations of the UN Commission on Human Rights (2005) on the principle of the right to reparation for victims of violations of their fundamental rights. Among the symbolic reparations, the mechanisms for exhuming the dead and missing occupy a prominent place. This is evidenced by the increase in the number of mass graves opened around the world

over the past twenty years. Bosnia, Rwanda, and Peru are just a few examples of countries that have carried out this process. Exhumations therefore fall within the scope of the measures described as “restorative” justice and thus represent procedures that are alternative, or at best complementary, to those of criminal justice. They consist of locating the graves to extract the bodies and proceeding to their ultimate reburial. In some countries—in Peru, for example, but not in Rwanda—the aim is to identify the recovered remains before returning them to the families of the dead and missing. The aim of the international institutions that promote exhumations is formulated in terms of “restoring the dignity” of the deceased, but it is also intended to appease families who will thus take the path of “healing” through their “mourning work”. The call for empathy and respect for the dead and the mourning of families is about moral values that are considered superior and universal. The legitimacy of the public expression of exhumations is often made possible by a process of political neutralization of the discourse, which is limited to the “right to a dignified burial”.

The mobilization of a compassionate language marked by the pathologization of suffering confirms the value given, nowadays, to the category of “trauma” and the condition of “victim” as well as the priority given to the need to relieve the “psychological” pain of families. Thus, the repertoire of victimization produces new forms of political subjectivities by offering dominated individuals and groups new ways to access, through public recognition of suffering, rights that they were previously denied (Fassin & Rechtman 2009). In this perspective, exhumations have become emblematic of the local modes of deployment of “humanitarian reason”, where resorting to moral sentiments is an essential part of public policies (Fassin 2010). The exhumation of bodies primarily concerns the living, whom it is a question of “pacifying”, particularly in the aftermath of fratricidal conflicts. That the living can finally begin their individual mourning is considered as the necessary prerequisite for the subsequent development of a national collective mourning that is supposed to allow for the “reconciliation” of all citizens. The “return” of the disappeared mobilizes standardized care modalities for unearthed human remains, from forensic expertise to mediatized funeral processions, which raise questions about the discrepancies and tensions between these models of actions, as conceived and imposed from the top, and the expectations of the recipient groups. The ways in which these policies are received range from relief to ambivalence, from local reactivation of stigma to strategies of rejection or avoidance. Exhumations, carried out just after armed conflicts, thus appear as pivotal events. They are the scene of the emergence of new subjectivations and new statuses resulting from the experience of suffered and/or inflicted violence and the logic of action of the national and international institutional actors. Around the exhumations of human remains and objects unearthed, identities emerge and are recomposed, as are negotiations and memory-related conflicts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop and Strengthen Self-Restoration Apparatuses

Self-restoration apparatuses are those that focus on the psychological care of the consequences of violence (suffered or inflicted)—whether trauma (PTSD), sexual violence and forced childbirth, torture, child soldiers, etc.—or the so-called therapeutic mechanisms involving perpetrators and victims. Psychological restoration here involves the idea of subjective reparation for a singular trauma that nevertheless characterizes a collective destiny. These apparatuses are based on the establishment of individual, family, and collective care facilities, using clinical and psychosocial approaches. This requires the following:

1. developing scientifically validated practices. Focused on the victim’s discourse, the main goal of these apparatuses is to enable the victims to be recognized in their pain, to be supported, and to be healed;

2. simultaneously facilitating the exit from this single-victim position in order to place the victims or the perpetrators in the position of acting toward ending violence in the (post-) conflict social space, essentially revolving around structural violence;
3. moving away from the “child soldiers” discourse altogether to allow research to explore the cultural and context-specific experiences of involvement in armed groups and therefore better grasp the array of psychological complexities of the experiences of war;
4. developing a greater scientific understanding of young subjects and political activism without the influence of moralistic discourses;
5. using knowledge developed through the study of individual contexts to inform culturally specific training modules and on-going mentoring of local frontline staff engaging with a particular population and their families and communities;
6. advocating for DDR and other policy-related interventions to be given the means to prioritize addressing structural violence.

2. Develop the Apparatuses for Restoring the Social Space between the Dead and the Living.

Most processes of extreme violence, including genocide, aim to make the deceased disappear, transforming them into simple corpses. Examples of this include the abandonment of bodies, the use of mass graves, the prohibition of funeral rites, and the disappearance of opponents, all of which deliberately deprive the living of their dead. The goal is not only to kill in large numbers but also, if not above all, to make it impossible to maintain the cultural and ritual nexus between the dead and the living. Indeed, depriving the living of their obligations toward their deceased is part of the ambition and practical modalities of mass violence. Dealing with this requires the following:

1. allowing the dead bodies to be re-placed into a space for the deceased;
2. returning the bodies to families, searching for DNA traces, or exhumations of mass graves to allow for nominal burials;
3. encouraging individual restoration through the funeral rites for loved ones;
4. reinstating the central place of the collective in organizing funerals through the participation of the greatest number of people (which ensures some form of collective reparation);
5. ensuring that the relevant authorities support all the initiatives aimed at exhuming the bodies and returning them to their loved ones.

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CHAPTER 9

Gendered Approach to Violence & Exiting Violence: MENA Region and Diaspora

Leaders: Danièle Joly et Pénélope Larzillière

Contributors: Najwa Adra, Nadje Al-Ali, Sana Farhat and Nicola Pratt

INTRODUCTION: GENDERED APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE

This chapter presents a gendered approach to understanding violence and ways of exiting violence. Gendered approaches to war and violence conceptualize and understand these phenomena in distinct ways. First, gendered approaches emphasize the importance of studying violence not only in the public sphere but also in the private sphere and understanding the ways they are linked. Second, gendered approaches highlight the differential impacts of violence on women and men because of dominant gender relations, norms, and identities. Third, gendered approaches conceptualize peace as rooted in a social justice perspective, including gender justice, and as addressing structural inequalities.

A key overarching concept in a gendered approach to violence is that of the “continuum of violence”, which understands violence in the public sphere (such as conflict between armed groups and political violence), violence in the private sphere (domestic violence and other forms of violence against women), as well as gender-based violence wherever it may occur (in the home, on the street, in the workplace, and in public institutions) as linked through the thread of gender. By this we mean that the exercise of violence is deeply embedded in gender hierarchies and dominant gender norms. In particular, we highlight how male dominance enables the exercise of violence across a variety of contexts, which, in turn, reproduces and normalizes dominant notions of masculinity as associated with violence. Meanwhile, non-violence is associated with women and stigmatized as weakness and passivity, both socially and also in international politics.

As a result of gender hierarchies and gendered divisions of labour, women and men experience violence in different ways. Women (and children) make up the majority of refugees fleeing conflict and violence, while men make up the majority of fighters. Furthermore, because women are generally deemed responsible for social reproduction within the family, they are disproportionately affected by shortages in food, medicine, and other essential items and by the worsening public services that often accompany violent conflict. That is not to say that all victims are women (and children) and all fighters are men. However, dominant gender norms may mean that women who do participate as fighters are stigmatized and/or are obliged to masculinize their behaviour in order to be accepted. Equally, men who refuse to fight are stigmatized and may be targeted for violent punishment.

In discussing the process of exiting from violence, a gendered approach proposes a comprehensive vision of peace compared to some mainstream approaches, which generally focus merely on the cessation of armed violence. In this respect, another important concept is that of intersectionality, which understands that gender inequality is intertwined and cannot be separated from other forms of social, political, and economic inequalities pertaining to class, ethnicity, religion, sexuality,

and generation among other axes of social difference. A gendered approach to exiting violence emphasizes the need to address other forms of inequalities, oppressions, and exploitation based on class, race/ethnicity, and/or religion as well as guaranteeing human rights for all, regardless of gender, sexual orientation, race, nationality, religion, and class. This implies the implementation of positive measures to bring about social justice, including gender justice, ending gender-based violence, removing all structural inequalities, and guaranteeing women's equal access to resources. In this respect, this chapter highlights the important work of women in ending violence through their activism against different forms of injustice and inequalities underpinning violence, including, but not limited to, struggling against gender inequality.

Nevertheless, it is equally important not to romanticize women's agency or to essentialize women as "peace loving". Women have participated in violence, sometimes as part of armed struggles against oppression but also as members of dominant groups seeking to repress and exploit other groups, whether based on class, race, ethnicity, or religion. Overall, this chapter stresses the importance of going beyond binaries of perpetrator/victim, active/passive, and/or agency/victimhood when discussing women (and men) and their experiences of violence and contributions toward exiting violence. The discussion also challenges dichotomous thinking and approaches when it comes to the root causes for violence, moving away from the tendency either to provide culturalist explanations, pointing either to Islam or Middle East culture, or to adopt those frameworks that merely highlight the impact of colonial, imperialist and global neoliberal interventions as the reasons for "women's oppression".

Finally, our chapter takes a transnational approach to gendered violence in relation to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Given the long history of political entanglements, the large scale of labour and forced migration, and significant social and economic ties between MENA and Europe, it is important to conceptualize MENA beyond its geographical boundaries. Within Europe, the recent "refugee crisis", but also more long-standing politics of immigration as well as growing fears of radicalization and Islamophobia in Europe have led to the securitization and criminalization of immigrant communities of MENA background. Thus, strategies for exiting violence in MENA must also include strategies for exiting violence against and within diasporic communities.

The continuum of violence

Conceptualizing violence from a gendered perspective rests on the recognition of a continuum of violence, experienced by women through the thread of gender that includes overt armed conflict, warfare, structural violence (linked to differential access to resources and power), and domestic violence, as well as various forms of sexualized violence (Cockburn 2001). Moreover, gendered violence exists both during periods of overt warfare and conflict as well as in post-conflict contexts and during peace times. This does not detract from the fact that there are peaks of exacerbated violence during certain periods. Patriarchal gender norms and relations, in conjunction with heteronormativity, are central to the creation, reproduction, and reinforcement of authoritarian hierarchies of power and the privileging of militarized masculinities, which are prevalent in times of war and peace.

With respect to terminology, gendered violence, or gender-based violence (GBV), refers to violence against a person based on the normative roles linked to each gender contributing to and reproducing unequal power relations in a given society. GBV, often used interchangeably with violence against women (VAW), can lead to psychological, economic, physical, or sexual harm. However, men can also be victims of gender-based violence, which is often linked to their non-normative masculinity and/or sexuality. Sexual violence is one specific continuum of gender-based violence that refers to a wide range of threats, behaviours, and acts that are sexual or sexualized,

unwanted, and committed without consent; it includes sexual harassment, which has become prevalent in many countries in the region. Sexual violence can exist on an individual level but is often used more systematically to control, dominate, and reinforce gender-based oppression and heteronormativity.

Gender, crucially, does not refer only to women and the instrumentalization and control of women's bodies and sexualities, but also to men and hegemonic forms of masculinities and their bodies and sexualities. However, as several feminist scholars have demonstrated cross-culturally (Yuval-Davis 1997) and more specifically in the context of the Middle East (Al-Ali & Pratt 2016), women's behaviour and appearance are considered to be symbolic of the national, the religious, and the ethnic community, and, therefore, women are often the target of legal or informal mechanisms or even physical violence with the aim of imposing dress codes, controlling sexual behaviour, and limiting access to the public sphere, all in the name of "restoring authentic values" but operating to demarcate boundaries of "us versus them", to consolidate the authority of specific political actors or attempts to "break" the opposition (Al-Ali & Pratt 2016: 130). This trend is noticeable in the context of ethnic and sectarian conflicts in which communities instrumentalize women's bodies and women's sexualities as a way to demarcate boundaries and reify differences.

Critical approaches have demonstrated that it is necessary to historicize violence, avoid essentializing culture and religion, and apply a political economy and intersectional approach to violence, recognizing the ways that multiple local, national, regional, and international factors linked to the state, economic conditions (such as poverty and exclusion), political developments, and contestations over resources and power contribute to the relative levels of gender-based violence at any given historical moment. However, it is important to take into account equally references to colonial legacies and imperialist interventions, on the one hand, alongside local patriarchal power on the other hand (Al-Ali 2016). Moreover, Deniz Kandiyoti (2013) has pointed out that we cannot simply explain away the targeting of women's dress codes, their mobility, their sexuality, their participation in protests and political action as routine manifestations of patriarchy and misogyny. In her view, patriarchy no longer functions "as usual" and currently requires a higher level of coercion and the deployment of more varied ideological state apparatuses to ensure its reproduction. Therefore, the high levels of violence against women since 2011 are evidence of attempts to reinstate a patriarchy that some men feel is under threat. Nevertheless, many men have started to grasp the connections between patriarchy and political authoritarianism, often mediated through militarism and gender-based violence.

In the context of rapid political transformations and struggles over power and authority since late 2010, women's and men's bodies and sexualities have emerged as key sites of contestation and control in the region. Prior to that, there has been a long history of struggles and campaigns in relation to the personal status code, governing marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, but also attempts to address sensitive taboo subjects, such as domestic violence, sexual harassment, honour-based crimes and killings, as well as reproductive rights. Significantly, in recent years the mobilization and activism around bodily integrity have been linked to the acknowledgement that bodies are at the core of families, economies, and social and political institutions, shaping states, civil society, and citizenship.

Different Types of Violence toward and Involving Women

At any given historical time, different forms of violence have had an impact on women's lives in the MENA region, as elsewhere in the world. The above-mentioned continuum of violence requires a holistic approach not only in terms of identifying the range and variety of violence but also its different sources and perpetrators. A complex picture emerges: on a national level, state and non-state

actors, including the military, the police, militias, armed gangs, Islamist organizations, and tribes, but also the general public, colleagues, family, and friends, are perpetrators of various forms of violence experienced by women (and men) in the region. Moreover, conflicts and wars contribute to the emergence of regional and international perpetrators, especially invading and occupying armies/soldiers, mercenaries, security personnel, and Islamist militants.

Historically, the state has been identified as one central perpetrator of violence in the MENA region. Authoritarian states and dictatorships have used force, such as arrests, torture, and executions, to repress political opposition and dissent. This has often included sexual violence against women as a way to punish dissent and deter their involvement in political opposition. The state has been identified as a prime perpetrator of violence in the context of war and conflict, as we have seen most recently in Syria and Iraq. Non-state actors have also become major sources of violence in the MENA region. The most visible perpetrators of particularly gender-based violence are currently the so-called Islamic State (IS) and other Islamist militant groups, prominent in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. While the scale and level of violence perpetrated by IS are unprecedented, this violence does not emerge in a vacuum, given the long history of gender-based violence by Islamist groups. Meanwhile, secular militias and armed and criminal gangs are also rampant and are responsible for various forms of gender-based and sexual violence, including forced prostitution, trafficking, harassment and rape.

Rape, one of the most extreme forms of gender-based violence, is perpetrated both at the level of state and non-state actors during war and conflict, and during periods of relative peace. In war times, rape is often used as a weapon. This form of gender-based violence is used not only to violate and harm individual women but also to humiliate and annihilate entire communities as a systematic and collective weapon of war. One can cite the cases of Bosnian Muslim women collectively raped by Serbian troops, Saddam Hussein's atrocities against Kurds in the 1980s, the Turkish state's repression of Kurds in the 1990s and the rape and torture of Ezidi women at the hands of IS. Violating and potentially impregnating women (sometimes deliberately) result in long-term consequences and often affects entire communities, whether they be ethnic, religious, or political, because women are generally seen as both the biological and symbolical markers and reproducers of communities. It is important to mention here that rape is also used as a weapon of war against men, as experienced by Iraqi prisoners of war following the invasion of Iraq and opponents to the regime in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Turkey; and there have been accounts of rape of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons. The rape of men often constitutes more of a suppressed issue and source of shame and has thus remained underreported and even silenced.

An array of gender-based and sexual violence might be classified as a social form of violence, rooted in tribal, communal, religious, and family contexts and prevailing gender norms. These range from early and forced marriages and honour-based crimes and killings to female genital mutilation (FGM). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that neither culture nor religion are static, nor can they be analysed in an essentialized manner. Instead, they are contingent on specific historical and political economic contexts and developments, nationally, regionally, and internationally. Moreover, all of these forms of violence are in various ways related to deprivation, poverty, and insecurity.

In recent years, verbal and physical harassment has become a much-debated topic in academic, activist, and media circles. Indeed, sexual harassment has increasingly become a political tool and counter-revolutionary measure by authoritarian governments to suppress dissent and control its populations, at the hands of the police and military and/or via paid thugs, as illustrated in Egypt currently. However, this form of violence has existed prior to recent political developments. In addition, the street, the workplace, and the home are sites in which women experience different forms of harassment outside of those orchestrated by the state and related political groupings.

Underlying these different forms and perpetrators of violence are structural inequalities, which frequently make women more vulnerable. Economically, the past decades have seen an emergence of the “feminization of poverty” in several countries. The transition from Keynesian to neoliberal economies, coupled with an international division of labour that is reliant on cheap female labour, while women remain in charge of reproductive work and domestic labour, has affected the MENA region as well as other regions in the world. Privatization and restructuring have in many locations, most notably in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, led to lay-offs that have affected women disproportionately (UNDP, Arab Human Development Report, 2016). Employed women face similar challenges here as elsewhere in the world: lower wages than men, the double burden of employment and domestic work (*ibid*), employment in the informal sector, and part-time labour, all of which increase their precarious economic positions. This is compounded by women’s difficult access to resources and legal rights if they are members of ethnic or religious minorities. Increasingly, populist as well as institutionalized sectarianism has contributed to gender-based violence, as women are perceived to be barriers of both ethnic and religious communities as witnessed among Kurds, Berbers, Ezidis, and so on.

Furthermore, women are facing a number of legal challenges. Historically, one of the most debated sets of laws with gendered implications in the region has been the Personal Status Code, which governs marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance and enshrines unequal gender relations based on a patriarchal bias. Although laws vary greatly from country to country, legal protections against domestic violence are rare and those that exist often fail to be applied, as social pressures tend to result in the protection of men at the expense of justice for women.

Case Study1–Yemen: Impact of external intervention on violence in a domestic environment.

Case Study2– The Turkish-Kurdish conflict: Intersections of state-based and patriarchal Violence.

Hegemonic narratives of ‘otherness’

One form of symbolic violence affecting women in the MENA region and in the diaspora has been their representation through what can be called an orientalist narrative. Women have been portrayed as the foremost embodiments of the radical, intrinsic “otherness” of Muslims in the MENA region and in diaspora communities. These representations partly stem from a colonial and post-colonial history as testified by the unveiling ceremony of 1958¹ in Algiers, which marked the politicization of gender in the context of colonial relations and, in France today, the focus on the *hijab* and a true “politics of the veil” (Scott 2007; Joly & Wadia 2017). These representations pertain to colonial and postcolonial history, and to a neo-orientalist imaginary. They tend to reify and culturalize gender domination: Muslim women become, all at once, victims in need of liberation and markers of “otherness”, the incarnation of “them” in the face of an emancipated, exemplary “us”, as part of the power relations of an asymmetrically structured global society. In this process, gender domination tends to be transferred onto an “other” eschewing gender inequalities in Western countries. This is naturalized through hegemonic processes, discarding situational heterogeneities in Muslim-majority countries or diasporas as well as the historicization of prevailing gender norms. Moreover, the situation of women in Muslim-majority countries has also been used as an argument for external interventions. For example, “the military and humanitarian intervention into Afghanistan in 2001 advertised ‘liberating’ the women of Afghanistan as one of its key objectives”, thus inscribing women’s struggle for their rights in Afghanistan within a transnational

1. On May 13, 1958, an unveiling ceremony for Algerian women was organised. Under pressure from partisans of French Algeria and to support ‘French fraternity’, the women were invited to publicly unveil on the Algiers Forum (Shepard 2004, Gaspard 2006)

narrative and “a narrative about interventions as necessary measures” (Koloma Beck 2018).

These representations affect current Western policies on Muslim populations, but they do not detract from the fact that women face oppressive situations and combat them in their own countries and communities. Indeed, imperialism and its impact should not be overplayed, glossing over national power configurations and forms of oppression and running the risk of undermining national feminist activists. It works as a parameter within an intersectional approach. The instrumentalization of struggles for women’s rights within imperialist power relations is intricately linked to key national and local issues in the same way as perceptions of gender issues and racialization intersect. Struggles for women’s rights have often been reinterpreted within the context of this power relationship with the West. Lamrabet (2012) thus refers to a “hostage” problematic. Hence, opponents of the struggle for women’s rights have deemed the movement tantamount to a “betrayal” of their own society or of their community in minority contexts, as best proclaimed by Islamist movements who denounce what they instrumentalize or perceive as a collusion with imperialist powers. A type of confiscation of struggles for women’s rights thus operates in the form of a minority/majority or hegemonic relation.

Various circumvention strategies have sought to dissociate the two questions. Some branches of Islamic feminism have, for example, drawn on the reinterpretation of Islam to dismiss gender-based inequalities as a custom rather than as a religion-based requirement. In so doing, they circumvent disputes over “authenticity” versus “betrayal”. Sometimes, gender differentiations may be reinforced by essentialist forms of feminism, attributing to women a specific but positive role. Other branches of feminism position themselves in the struggle against authoritarianism within a broad approach akin to the struggle for emancipation. This can also allow them to turn to a globalized public for support, transcending the frame of othering and reference to intrinsically oppressive cultures, thus making a transnational theme out of gender inequalities in a political, contextualized reading.

WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: BEYOND THE BINARY OF AGENCY/VICTIMHOOD

The current forms taken by women’s activism in the MENA region are extremely varied and wide-ranging, both in terms of the causes defended and the types of collective action adopted. They include political struggles, struggle against authoritarianism and for democracy, struggle against occupation and inequalities, nationalist women’s rights campaigning, welfare and charity initiatives, and environmental campaigns. Women activists’ involvement in the Arab uprisings of 2011 and 2012 have been noticed, as has their participation in the occupation of public places in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, in particular. Female activists can be found in classical political organizations (political parties and unions, running for election, and attending parliament) but are most particularly involved in the voluntary sector and locally based associations. Altogether, these commitments are inscribed in broad political visions and social projects.

These different forms of women’s activism contribute to struggling against injustice and to challenging violence, conceptualized here in a social continuum. Gendered approaches highlight how gendered inequalities shape the experience of these activists and how the perception of their commitments is marked by gendered assignments and binaries that are contested by our research and case studies.

Women as Social Actors: A Gendered Approach to Civic and Political Commitment

Decision makers and men in positions of power tend to consider that women are not significant actors in public and political life and are little interested in politics: “they think that politics is mainly

a man's thing, because everything encourages them to think this: tradition, family life, education, religion, literature" (Duverger, cited in Allwood & Wadia 2000: 140). Women from the MENA region as well as those of migrant background in diasporas in Europe and North America who either belong to Muslim communities or are of MENA background have been portrayed through the same lenses. Mainstream media have fed a public imaginary of these women as victims of domination and violence, thus consolidating prejudices that depict them as submissive, subjugated, apathetic, or uninformed beings, confined to the private realm of home and family. The implication is that they are unable or unwilling to act as subjects and hence not entirely worthy of the many rights accruing from social, economic, and political participation. Moreover, feminist scholars have put forward that the classical definition of politics—that is, political parties and electoral politics—has excluded other forms of participation, which are precisely the ones that tend to attract women's participation: "women do not participate less than men; instead, they participate differently..., more *ad hoc* and unstructured community associations, voluntary organizations and protests groups" (Githens *et al.* 1994: 5–26). Various studies have found that women have participated at the grassroots level in social movements, protest politics, informal community groups, voluntary organizations, and so on. Indeed, women in and from the MENA region have been noticeable in actions on the ground in their neighbourhoods, while remaining largely barred from sites of decision making (Amiriaux 2003: 90; Christy 1994; Allwood & Wadia 2000; Randall 1987).

Women, often express their acute sense of justice and ethical considerations that project them into meaningful action. Against the violence that attacks their physical and moral integrity and hinders their capacity of action, women have constituted themselves as social actors and subjects in their own right (Joly & Wadia 2017). As we currently see in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, women are recurrently the ones who, in times of crisis and war, have kept communities alive and children fed through concrete actions of solidarity at the ground level. Moreover, their engagement has gone far beyond gender issues to fight for social justice against all forms of inequalities.

However, the realm of activism is fraught with the same gender-based inequalities that pervade society (something not unique to MENA countries). Activists face, circumvent, or challenge these limitations in various ways. First, having a lived experience of inequality, domination, or violence may nourish the decision to take action if a field of opportunities for struggle emerges (Larzillière 2004). For those in a minority situation in Western countries, gender inequalities intersect with the impact of the "Arab" or "Muslim" categories of differentiation (Ajbli 2016).

In Western as in Muslim majority countries, MENA women represent the "particular" in relation to an apparently neutral "universal", which in fact is traversed with categories of differentiation. In this sense the "neutral" individual embodying these "abstract universal principles" proves rather masculine (Scott 2005) and, one might add, within a patriarchal definition of masculinity. This encourages a particularized, differentiated reception to women's engagement, which is sometimes utilized by the activists. For instance, Sahrawi activists who positioned their engagement as part of a national political struggle were perceived in the West as "mother" activists, thus gaining special media coverage and another form of legitimacy (Allan 2016).

Finally, gender inequalities also have an impact on activist organizations, in particular classical political organizations, where women activists encounter specific difficulties in obtaining recognition and accessing leading positions. Among Islamist parties in particular, women tend to be separated and oriented toward "women's issues" (education, charity work, etc.) (Larzillière 2016). For example, professional women in Jordan who run for election do not reach senior positions; even the presidency of the nurses' and midwives' association—where women are in a large majority—is generally held by a man. In Islamist voluntary organization meetings in Jordan, women sit together at the back of the room. Such inequality and glass ceiling effects, which are particularly prevalent in classical political parties, are general features in activism. They partly explain women activists'

more numerous presence in civil society and the voluntary sector (even though gender inequalities persist everywhere) as well as the search for new forms of engagement.

Gender and Nationalism

One context in which women's mobilization and political participation have flourished in MENA countries is that of nationalist movements. Although some feminists view nationalism as an inherently masculinist ideology wherein women are reduced to cultural symbols and biological reproducers of the nation, underpinning their second-class citizenship, we posit that a more nuanced approach to nationalist movements is required. Here, we draw a distinction between the nationalism deployed to dominate and exploit other groups/communities, on the one hand, and the nationalism that mobilizes resistance against exploitation and oppression, on the other hand. We also highlight differences between nationalist ideologies that include progressive attitudes and those displaying conservative attitudes toward gender issues. Nationalism has played an important role in struggles for self-determination against colonialism in former European colonies as well as in contemporary struggles for the self-determination of the Kurdish and Palestinian peoples. Across these contexts, strategies of both armed violence and non-violent resistance have been pursued separately and/or simultaneously.

Women in MENA countries have a long history of involvement in nationalist movements against European colonialism that emerged across the region in the beginning of the twentieth century and gained ground thereafter. Women contributed to these movements mainly through women's associational and philanthropic work, providing services and welfare for the poor and particularly for women and girls. At times of national crises, such as the Egyptian uprising against British rule in 1919 and the Lebanese protests against French rule in 1945, women also participated in street protests and other forms of explicitly political activities, transgressing dominant norms concerning female modesty and propriety. They even took part in armed resistance against colonial rule, predominantly in auxiliary roles. During the Great Arab uprising of 1936–1939 against British rule and Zionist colonization in Palestine, the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–1927 against the French, and the Algerian struggle for independence, also against the French, women played an important role by smuggling weapons, planting bombs and providing food to the fighters.

Within nationalist movements, women have emphasized the importance of their role alongside men in the struggle for national independence and freedom while maintaining their commitment to women's rights and freedoms. Their experiences in nationalist movements and male nationalist leaders' failure to support women's equality have motivated women to put forward gender-specific demands, such as women's suffrage, greater political inclusion, and family law reforms. Women who experienced human rights violations based on their national belonging and their gender have thus often promoted an intersectional approach that addresses injustices at national and interpersonal levels.

New forms of feminist engagement

Historically, feminist activism in the region took place along a continuum of initiatives and organizations closely tied to governments and state structures, on the one hand, and independent activism, often critical of the state's gender policies, on the other. Within so-called state feminism, particularly in relation to Tunisia, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, feminist activists were often co-opted by authoritarian regimes pursuing modernizing projects that involved women's education, labour force participation, and increased public presence, as well as formal political participation. The perceived collusion between women's rights proponents and authoritarian regimes involved in political persecution

and human rights oppression has had devastating impacts on feminist claims and credibility in the region.

Yet, throughout the region and at different historical moments, feminist activists have also combined opposition to political authoritarianism and repression and the promotion of women's rights and gender-based equality. Such involvement has forced many activists into exile, as in Iraq and Iran. In the current context, feminist activists are noticed for their challenges to existing governance, especially in terms of its patriarchal and authoritarian aspects. This is particularly evident in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq. Much of contemporary feminist activism take on board the various ways gender-based inequalities intersect with other structural forms of inequalities, such as class differences, economic exploitation, discrimination against ethnic minorities and sectarianism, as illustrated in women's rights activism in Iraq and Kurdistan. Many examples of women's activism can be cited. In Kurdistan-Iraq, women have progressed the promotion of their rights and obtained the promulgation of the Act of Combatting Domestic Violence in Kurdistan Region-Iraq (Act No. 8 2011) (Al-Ali & Pratt 2011; Joly & Bakawan 2016; Hardi 2013). In Israel, women are active participants in the peace movement. In Syria, Kurdish women are active political participants in the development of a progressive societal project and have joined the armed struggle to combat the threat of massacre and enslavement by IS, several of them occupying high-responsibility positions. In Tunisia, women have mobilized to change the law on violence against women (Ben Achour 2016). Moreover, many feminist activists in the region have a transnational feminist perspective and struggle against the impact of globalization, particularly global capitalist expansion, neoliberal economics, imperialism, and neocolonial power configurations.

More recently, novel forms of feminist engagement, particularly prevalent among the younger generation of feminist activists and organizations, frequently revolve around body politics and involve innovative forms of organizing outside of NGO structures, including online activism. Young feminist activists engage in new alliances with broader political movements, as particularly evident in Morocco, Iraq, and Egypt. This engagement sometimes includes greater links between feminist and LGBTQ activism, particularly noticeable in Turkey, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Egypt, while LGBTQ activism is still largely non-existent or underground in other countries, such as Iraq and Yemen. All these novel forms of feminist engagements stress the intersections between structural forms of violence, symbolic violence, and body politics, frequently presenting a much more holistic approach to and strategy for exiting violence than previous generations of feminists.

Case study 1. Activism of Tunisian women against violence

Case study 2. Yemeni women and the Arab spring

Case study 3. Women's mobilization against violence against women in Egypt

Case study 4. Iraqi women's rights activists at the forefront of struggling against sectarianism and authoritarianism

Case study 5. Turkish and Kurdish feminist activism against patriarchal and state violence

Case study 6. The Palestinian women's movement: struggling on two fronts

Case study 7. Female suicide bombers in Palestine and Iraq

Women in diasporic communities in non-Muslim majority countries

Middle East and North African countries are not isolated and should not be portrayed as such. Indeed, it is important not to consider them as independent cultural areas but to take into account the wider context of their long relationship with Western countries, in particular with regards to the history of violence and the social history of activism within MENA regions. As a case in point, gender-based representations are central to Western hegemonic narratives regarding the populations of

both the MENA countries and diasporic communities. In Muslim-minority contexts, that is, in the diaspora, the situation of MENA women is fraught with widespread discrimination, prejudice, and hostility. Women from the MENA regions who are in Western countries belong to populations who live in a minority situation as ethnic and religious groups. They have to steer through the complex interconnections between their cultural and religious groups and wider society and also to contend with the numerous obstacles thrown in the path of their autonomization and activism within each of those three main collectives of reference. In addition, those women face injunctions of loyalty, which are sprung upon them both by majority societies and by their own communities.

Diasporic women from the MENA region perceive the collective where their immediate socialization took place, the ethnic group, as an ambivalent source of restrictions and support. Although they mostly value their closeness to the immediate family, the extended family and the community have been considered a source of restrictions and norms grounded in patriarchal traditions. Consequently, many women contest any authority claimed by the community, invariably led by older men, to interfere in their plans—whether to pursue education, undertake employment, or become involved in civic and political life. The patriarchal pattern displayed by the ethnic community tends to be replicated in the Muslim sphere, whereby mosques and Muslim associations are dominated by men who control power to the exclusion of women. Moreover, collusion can occur, whereby elder men, leaders of ethnic or Muslim associations, are treated as privileged interlocutors by governmental entities, thus excluding women from policymaking.

Within majority society, minority Muslim women are faced with the increased prejudice and constraints inflicted on Muslims in the wake of the September 2001 events in New York, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and terrorist attacks in several countries. Therefore, MENA women suffer from multiple disadvantages, on racial and religious grounds, and on gender grounds generally but also because of specific stereotypes to which they are subject, portraying them as passive, submissive, and uninterested in civic and political life. Obstacles to their engagement have crystallized around two major themes in Britain and France—respectively, the securitization of Islam and that of national identity, while both issues arise throughout the Western world, with differentiated emphases. The legislative and cultural counterpart to the War on Terror in Britain has been the onslaught on women's Islamic dress in France, with the full force of the state being deployed. However, state policy has also spurred Muslim women to enter the public arena, in Britain, for instance, through their participation in anti-war campaigns, and in France through their mobilization against the 2004 law that prohibited headscarves in schools.

Within this adverse context, MENA women have developed their capacity of action and elaborated a repertoire of strategies to pursue their life project and engage in civic and political life. While not ignoring conventional channels of politics (notoriously less accessible to women), they favour associations as their main domain of action. MENA women have created their own Muslim associations or ethnic based support groups outside men's control, and they have built or joined neighbourhood and locally based associations—indeed, the 21st century has witnessed the multiplication of a great variety of such associations. These organizations provide social welfare, legal, and other services, according to their members'/clients' needs. Thereby, the women express a keen interest in attending to diverse social issues on a national or international scale: gender inequality, ethnic/racial discrimination and Islamophobia, poverty, social inequality, and human rights. For those who are believers, Islam represents a powerful motivator of engagement, linking politics and ethics. It is held up as a source of values, an ethical guide for the conduct of their actions over and above traditional ethnic norms, and provides many of the women concerned with an answer to injunctions of loyalty from both the ethnic group and majority society².

2. Data drawn from a large ESRC research project (Joly & Wadia 2017)

Case study 1. Negotiations in the family/community in the diaspora in Britain

Case study 2. Mobilization of women from Muslim communities in the UK and in France

TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

MENA women have not circumscribed their struggles to their own geographical area. They have also mobilized across countries through the development of transnational feminist organizations, and they have taken action to influence international law concerning women and violence.

Women in Muslim majority countries

Women in Muslim contexts have been engaging in transnational feminist activism (Balchin 2012) and have challenged numerous stereotypes about the political context and engagement of women in Muslim communities. For instance, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), an international solidarity network, links women in over 70 countries from South Africa to Uzbekistan, Senegal to Fiji (Shaheed 1994). Musawah, a 47-country-strong transnational movement for equality and justice in Muslim families, was launched in 2009 to campaign for equality between men and women in the family and the right to equal and fully fledged citizenship (Musawah 2009).

Transnational women's activism to end violence

There is a long history of women's activism against war and violence, including in solidarity with women in conflict zones. For example, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) has campaigned against war and militarism since the First World War, bringing a specific gender dimension to transnational solidarity, promoting women's rights and women's voices as part of calls for peace. In recent years, it has worked with Syrian women to lobby for their inclusion in peace talks.

Yet, transnational feminist solidarity with women in the Middle East has had a troubled history. In the era of colonialism, European and North American feminists failed to stand in solidarity with women resisting colonialism and took a rather "maternalistic" attitude toward women living in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. During the Cold War, the international women's movement was divided along East/West and North/South lines. Western feminists emphasized women's legal equality, while the USSR promoted a "peace" agenda in which women's roles in struggling against imperialism and capitalism were prioritized. The Soviet agenda resonated much more with women in the Global South. Indeed, women's conferences during the Cold War witnessed sharp divisions between Western feminists, who resisted what they regarded as the "politicization" of women's issues, and women in the Global South who believed that western feminists were trying to universalize their concerns around legal equality and sexual politics, thus ignoring the important issues of economic inequalities and imperialism affecting women in the Global South. In particular, the United States and its allies resisted discussion of the question of Palestine and the role of Israel in perpetrating violence against Palestinian women (Ghodsee 2010; Moghadam 2005: 85).

Since the end of the Cold War, much transnational women's activism has been dedicated to ending violence against women in all its different manifestations. As a result of their participation in the Beijing Women's Conference in 1995 and other UN conferences, MENA women activists became more aware of the issue of violence against women and adopted it in their work. In this work, they have faced resistance from religious leaders and politicians, who have labelled this as a "foreign agenda". In some cases, such as FGM, the latter have supported violence against women in the name of protecting the moral fabric of society.

Transnational solidarity remains flawed, however, insofar as it is largely limited to Western NGOs providing funds to selected women's NGOs in MENA and other countries of the Global South for programs and projects, often reproducing international hierarchies. Moreover, women activists in the MENA region have also had to challenge some Western feminists who have presented violence against women in the Global South as a marker of a "backward" culture, despite the evidence that violence against women is universal. Meanwhile, Western NGOs are frequently reticent to criticize wider structural causes of violence that may be linked to their own Western governments' foreign policy and military interventions in the MENA region.

Women and International Agencies

Women compose broadly 50% of the populations in all societies, which suffices to provide a cogent reason to include women's participation in all levels of peace building. Further, there is a growing consensus among international agencies that women's active participation in peace building has a positive impact on the sustainability of peace frameworks (Coomaraswamy 2015). However, simply adding women to the negotiating table does not impact the results if the women are not influential and do not have decision-making powers (Paffenholz *et al.* 2016:22; Coomaraswamy 2015:15). Women's rights activists worldwide have pressured the UN into the adoption of resolutions on women and violence. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was the first United Nations resolution to mention women and gender-based violence, express support for women's participation in peace negotiations, and consider the needs of women refugees. Many women's organizations hailed this resolution, while others justly criticized the resolution for essentialising women and failing to recognise that women's victimization as a tool of war is tied to wider forms of exclusion and violence (Adra 2013). The Security Council remains selective in the inclusion of women in some of its resolutions, for example, resolutions involving Saudi Arabia. One substantial failing of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions is that they are not legally binding and thus are not enforceable (Coomaraswamy 2015: 14-15; Hafner-Burton *et al.*, 2015: 28; see also Oxfam 2017: 89). Nevertheless, there is a 'shame' factor that women's organizations can leverage in lobbying national actors and political parties for women's representation in peace building. For women activists, knowing that an international organization has taken a moral stance on behalf of victims has been empowering (Najwa Adra interviews with activists 2013-2017).

CONCLUSION: EXITING VIOLENCE, A HOLISTIC GENDERED APPROACH

Strategies for exiting violence require a reconceptualization of both violence and peace from a gendered perspective. As our discussion illustrates, exiting violence for women cannot simply be equated with ending armed conflict but needs to address specific gender-based violence as well as underlying structural forms of violence and injustice. It means redressing gender inequality and marginalization as well as other forms of disadvantage during conflict and outside conflict. Thus, exiting violence involves the recognition and support of women's activism, organizations, and initiatives that challenge diverse structures of domination and inequalities, and also ensuring social justice in the regions concerned. This is what our gendered approach to exiting from violence proposes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

What follows is a list of specific recommendations that have emerged out of our research and analysis.

1. The analysis of all forms of violence, whether ethnic, religious, political, social, domestic, or economic, needs to be gendered.
2. Acknowledging the “continuum of violence”, the notion of violence must be expanded to include all forms of physical, verbal, symbolic, and structural violence in the public and private spheres.
3. The specific needs of women facing gender-based violence and gender-specific vulnerabilities during and outside of conflict must be addressed.
4. Women’s organizations must be recognized as fully fledged political actors.
5. Strategies for exiting violence must include support for women who are already working to challenge gender inequalities and dominant gender norms as well as other social inequalities and injustices.
6. In line with UNSCR 1325, and a growing body of social science research, the meaningful inclusion of women in decision-making roles in all levels of peace-building activity, including negotiations, conflict resolution, reconciliation, and reconstruction, must be ensured.
7. Women from the grassroots and at all levels of organizational hierarchies must be included in all phases of peacebuilding, including women combatants.
8. Stereotypic assumptions about women in MENA countries must be challenged through working with media, international agencies, and policymakers.
9. There must be recognition that the struggle for women’s rights and gender-based justice cannot be separated from the struggle for national self-determination and freedom.
10. Women activists in the Global North must avoid maternalistic attitudes toward women in the Global South, and respect difference and the priorities of women activists on the ground.

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