

International Panel on Exiting Violence

CHAPTER 2

DERADICALIZATION



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“There was probably few areas in the social science literature on which so much is written on the basis of so little evidence” (Schmid & Jongman 1988). Our understanding of what makes individuals tip over into pathways of violence in the name of creed, ideology, or religion has progressed to some degree but it is still unsatisfactory, especially because many studies treat pathways to radical thought and activity as static and monolithic concepts. This lack of clarity on the triggers of radicalization, plus a lack of compelling fieldwork on the issue, translates into a commensurate lack of certainty as to how to “deradicalize” individuals. Many national legal regimes simply prescribe the same “normal” judicial treatments for violent extremists as they would for criminal elements (e.g. imprisonment). Though judicial and even criminal processes will be warranted in some cases, at the same time, it must be recognized that many radicalized, imprisoned individuals will eventually be released with the same violent ideology—in some cases, perhaps even with a renewed intensity. Securitized approaches can work, but, on their own, they are not enough to curb further ideologically driven violence. Thus, deradicalization as well as rehabilitation and reintegration have emerged as promising alternatives to conventional punitive measures that, on their own, sometimes fail to address the source of violence.

RADICALIZATION/DERADICALIZATION

There is vigorous debate on what is understood by “radicalization” both by politicians and academics,¹ partly because the meaning of the term “radical” itself changes depending on the culture in which it is used. Alex Schmid, a respected commentator on the subject, posits that the definition of “radicalism” is twofold. First, it refers to “advocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to the radical”; and, second, it encompasses “the means advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical solution for government and society [which] can be non-violent and democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through coercion and revolution)” (Schmid 2013: 8; 2011: 679-680).

As Australian government experts remarked in 2011, “About the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that radicalization is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to

1. A sample of variant academic definitions of “radicalization”: “process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politic-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods” (Ongering 2007: 3), “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology” (Horgan & Braddock 2010: 279), or (most simply, but perhaps also reductively) “the process through which individuals and organizations adopt violent strategies—or threaten to do so—in order to achieve political goals” (Olesen 2009: 8). These definitions are collected conveniently in Schmid (2013: 17-18).

make existing research incomparable” (Nasser-Eddine *et al.* 2011: 13 quoted in Schmid 2013: 1). Experts in the recent past have pointed out that the logic of presupposing a linear pathway of progression (“radicalization”) to actual engagement with violence is deeply flawed. The process is extremely fluid, and the vast majority who are “radicalized” do not engage in violence. As the evidence has increasingly come to suggest, those who do engage in violence could not always be classed as “radicalized” by conventional academic or law-enforcement definitions (Knefel 2013).

“Radicalization”, in its common usage today, evolved in the post-9/11 era as the consequence of a complex phenomenon that involved the interaction of personal and local dynamics, and transnational phenomena. It should be emphasized that radicalization does not always occur on the basis of religion; the example of extreme right- and left-wing movements in Europe in the twentieth century is a case in point. Studies have been produced well before 9/11 on individuals and groups who elected to choose the path of violence in the name of their cause—ETA, the IRA, the Red Army Faction to name but a few (Moghadam 2012; Kassimeris 2011; Alonso 2011; Rosenau *et al.* 2013). Again, there is no single answer as to why some individuals choose these pathways—and why some chose to stay the course while others drifted away.²

Many Drivers, not one

The academic and scientific consensus does not in its present state support the idea that there is one “terrorist personality” and still less that all terrorists are categorically disturbed individuals. As Andrew Silke observes, four decades of reliable studies suggest “terrorists are essentially ordinary individuals” (Silke 2003: 30). Like all ordinary individuals, terrorists are not monolithic. The driving motivator is not always religion (Kruglanski 2014a), and radicalized individuals vary from the psychologically healthy to the psychologically imbalanced, from seemingly model citizens to criminal heavyweights, from disenfranchised minorities to well-integrated citizens with seemingly promising futures ahead of them.

The anthropologist Scott Atran has led teams conducting qualitative frontline investigations by interviewing fighters in Iraq (PKK, Iraqi army Kurds, Arab Sunni militia, and captured IS fighters) combined with online studies to explore reasons behind fighters’ willingness to fight. The research is theoretically informed by a framework integrating research on sacred values (values people refuse to trade off for material or monetary compensation) and identity fusion (feelings of inseparable connection between self and group). Within this framework, people are most willing to engage in costly sacrifices and extreme actions when motivated to protect non-negotiable sacred values—whether religious or secular—and when such values are associated with a group to which they feel viscerally connected and that imbues them with a collective sense of invulnerability. Most subjects saw their spiritual formidability and sacred values as intricately linked, which led them to be more willing to sacrifice (Gómez *et al.* 2017; Davis 2017).

Fieldwork of this type has given some of the most important insights into the group dynamics of individuals engaging in violent acts in the name of a cause. But when it comes to the understanding the trigger—if there is one—for such groups coalescing in the first place, or the wellsprings of the individual’s movement to being attracted to such causes, we are no closer now than we were years ago to understanding what makes individuals tip over into pathways of violence in the name of creed, ideology, or religion.

2. A useful and brief account of the post 9/11 development of the term “radicalization”, particularly as it pertains to Europe, can be found in Coolsaets (2016: 7-15).

“The persistent lack of consensus on the drivers of radicalization helps to explain why deradicalization programs tend to be a potpourri of objectives of all kinds, from cohesiveness to repression to counter-narratives. The sheer number of possible drivers for extremism has also created the temptation to narrow them down into manageable lines of approach, such as a checklist of “indicators of radicalization”[...] Many first-line prevention workers have discovered that theological or ideological discussions are indeed mostly pointless when dealing with “radicalized” individuals. [...] By privileging ideology over context, however, the challenging task of devising a multifaceted whole-of-government strategy could be bypassed. It also meant that all the blame could be offloaded onto the radical individual and that the instigating circumstances that are inherently part of the social environment and context in which that individual lived could be downplayed. Accordingly, the share society has in the creation of these breeding grounds for radicalism could be dismissed. (Coolsaets 2016: 38)

Overall Approach: No Pattern for Radicalization, No Pattern for Deradicalization

The notion of deradicalization depends strictly on notions of radicalization; without an understanding of its causes, how could we reintegrate the radicalized? Just as radicalization is an imprecisely defined and changeable notion, deradicalization also remains concomitantly ill defined, which ultimately results in a lack of certainty as to how to deradicalize individuals. If very little is known about what makes a terrorist, even less is known about what makes an individual leave terrorism behind.

It is necessary to distinguish between “deradicalization” and “disengagement”. “Deradicalization” refers to a process by which individuals are drawn away from violence, sometimes by attempting a change of mindset or ideology, or another form of rehabilitation. Disengagement, on the other hand, refers to a process that can take place over months or years (Horgan 2014: 115-120) during which a previously radicalized individual clings to previous beliefs but no longer plays a part in the violent group, because either they are no longer willing to break the law in pursuit of their aims, or they are no longer convinced of the need for violence to achieve their aims (Barrett & Bokhari 2008). Thus, this disengagement can occur independent of deradicalization.

Both deradicalization and disengagement have been attempted by the state and state-supported programs. But with both—and with disengagement in particular—sometimes the journey away from violence is a personal one and does not require the authorities’ intervention.

Disengagement might occur for a number of reasons. In some cases, it could be part of a wider disillusionment (e.g., realizing that everyday life in the terrorist group does not meet the individual’s aspirations or initial expectations). Many individuals disengage for personal reasons, including a desire to return to pre-extremist-group relationships, while others describe a “turning point” following incarceration or witnessing the deaths of friends or innocent civilians resulting from the group’s activity. Motivations for disengagement vary between individuals, and thus it is extremely difficult to generalize as to its causes³. Post-disengagement life is often fraught with complexities for those who walk away from extremist groups, and the difficulties of reintegration persist with disengaged groups as well as deradicalized ones.

3. For the illuminating study of the disengagement of a single individual from right wing extremism, which illustrates this, see Horgan *et al.* (2016). More such studies are urgently needed.

A 2008 UN/CTITF report identified 11 types of national programs for deradicalization and their characteristics. Experts might have disagreements with some of the points included (religious indoctrination, a feature of some national programs, does not feature), but the list is nonetheless useful:

- education;
- promoting alliance of civilizations and inter-cultural dialogue;
- tackling economic and social inequalities;
- global programs to counter radicalization;
- the Internet;
- legislation reforms;
- developing and disseminating information;
- training and qualifying agencies involved in implementing counter-radicalization policies.

National programs may have the following aims:

- re-socializing ex-members back to normal life;
- acquiring intelligence, evidence, and witnesses in court cases;
- using repentant ex-terrorists as opinion builders;
- sowing dissent within the terrorist milieu;
- providing an exit from terrorism and “underground” life;
- reducing the dependency on repressive means and making use of more humane means in counter-terrorism;
- reducing the economic and social costs of keeping a large number of terrorists in prison for a long time;
- increasing the legitimacy of the government or state agency.

(United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2008: 5)

A Broad Approach to “Deradicalization”

The future will almost certainly see more deradicalization programs and diagnostic toolkits for risk assessment developed and delivered in various countries⁴. These programs will likely aim to move treatment of the problem upstream, and away from the much-criticized securitization of the problem. Further dialogue concerning the efficacy of these programs and toolkits would be advantageous⁵.

While inter-party dialogue between academics and practitioners is important, so too is the distinction between the policies adopted nationally and the methods/approaches developed by practitioners. Our intention in the following pages is to set out what has been tried in various geographic theatres—what we know works, what shows promise, and what has failed. Our aim is not to provide solutions with universal applicability; rather, it is to suggest provisional lines of inquiry, and to highlight some promising models or mechanisms in precise locations and conditions.

4. For a general overview of state-sponsored programs, see Horgan & Altier (2012).

5. The very pertinent comments of Michael Jacobson are worth quoting: “For policymakers, understanding what motivates members of terrorist or extremist organizations to leave is critical to designing effective programs to encourage them to make the break. Unfortunately, the process of withdrawing is not always so straightforward, making the analysis of what is likely to work somewhat difficult. Leaving a terrorist or extremist group is often a lengthy, convoluted, and complicated process. Perhaps even more important, it does not always result in the group member’s abandoning his radical beliefs, so ‘success’ in this area can be difficult both to define and to achieve” (Jacobson 2010: 1).

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN MODEL OF DERADICALIZATION?

In recent years, European countries have been confronted with a growing number of young people (often born and raised in Europe) joining jihadist groups. Recent growing radicalization rates seem more worrying than in earlier years because of the large number of young people involved and the heterogeneity of their profile. In response, most European countries have implemented prevention policies over the past two decades, as well as experimental programs aimed at disengagement and deradicalization of individuals who have been led by extreme ideology to the path of violence. In the following sections, we describe the outlines of a (still) contradictory and uncertain European approach to “deradicalization”.

National Answers to a Transnational Problem

The European programs discussed here were developed starting in the early 2000s, and generally have two main objectives (that can become contradictory): to reintegrate radical individuals and to punish them. Some of these exit programs (many of which originated as attempts to help individuals leave far-right movements) work with individuals already in prison; others take a more upstream approach and work with individuals who might be deemed “at risk” but who have not yet undertaken illegal activities. These programs usually involve a large and diverse variety of actors (psychologists, imams, political analysts, social workers, etc.) and rely on varied and sometimes even conflicting methods.

Denmark has been developing a complex plan of action aimed at preventing radicalization and extremism since the early 2000s. The city of Aarhus today represents a veritable counter-radicalization laboratory (Bertelsen 2015; Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration 2012) with its launch of the Exit Jihadist Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Program. This program is voluntary and based on the involvement of families, the assignment of a mentor to each participant, and a long-term effort to initiate a process of self-reflection to lead to the abandonment of violence as a means of resolving the problems experienced. There is some evidence that tailored programs of this type—especially targeting individuals thorough mentoring, for example—are effective: the number of individuals travelling from the city to fight in overseas battlefield dropped from 31 in 2013 to just one in 2014, though ISIS’ apogee has caused numbers to begin rising again. However, as previously stated, measuring the success of deradicalization is difficult.

Germany’s Hayat program (<http://hayat-deutschland.de/English>) (Köhler 2013), a deradicalization program developed by the Center for Democratic Culture (drawing on methods and practices based on the country’s previous experiences with the far right), takes a family-centred approach, focusing on the emotional elements of deradicalization. The Hayat program plays a key role in the deradicalization of young jihadists through the implementation of programs addressed to young people at the beginning of a radicalization process, to already radicalized individuals, and to people leaving different theaters of jihad and expressing the wish to return to Germany.

In Great Britain, which has seen more than 700 departures for Syria and as many as 400 returnees, a concerted counter-radicalization policy was launched after the 2005 attacks in London (Stuart 2015)⁶. Its program is distinguished by two major elements: the involvement of local authorities and Muslim actors in prevention and deradicalization efforts. The involvement of Muslim actors has produced a variety of initiatives that are original and innovative but also controversial, starting with the Unity Initiative (<https://www.theunityinitiative.com>), which applies a methodology combining the use of alternative narratives to jihad with methods derived from behavioral and

6. On the number of ISIS returnees to the UK, see Barrett (2017: 13).

social sciences.

Consensus and Disagreements on Principles, Tools, and Methods in the Construction of a European Approach

Over the past few years in Europe, the guidelines of a European model (still strongly defined according to national traditions or specific situations) seem to have emerged, encompassing a varied set of principles, tools, and methods to withdraw a person from a radicalization process by promoting his or her rehabilitation into society. Unlike many programs in the Middle East and Asia, in Europe the emphasis has not been on re-indoctrination in an ideological or (still less) a religious sense, but on promoting “exit” from the movement that the individual belonged to, especially through disengagement (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013: 99-100). Besides individual mentoring, the majority of these programs have one or more of the following characteristics: personalized work; engagement with the family or even with the wider community; counseling (either religious or ideological, depending on the individual’s profile); and work on building up resilience, critical thinking, empathy, and self-esteem. Some of these programs use “formers”, individuals who themselves were formerly part of these extremist movements, as part of the attempt to engage the individual in question⁷.

The “Aarhus Model”

In recent years, the Danish city of Aarhus has attracted attention worldwide on account of its approach to dealing with radicalized (as well as “pre-radicalized”) individuals. The “Aarhus Model” (which is applied not just in the city but nationally too) hinges on the historically close cooperation between Schools, Social Services and Police (SSP). The current approach to the issue of (mainly) young men thought to be radicalized, or on the pathway to radicalization, actually began in 2007 as a way to deal with the issue of a small number of far-right extremists in Aarhus. The approach was again put to use when individuals from the Somali diaspora living in Aarhus began to join al-Shabaab. Subsequently, a second wave from Aarhus either made the journey to join ISIS or else remained in Aarhus but in various states of “radicalization”.

The SSP component is in the form of community engagement and cooperation, which sees various agencies closely cooperating and sharing information about individuals suspected to be on a trajectory of radicalization. When the individual is identified, the authorities (the police, sometimes using an imam as intermediary) reach out and offer help. Those who accept this offer are paired with a mentor. The mentoring is, on the whole, non-ideological and (in contrast to other approaches tried in other parts of the world that involve counseling) does not as a general rule involve debates over religious doctrine. However, discussions and activities between mentor-mentee can range over any topic. As one mentor observes, “With all of them, he says: ‘I can, and do, help with homework, applications, practical stuff like that. But we also talk, a lot—about religion, Islam, free speech, politics, international relations. Serious, philosophical, intellectual conversations, twice a week for two, three hours”’.

The Aarhus model has become renowned for its apparent ability, through the methods above, to draw radicalized and pre-radicalized individuals out from their trajectories. As Preben Bertelsen, a psychology professor at Aarhus University, observes, the approach is about inclusion: “These are young people struggling with pretty much the same issues as any others—getting a grip on their lives,

7. For summary of these programs, their methods and approaches, see Radicalization Awareness Network (2018: 89-95). For a practitioner’s take on the importance of the family in an “exit” process, see Köhler (2013: 182-204).

making sense of things, finding a meaningful place in society. We have to say: provided you have done nothing criminal, we will help you to find a way back”.

There are several misunderstandings of the approach. Detractors of the programs who critique the model state that the Aarhus approach is too “soft”; it mollicoddles individuals who might be at odds with the tenets of what it means to be a Danish society, or who might even intend to perpetrate terrorist acts in Denmark. The latter may rest on a misperception: those are thought to be responsible for criminal or terrorist acts (or in the course of planning them) at home or abroad are not candidates for the early intervention; they may be referred for investigation or even possible prosecution.

The authorities in Aarhus acknowledge that their model is not perfect. Some individuals identified as candidates for intervention, or who have been approached to take part, have gone on to fight for ISIS in Syria or Iraq. Some of those who return from foreign battlefields decline all offers of help, and others discontinue their involvement in the program after some time. It appears that many who have returned are disillusioned with what they have seen, but there is considerable difficulty in objectively measuring this assumption or, for that matter, determining the extent to which they still harbor thoughts of jihad, of committing violent acts, or of travelling again to foreign battlefields.

Does the Aarhus model work? The numbers of individuals travelling from the city to fight in overseas battlefield dropped from 31 in 2013 to just one in 2014. But this was before the apogee of ISIS: the numbers appear again to have risen. The Aarhus model may well in the ISIS and post-ISIS have to evolve further.

Further reading (including sources of specific quotations): Henley (2014); Pedersen & Stothard (2015); Kühle & Lindekilde (2010); Higgins (2014); Braw (2014); Agerschou (2014).

For mentoring in the United Kingdom and the experiences and challenges faced by the mentors there, see Spalek & Davies (2012).

Many Paths to Radicalization, No Miracle Solution

Interdisciplinary approach: Although it is often still difficult, if not rare, to bring people from different disciplines or sectors to work together, the interdisciplinary approach has become a *conditio sine qua non* of all deradicalization programs, as a consequence of the shared idea that radicalization has multiple causes.

Trust building: Instead of an accusatory approach, most successful programs use a constructive approach, based on trust building between program workers and the target person.

Work over the biographical trajectory: Working on a person’s individual trajectory has emerged as one of the most relevant tools to “separate” the individual from the group and to allow him/her to begin a self-reflection on his/her own path.

Social, familial, and professional rehabilitation: As scholars have pointed out, radicalization is often a consequence of an estrangement from the familial, social, and professional life of the person. The reinsertion process includes renewing the individual’s links with family members, social life, and professional environment.

The inefficacy of counter-discourse and ideological re-education: Counter-discourse seems to have limited effects on radicalized people. In fact, as found in field research and practical programs,

radicalized people reject discourses produced by “the enemy”. Alternative discourses could have a positive effect only when the rehabilitation process is quite advanced. In Europe, most programs avoid focusing on ideological/theological re-education, but this issue is still highly controversial in some European countries such as France.

What Balance between Security Needs and Reinsertion? A main divergence between countries, but also between initiatives in the same country, is with respect to the balance between the security needs of the country and the social reinsertion of the radicalized person.

Beyond imprisonment: As the French scholar Farhad Khosrokhavar has shown based on his research in prisons, imprisonment can reinforce the radicalization process.

Prisons as Opportunity?

“While most analysis of prisons has focused on them as potential sites for radicalization, prisons can also be places of opportunity. As a British government psychologist noted, in prison, terrorists or extremists find themselves in a completely different environment, forced to interact with a wide variety of people, including non-Muslims. Not surprisingly, then, a number of people have turned away from jihadism or extremism while incarcerated. British-born HT leader Maajid Nawaz began to experience doubts about his organization during his time in an Egyptian prison. As he later recounted, “My experience in prison was a critical step in my de-radicalization.” The prison was a relatively free environment for open conversation, and Nawaz was surrounded by secular Egyptian activists such as Ayman Nour and Said Ibrahim. Nawaz also learned Arabic while imprisoned and began to read a wide range of classical Islamic texts, broadening his horizons. Mosab Hassan Yousef turned away from Hamas, and even from Islam, while in prison. He later said that while serving time in an Israeli prison, he began to read a wider range of materials, including the Bible. In studying the Bible verse by verse, he began to “see things in a different way” (Jacobson 2010: 20).

SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA

Like Europe, Southeast Asia is extremely diverse and lacks a single pattern, its countries’ known terrorists ranging in profile from civil servants in the Muslim-majority country of Malaysia to an ethno-separatist Muslim minority in Thailand. Some Southeast Asians who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan formed the nucleus extremist group in the region, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), upon their return. JI was responsible in the 2000s for a wave of terror attacks in the region (most notably those in Indonesia and Bali). JI has to some degree been neutralized in the region, but other threats have emerged: (1) self-radicalized individuals, starting around 2005, and (2) an estimated 1,000 individuals who have made the journey to the ISIS caliphate, starting around 2014⁸.

8. The numbers are imprecise and clouded by the fact that many are known to have brought their families (women, children). With the recent reverses suffered by ISIS, small numbers are known to have attempted to come back to Malaysia and Indonesia.

East and West

“We have seen that the exit programs in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe all place emphasis on trust building, on a constructive and benevolent rather than accusatory approach, and on demonstrating a fair and professional approach on part of the authorities. In light of what social psychology tells us about cognitive consistency, dissonance, and reactance such an approach seems well placed. But the programs in South East Asia and the Middle East on the one hand and Europe on the other also differ with regard to how openly they seek to influence the potential exiter and in terms of how much emphasis they place on ideology. It is currently not possible to draw firm conclusions about the relative merits of these approaches due to the lack of independent evaluations or data on success rates. Central theoretical concepts and experimental studies from social psychology, however, provide pointers. Arguably, an external intervention should stay close to the potential exiter’s own doubt, make the influence attempt as subtle as possible, use narratives and self-affirmatory strategies to reduce resistance to persuasion, and consider the possibility to promote attitudinal change via behavioral change as an alternative to seek to influence beliefs directly. A fixed curriculum, mandatory ideological re-education, and a strong reliance on the power of rhetoric and arguments—no matter how well-founded in reason and theology—on the other hand, is unlikely to provide a successful formula in a Western context”. (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013: 110)

Singapore’s Approach: the Religious Rehabilitation Group

Forty individuals from the Muslim-minority country of Singapore have been identified since 9/11 as members of JI (or linked to it). More recently, the main threat in Singapore has come from self-radicalized individuals who either plotted terror attacks locally or attempted to make the journey to join ISIS. Again, there is no pattern: some were young, others were old, and included middle-class professionals. However, none appear to have been poor or disenfranchised, nor appeared alienated from mainstream society⁹. Initial analyzes of the first radicalized individuals arrested (c. 2001) suggested that only a very small number were of the charismatic “leader” type, while many others were “followers”. Almost all appear (either through religious instruction or group association or through indoctrination in training camps in Pakistan or the Southern Philippines) to have had a deeply mistaken idea of the nature and purpose of jihad, and mistaken views especially when it came to the idea of Muslim Singaporeans living side by side with non-Muslims¹⁰.

The cornerstone of Singapore’s approach to radicalization is its heavy emphasis on religious counseling in its deradicalization process. The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), the main group in charge of carrying out the deradicalization and rehabilitation process, conducts religious counseling sessions to challenge the detainees’ radical beliefs and rectify their misguided understanding of the religion. Individual deradicalization in Singapore breaks the dynamics of militants’ groups by separating detained leaders and core members from their followers (Kruglanski 2014b) and then counseling detainees individually, sometimes by psychologists but more often by religious counselors (Kruglanski *et al.* 2010). The Singapore approach also seeks to be holistic, allowing detainees access to the gym and to educational courses, and offering financial assistance to

9. Since 2014, over a dozen Singapore Muslims were influenced by ISIS social media and Internet propaganda. The vast majority had the intention to join ISIS in Syria or Iraq. Among the recent cases, on 20 June 2017, two Singaporean auxiliary police officers were arrested for terrorism-related offences under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Not long after, an infant care assistant who was planning to travel to Syria with her child to become a “martyr’s widow” fighting for ISIS was detained. These individuals were all products of online propaganda and were planning to take action by joining the ranks of ISIS.

10. For good overviews of the “Singapore model”, see Ramakrishna (2014 and 2009), Gunaratna & Hassan (2015).

detainees and their family during and after the programs. This support system is key to initiating the realization that the “enemy” is, in fact, trying to help them and their loved ones.

On some counts, the Singapore model is a successful one. Since the establishment of the RRG, 88 percent of the 40 JI-linked individuals detained have been successfully counseled and released (Bei Yi 2018). Compared to individuals who belong to a terrorist group where there is a set organizational religious motif or mantra, which can be broken down easily by the religious counselors, self-radicalized individuals have proven to be more difficult subjects for counseling, as their beliefs originate from different sources and are often intertwined with their own sense of justice and views. Just 25 percent of all self-radicalized individuals detained since 2007 have been released (Bei Yi 2018). In addition, the median age of self-radicalized individuals (many of whom are especially influenced by ISIS ideology) is lower than that of JI adherents. Since 2015, the authorities have detained five self-radicalized individuals aged between 17 and 19. And while the backsliding or recidivist rate in this process is also low—only two individuals are known to have become recidivists—it is worth noting that the two individuals in question were self-radicalized (Yan Liang 2016).

The Saudi and Singapore “Models”

The Saudi Ministry of Interior, faced with several major terror incidents from the mid-1990s onwards, began to develop a strategy that combined “hard” and “soft” approaches. A key part of the focus is on religious and psychological counseling given the detainees, which, over time, expanded to preventative counseling (including to the families of detainees). Second, there are specific efforts to deradicalize and rehabilitate some terrorists prior to their release in special halfway house settings. This latter type of intervention, which is aimed partly at individuals repatriated from Guantanamo, has at its core a religious programs aimed at correcting misunderstandings of Islam, but it also has the aim of putting in place a framework to reintegrate these individuals into society. This opportunity was also offered to those prisoners under the charge of the Interior Ministry who responded well to prison-based counselling. Third, a key part of the program is social services and support (including pecuniary support) given to the detainee and his family. The final part of the program is an “after-care” or post-release component that uses social service provision together with security monitoring to ensure that the released individual does not fall back into terrorism. Saudi officials consider in particular three waypoints as being key in the re-socialization of the individual: getting married (or rejoining wife and family), continuing education, and rejoining the workforce. The Saudi program has seen well over 1,000 individuals passing through its halfway house component, with, according to official estimates (which are themselves disputed), a very small proportion re-offending and being designated recidivists. It is, experts agree, a very culture- and context-specific program, and its various features do not lend themselves to easy replicability in other countries.

The Saudi and Singapore models are differentiated by their cultural and societal backdrops. Singapore has a multi-ethnic, religiously plural society (with Muslims forming approximately 15 percent of the resident population). A great deal of upstream work (not immediately recognizable as countering violent extremism, CVE) takes places in Singapore with respect to community engagement programs and interfaith dialogue aimed at cementing racial tolerance and understanding. In addition, the Saudi program is of a much larger scale. But there are similarities, too: the attempt to correct misunderstandings of religious doctrine, and an “aftercare” component that seeks, through a combination of monitoring and assistance to the individual (and family), to ensure that the individual in question does not “re-radicalize”. In both these models, different government agencies are involved, as befits a holistic, multi-stakeholder approach that involves security, social, and community perspectives (Braddock 2014; Porges 2014; Lankford & Gillespie 2011).

Programs in both of these states focus on “the three Ns” that Kruglanski (2014b) has identified as necessary to deradicalization: need, narrative, and network.

Simply put, de-radicalization depends on three Ns: need, narrative and network. The first step toward de-radicalization involves recognizing the needs of jihadists, which shape their motives, beliefs and reality. Often we only see what we want to see and believe what we want to believe. Valid arguments, however strong, can be utterly unpersuasive if they run counter to our needs. The second step is to devise a narrative that acknowledges a person’s need for relevance and respect and provides a nonviolent means to address that need. That is why current de-radicalization programs in Muslim countries, or countries with significant Muslim populations, employ much more than theological arguments against violence. Programs in Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Iraq address detainees’ need for significance by providing them with vocational education, finding them jobs and, in some cases, even wives. The third step is to recognize that the social network in which militants are embedded is crucial to their radicalization — and de-radicalization. People’s attitudes and beliefs are firmly anchored in the shared reality of their group. Radicalization occurs in a social context that is shaped by family, friends and charismatic leaders. De-radicalization cannot take place in a social vacuum, either. Sophisticated de-radicalization programs such as those in Saudi Arabia or Singapore break the dynamics of militants’ groups by separating detained leaders and core members from their followers. They also make wise use of militants’ families, who are called upon to exert a moderating influence on graduating detainees, helping to prevent their slide back into extremism. (Kruglanski 2014b)

The Indonesian authorities have had to grapple with the issue of extremist detainees since October 2002 when the JI carried out the single biggest terrorist atrocity in modern Southeast Asian history, bombing Bali and leaving 202 individuals dead. Official approaches in the past decade have been loosely structured, emphasizing a “soft approach” to radicalization, including giving perks to detainees (reduced sentences, financial assistance, better incarceration conditions) in hopes detainees would cooperate and turn away from violence. Religious rehabilitation, or correcting misperceptions of the core tenets of Islam (especially governing the use of violence), has not been tried widely (Osman 2014: 223). Even for some former extremists who have been released and who would appear on the surface to have disengaged from violence in Indonesia, what appears to have happened is not “deradicalization”, or some renouncing of armed jihad in the name of protecting Islam, but rather a renegotiation of the time, place, and possibly targets for this jihad.

Recently, over 500 Indonesian militants have joined ISIS with their families. Indonesia’s approaches to extremists’ rehabilitation have been varied both in method and degree of success. Some of the initiatives are government-led, but many others are not. Many of these initiatives work with convicted, imprisoned extremists, including post-imprisonment follow-ups. While it is difficult to measure success or failure, recidivism is a concern, with one credible authority suggesting that, of 400 imprisoned militants released between 2015 and 2016, 40 percent returned to former radical networks, with some even participating in further terrorist attacks (Wright & Karmani 2016; Sapiie 2016)¹¹.

A key facet of the problem stems from the nature of incarceration. Indonesian prisons are permeable, with incarcerated militants having access to cell phones (and therefore the internet and social media) and sometimes even to their former associates (Fabi & Kapoor 2016). Consequently, radical teachings proliferate even within prisons, with some reports suggesting that “ordinary”

11. For a Western view of Indonesian efforts, see Horgan & Braddock (2010: 273-275).

criminals have been radicalized through in-prison associations (Huda & Sim 2016)¹². A small handful of key charismatic ideologues within prison are responsible for keeping the flame of virulent ideology alive in their impressionable associates (Huda & Sim 2016), nor is it uncommon for these individuals to use peer pressure to prevent their fellow inmates from joining official deradicalization programs. One study based on first-person interviews notes, “for Indonesian jihadists, a spell in prison, rather than being an intervention stage, is seen as a way station to further glory. Many leave prison not only unreformed, but also more influential in local jihadi circles” (Huda & Sim 2016).

Case Study: Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP)

One of the more promising and holistic approaches in Indonesia is Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), a small dedicated Indonesian NGO that has four programs conducted in cooperation with the Indonesian Directorate-General of Corrections:

The first is working to empower the capacity of prison officers to manage the psychological and ideological features of their relationships with extremist inmates, and the capacity of parole officers to assist former prisoners’ transitions back into society. YPP’s second program attempts to address a difficult issue: how to engage hard line supporters of IS who are self-contained and antagonistic towards group outsiders. The idea is to get cooperative terrorist inmates to work with the more hardened ideologues and militants in order to slowly soften their positions, so they may be open to further dialogue. Cooperative prisoners are trained in effective strategies to engage their cell mates, and YPP is experimenting with this initiative in two prisons: Pasir Putih on Nusakambangan Island, and Porong Prison near the East Java city of Surabaya. YPP also works directly with current and former prisoners to promote positive pathways away from old networks. Participants are taught how to develop business plans for small start-ups such as catfish farms or electronic repair businesses, and receive assistance with applying for further education while in prison. YPP practitioners believe that attempts to change prisoners’ religious and political convictions (or indeed to replace them with the state ideology) are overly ambitious and can even be counterproductive as subjects may become further entrenched when their positions are threatened... De-radicalization is rather seen as a long-term, personal process, and the small organization considers their most effective role to be providing seeds and opportunities for disengagement from the violent social networks to which the inmates belong. YPP also works closely with the families of inmates, offering support and encouraging engagement with their communities. (Sumpter 2017: 20)

DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALIZATION IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

The problem of radicalization, insurgency, and terrorism in Russia and the post-Soviet space is well documented. Radicalized individuals either direct their activities domestically or join violent jihadist groups abroad. According to the Russian Interior Ministry, as of March 2016, 3,417 Russian citizens of various ethnic origins had joined ISIS (Turovsky 2016).

In Russia’s North Caucasus, radical ideologies have thrived on unresolved ethnic and intra-confessional conflicts, heavy-handed counter-insurgency, lack of democratic channels to

12. One study that interviewed a former radical notes: “One former inmate recalled getting visits from Jemaah Islamiyah members who brought him books on suicide bombing and tried to match-make him with a woman from the network” (Huda & Sim 2016).

voice discontent, bad governance, and economic under-development. Russian security forces have traditionally employed a very hard-power approach in addressing insurgency and terrorist activities. Enforced disappearances have been a major problem (especially in Chechnya, where it is estimated that 5,000 are missing after detentions, in a population of around one million), torture is widespread, and collective punishment is applied to family members in some republics. These harsh measures have visibly contributed to radicalization.

In parallel to military and law-enforcement operations, the Russian government ran a series of amnesty programs in Chechnya in the 1990s, 2003, and 2006. The last two were personally administered by Moscow-installed Chechen leaders (Presidents Kadyrov, father and son), who negotiated with groups of fighters and gave them personal security guarantees¹³. In most cases, especially in 2003, amnesty was conditional on the former fighters joining Kadyrov's group and swearing loyalty to him. Oftentimes fighters were captured and forced under torture to switch sides. No rehabilitation or reintegration assistance was provided to them. Then part of Kadyrov forces, they were tasked with disclosing and capturing (and often killing) their former comrades. This enmeshed returnees in blood feuds, of which there was already an established tradition in Chechnya, and tied them "with blood" to their new group.

By 2009, the conflict that started as a nationalist separatist war in Chechnya transformed into a regional jihadist insurgency operating in all republics of the North Caucasus. Regional and federal authorities began to understand that heavy-handed measures alone produce more terrorists than they kill, and they began to introduce experimental methods (Russkiy Reporter 2011). In 2010, the (federal) National Anti-terrorism Committee (NAC) together with the North Caucasus republican governments tested soft-power approaches. Several regional exit programs for fighters have been undertaken under the supervision of NAC, with varying degrees of success. In two republics, they were accompanied by a series of counter-radicalization measures aimed to overcome a Sufi-Salafi intra-confessional schism that fed the armed conflict.

In the months before the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, the Russian security services cracked down on the jihadist insurgency in the North Caucasus at home and at the same time facilitated the mass exodus of radicals to Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. In the lead-up to the Sochi Olympics, most of the soft measures were temporarily rolled back, but the republican commissions aiming to facilitate the exit of fighters from the insurgency and their return to peaceful life have been revived and continue operating in three republics: Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkariya.

Central Asia

Central Asia has supplied foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq as well as Afghanistan; ISIS-affiliated Central Asians have been recently involved in terror attacks in the Ataturk Airport and the Reina Club (Turkey, 2016) as well as St Petersburg metro bombing (Russia, 2017). A number of terrorist, violent extremist organizations and outlawed Islamic parties operate in the region, which has been the target of sporadic terrorist and insurgent attacks. The numbers of foreign fighters from Central Asia identified by officials and independent experts differ significantly, anywhere from the low hundreds to 2,000-4,000. Critical scholars claim that the numbers of Central Asian foreign fighters have been significantly inflated by the authorities for political purposes. Labor migration, bad and repressive

13. hmad Kadyrov (father) was a former Chechen separatist mufti (religious leader), who swapped sides in 1999 and supported the Russian invasion. His son Ramzan was in charge of his father's paramilitary formation, which was later legalized as part of the Russian Interior Ministry. A few years after Akhmad was killed in a terrorist act in 2004, Ramzan gained control of the Chechen republic and continues to rule it, enjoying the full support of President Putin.

governance, corruption, nepotism, ethnic discrimination (especially of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan), and poverty (perceived as social injustice) are seen as the major drivers of radicalization. Recent developments in Afghanistan are also often named among key destabilization factors and as a serious potential threat, due to high concentration of militant jihadists across the border and their attempts to expand on the territory of neighboring Central Asian states. However, as of today, unlike Russia, Central Asia has no traditional frontline of conflict with militant Jihadi groups; moreover, according to various sources, the overwhelming majority of Central Asian recruits to ISIS have been radicalized in Russian territory and preferred to go to the Middle East rather than Afghanistan.

Central Asian government responses have been mainly focused on strict control of religion, attempts to promote “traditional” Islam, and police crackdowns, including on non-violent charismatic Salafi imams. In recent years, some countries have also launched soft-power and deradicalization initiatives. Tajikistan announced amnesties and has set free over 150 repentant returnees from Syria and “Salafis” who turned themselves in to police. Kazakhstan established a deradicalization center in Astana. Kyrgyzstan, the most open country of the region, has hosted a number of diverse civil society activities aimed at CVE, including raising awareness of radicalization processes, online counter-messaging, dialogue between relevant stakeholders, and community engagement. Civil society attempts to work with prisoners or build the capacity of prison officials to deradicalize former fighters and prepare them for successful reintegration have encountered problems due to denial of access to such individuals. On the other hand, a religious women’s organization, Mutakalim, quite successfully trains inmates of women’s colonies to increase their resilience to violent extremism.

Disengagement Programs: Dagestan (2010-2012, 2016-current)

In 2010, the then-president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, created a commission for the rehabilitation of fighters, which aimed at providing “legal and medical counselling; solving housing and employment problems; and, if necessary, relocating ex-insurgents and their family members” (Crisis Group Report 2012: 30). Commission members included directors of republican security and law-enforcement institutions, two ministers, the republican ombudswoman, the imam of the capital’s central mosque, and some civil society leaders. The commission convened to scrutinize each case, with officials holding long conversations with each surrendering applicant to understand the degree and trajectory of their radicalization, while the investigative authorities interrogated the returnees within the framework of criminal cases instigated against them.

The commission then ruled to either accept or reject leniency for the individual in question (referred to as an applicant), including probation sentences or closure of criminal case. In most of the cases, the returnees received leniency, and, in several cases, they were convinced to disclose large weapon caches and other important information about the insurgency.

Dagestan’s commission had been criticized for excessive publicity and for functioning as a vehicle for the self-promotion of certain officials. All its meetings were televised, with surrendering fighters having to publicly repent, condemn the insurgency, and cooperate with the investigators. After surrender, no program of rehabilitation was offered to former fighters, although sometimes their social problems would be addressed on an *ad hoc* basis. Overall, the program was a success, with only one case of recidivism between 2010 and 2012.

In early 2013, one year before the Sochi Olympics, President Putin replaced Magomedov, and the new republican leader closed the commission. Instead, the project of disengagement was transferred to the municipal level. Municipalities established their own “commissions for reconciliation and harmony”, which aimed to assist former radicals in disengaging from their activities and reintegrating into civilian life. In most of the municipalities the commissions exist on paper; however, in two or three cases, municipal commissions achieved functionality.

The most well-publicized example of a local effort to facilitate return and prevention of outflow is the Center for Countering Extremism run in cooperation with the city administration of Derbent. The center was opened in October 2014 and works with both families who want to find their loved ones in Syria and Iraq and persuade them to return home, as well as with fighters who have regretted joining violent jihadi groups and wish to return to Dagestan. The center is run by a woman who works closely with the security services and acts as a bridge between them and the families of fighters. Having struggled herself to save her own brother (eventually killed as an insurgent in a security operation in 2008) she has a unique hands-on knowledge of the process of radicalization. The center's director chats in messengers with potential returnees when they are in still Syria or Iraq, consults them on the procedures they would need to follow. She then checks their records with the FSB and informs the surrendering jihadists about their prospects in Russia. She further helps with logistics and legal procedure in close cooperation with the security services. In some cases she has also prevented outflow and helped parents stop their children at the borders. At this point however, she admits that her power ends: "I don't know how they will convince him, he has ISIS in his head", she told me referring to one of the cases when the escape of a 24-year-old man had been prevented: "I told his mother: isolate him, you have your family, your Elders, let them convene and try to convince him".

Disengagement Programs: Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria

The Ingushetia commission, established in 2011 using Dagestan's template, was probably the most successful of such initiatives. The Ingush committee kept a much lower profile than Dagestan's, working mostly through informal social networks of kinship and local communities. It never forced its applicants to publicly repent or televised its convenings if the victims were reluctant to speak.

In addition to disengagement, the Ingush republican commission focused on reintegrating former fighters who returned to Ingushetia after serving their prison terms. Usually this social integration assistance was targeted at solving employment problems, encouraging individuals to return to university, or relocating them to avoid revenge from former comrades. The commission has so far reintegrated several returnees from Syria (Caucasus Knot 2017).

The Kabardino-Balkariya commission was created in 2012, but mostly existed on paper until April 2016, when the republic got a new and very committed Minister for Countering Extremism who made some changes to membership, including the introduction of a prominent human rights figure onto the commission. Since April 2016, the commission has reviewed 16 cases, including returnees from Syria and those who planned to go but changed their mind on the way.

Existing commissions' statistics are not always reliable, and conflicting figures concerning rehabilitated fighters appear in different sources¹⁴. Most of the commissions' applicants are or were accomplices of a local insurgency rather than hardened fighters. This could be due, at least in part, to applicants' continued lack of trust in the state as well as the fact that the commissions' role

14. Before being shut down in 2013, the first commission in Dagestan had reviewed 44 applications and concluded 35 positively. According to the Ingush Security Council, over 60 people have been rehabilitated since 2011. However, a member of the Ingush commission claims that he only saw 15-20 people actually rehabilitated transparently and publicly. In May 2016, Dagestan's authorities claimed that their new mechanisms managed to reintegrate 70 fighters and accomplices in one and a half years, but there are no reliable ways to verify this information since the commission's work is no longer transparent.

has been consultative, which means that oftentimes security services have ignored their decisions. Although the commissions have gained invaluable experience, they have lacked a coherent methodology of disengagement or deradicalization.

Regardless of the challenges, the commissions have created a channel for secure, torture-free exit, accumulated unique experience, and shown that the state is ready to support exiting fighters. In a repressive authoritarian setting, these are very important achievements.

The problem of insufficient methodology in deradicalization efforts has been identified by most interlocutors in the North Caucasus. As elsewhere, clashing approaches to disengagement and deradicalization result from competing understandings of the radicalization, deradicalization and disengagement processes. The problem of a lack of an accepted definition of radicalization persists in the case of Russia too. Additionally, diagnostic tools are lacking and there is a gap between theoreticians and practitioners as well as between different generations of social workers.

Integrating Russia in the international debates on best exit and deradicalization approaches could be conducive to that state's development of more effective and humane practices, which could well deradicalize fighters rather than create new terrorists.

Radicalization/Deradicalization in Prisons

In recent years, radicalization in Russian prisons has been an increasing concern. The reported growth in numbers of radical Muslim jamaats in prisons can be explained by both the spread of radical ideologies, including ISIS, and the system of internal relations/hierarchies in the Russian penal system. Since Soviet times, Russian prisons are to a greater or lesser degree run by the so-called thief laws, an informal system of hierarchical relations and laws established by professional criminals, whereby all prisoners are divided into four castes, the elite castes (known as the “thieves”) govern the others through violence and even sexual abuse. For decades the prisons have been informally divided into “Red” and “Black” ones: in the latter, the control is executed by the prison administrations; in the former, the “thieves” control the situation while the administration limits itself to the general control of daily routines.

The growing influence of Islamic jamaats within these prisons is not purely ideological. They are the only force that is able to resist this system of informal relations, thus joining them is a way of gaining protection from the pressure both of the administration and the criminal authorities. For this reason, an increasing number of ethnic Russians and inmates of other non-Muslim origins are converting to Islam in jails. Another factor is that, since the legislation on insurgency-related crimes was toughened in 2014, the sentences for these crimes have increased. Knowing that he will spend many years behind bars, a sentenced fighter has more incentives to establish himself in the prison hierarchy, and creating his own Islamic jamaat is one channel for doing so.

Recently, experts claim that Russian prisons are turning “Green”—that is, significantly influenced by fundamentalist Islamic jamaats. According to Russian Federal Service of punishment fulfillment (FSIN) experts, Russian prisons today contain 300 jamaats that unite over 10,000 prisoners. According to estimates given to the present writer by interviewees from among former (released) inmates, some prisons in Dagestan are 80 percent “Green.” Independent research of this phenomenon is difficult, given that FSIN is a closed system that trusts only its own experts, does not give access to independent researchers, and only reluctantly grants interviews to journalists. FSIN experts oftentimes inflate the scale of the problem, to securitize policies and attract additional funding.

The toolbox of FSIN's responses to the radicalization challenge and its deradicalization activities are just starting to develop. In 2013 the authorities decided to evaluate the scale of the problem, and FSIN was tasked with creating a “preventive register of extremists” and organizing “targeted

correctional work” with them. According to the official response of FSIN to *Kommersant* newspaper in 2016, the service has 800 registered Islamic extremists. The same official document refers to two main measures aimed at “deradicalization”: *isolation* —from each other in different prisons/camps and cells — and *rehabilitation* applying the neurolinguistic psycho-correctional system SCORE.

In reality, radical Muslims are often isolated in solitary confinement and in punishment cells and can be deprived of the opportunity to work. According to FSIN experts, “deradicalization conversations” with this category of prisoners are ineffective. In 2017, the Moscow spiritual board of Muslims delivered training to personnel of the Moscow FSIN with the aim to build their capacity to diagnose Islamic radicalism and avoid inter-confessional conflicts. Prisons and camps with large Muslim populations sometimes invite imams to work with their inmates.

CVE IN NORTH AMERICA

In the United States, homegrown extremism and radicalization inspired by Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda persist. According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director Christopher Wray’s testimony before Congress in September 2017, the Bureau reportedly has over 1,000 active investigations into supporters of foreign terrorist organizations and an additional 1,000 investigations into domestic terrorist groups across all 50 states (Wray 2017). At least 300 U.S. persons have attempted to or have travelled to join extremist groups in Syria or Iraq¹⁵. Since March 2014, 159 individuals have been charged with terrorism-related activities in connection with the Islamic State (George Washington University 2018). While a near majority of that number travelled or attempted to travel overseas to join the IS, 30 percent were accused of plotting to carry out attacks on U.S. soil (George Washington University 2018).

Homegrown jihadist extremism also poses a significant terrorist threat in Canada. According to a 2017 report published by the Canadian government, there are “over 190 extremists with a nexus to Canada who are abroad and who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity” (Goodale 2017). Like many European countries, Canada is working to cope with challenges posed by people returning from extremist-controlled territory, as over 60 extremists have re-entered the country (Goodale 2017). In addition to these challenges, Canada also faces its own “homegrown” mobilization. The government assesses that Canadian extremists will increasingly prefer domestic attacks rather than travel abroad (Goodale 2017).

Mobilization dynamics in the US run parallel to, and even intersect with, Canadian radicalization and recruitment trends. Both countries face challenges posed by persons who travelled to IS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria. For example, three Canadian residents, Hamsa and Hersi Kariye, and Mahad Hirsi, were reportedly killed in Syria along with Hanad Mohallim, their American cousin who also migrated to jihadist-controlled territory (Huncar 2015). Furthermore, domestic plots like the 2014 Parliament Hill shooting in Ottawa, Canada (Nease 2015), and, more recently, the 2017 truck attack in New York City (Grinberg 2017), undoubtedly are part of the threats to these two countries.

A diverse array of individuals comprises the base of supporters sympathetic to IS objectives. In both the US and Canada, radicalization is truly a “homegrown” issue, as the vast majority of IS supporters are US citizens or legal permanent residents (George Washington University 2018).

The incidence of violent extremism and radicalization in Canada is relatively low, at least when compared to several Western European countries for instance (let alone those in Asia and the Middle East). In Canada deradicalization efforts are largely *ad hoc*. There are no known, publicly

15. Authors’ interview with Federal Bureau of Investigation officials on 24 October 2017. This number includes travellers, attempted travellers, and participants in jihadist and non-jihadist groups.

available data on numbers or success rates, and the literature that is open suggests that all attempts to undo the radicalization process are highly localized and applied to very small data sets (often single individuals). It is thus not possible to determine, at this point, whether these approaches work (the data sets are far too small, and there is a distinct lack of longitudinal study). Nevertheless, there are a few initiatives that could include some form of deradicalization. An example is the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV), a Montreal-based centre that offers both a hotline and a number of trained specialists to deal with individuals heading down the path of violent extremism. The CPRLV is best seen as an early intervention model. Another group is run by Navaid Aziz, who sees steering youth away from radical groups “as a civic, moral, and religious duty”.

A youth counsellor to young people living in Calgary, Alberta, he runs a mentorship group with his wife for young people in their local community. “Our focus is on keeping kids safe from the dangers that exist out there, whether they be gangs, drugs, or other forms of violence,” Aziz says. “Protecting them from radicalism is a natural extension of that.” As part of the mentorship program, which runs out of a local mosque where Aziz is an instructor, young people receive lessons on social justice and take part in community volunteer activities intended to provide a sense of purpose and responsibility. “We have study sessions where we focus on critical thinking and teaching young people the consequences of their actions. We also look at the lives of people in the past who confronted situations of injustice without resorting to violence, like Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and historical figures from Islam,” he says. “The purpose of all this is to show young people they are part of something greater than themselves. We do volunteer work in the broader community, particularly with senior citizens, and the kids start feeling like their lives are part of something big and meaningful”. (Hussain 2016)

CVE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn of Africa continues to present a great opportunity for expanding deradicalization studies not only because of the peace and security context in that region, but also for the approaches currently being adopted in dealing with the threat of violent extremism, radicalization, and terrorism exported through al-Shabaab in lawless Somalia. Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have all contributed boot soldiers under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Security Cooperation Framework supporting the African Union in stabilizing Somalia through the Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) to “significantly degrade the growing threat posed by al-Shabaab” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations 2018).

The context in this region is complex, marked by socio-economic and political challenges facing the youth in many countries in the Horn of Africa, challenges that continue to cripple counterterrorism interventions locally. Youth demographics, characterized by a surge of unemployed youth who are increasingly becoming candidates for radicalization and recruitment into terror groupings is a potential security threat. Several cases of youth crossing the border into Somalia from countries like Kenya have been well documented (Ogenga 2016a; 2016b). This includes incidences of young women (Jihadi Brides) who have been arrested along the Kenyan-Somalia border while attempting to sneak into Somalia to join al-Shabaab fighters. Similarly, there is an increasing phenomenon of al-Shabaab returnees, young men and women returning from Somalia to Kenya as disengaged combatants after failing to benefit from the promise derived out of joining al-Shabaab as proclaimed

by the terror group through mass media propaganda.

Kenya's amnesty program has faced several challenges that are opening a window for possibilities of inspecting deradicalization trends inherent in al-Shabaab returnees. Could al-Shabaab returnees be associated with the perceived diminishing of the attraction of its ideology among potential recruits? Is the ideology facing a backlash among youth in countries like Kenya? Could this be a good premise to begin appraising and tracking deradicalization trends in the Horn of Africa, with the aim of building on the scarce literature on deradicalization in the continent and globally? How can different stakeholders respond to questions of youth deradicalization through trends visible in disengaged combatants and returning Jihadists, as evidenced in countries like Kenya, in a more useful and sustainable manner?

It is important to note that a holistic approach to "targeted interventions" that involves multiple stakeholders needs to be adopted. It is not useful to assume that government alone bears the greatest responsibility for peace and security, especially given the recent historical understanding that has called some government interventions into question. The government of Kenya, for example, has been accused of heavy handedness in its response to radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism. Kenya initially sent troops to Somalia after a series of tourist abductions that threatened to affect the tourism industry. The country, then under Mwai Kibaki, invaded Somalia with the blessing of Mogadishu to pursue al-Shabaab. Kenya later negotiated with the UN for Kenyan Defence Forces to be part of AMISOM troops. Locally, Kenya instituted Operation Uslama Watch or Security Watch, which is an example of the government's material interventions that have drawn criticisms from different sections of the counterterrorism community. The operation has been criticized by many observers as discriminatory and targeted at Kenyans of Somali origin and, in many instances, for not being compliant with gender and human rights. Such operations that explicate governments' preferences for military interventions have been accused of human rights abuses characterized by arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances of suspected terrorists, abuses that have, in a sense, contributed to further radicalization.

In a key White House Report (White House 2017) published recently, the United States argues that "Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory wherein Somalia has served as a paradigmatic world example of state failure, warlord-ism and corruption" echoing the "tailored engagement strategy" employed by the US since 2007 to deal with the al-Shabaab threat. The strategy involves "a small number of US special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, providing intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations" (Jones *et al.* 2016). Even though the report concludes that the "tailored engagement strategy" was key in degrading the principal source of terror threat, it concedes that the approach cannot completely eradicate terrorism. So what kind of interventions do we need in the Horn of Africa going forward?

There is a need to rethink the best approaches of countering extremism, radicalization, and terrorism in the Horn of Africa by exploiting opportunities presented by deradicalization trends found in amnesty program in countries like Kenya, where individuals are given the opportunity to surrender to the state for rehabilitation, mentoring, counseling, and reintegration. One of the greatest challenges facing such programs has been the fact that rehabilitation happens in a confined prison-like institutional context and therefore risks being perceived by potential deradicalization candidates as yet another round of incarceration. This in turn increases the stigma associated with disclosure and amnesty and works against the program¹⁶. This subsection therefore highlights the

16. In 2011, the government of Kenya issued an amnesty for al-Shabaab returnees in a move targeted at deradicalization as part of state efforts of instituting a national deradicalization program. However, the program is currently burden by the failure of reintegration. See Kazungu (2016).

need to fully engage all stakeholders from the grassroots community level and upwards. It argues that media that are owned, managed, and supported by the community stand the best chances of initiating a bottom-up supportive infra-structure that links government interventions, such as reintegration programs, with community members for ownership and participation in a post-amnesty scenario in countries like Kenya.

CONCLUSION

How should countries deal with, or reintegrate, individuals who have been led by extreme ideology to the path of violence? Different programs, policies, CVE models, and deradicalization programs have been tried by way of an answer, with different and often controversial results. There have, however, been some gains in our knowledge. In the past two decades, our understanding of what makes individuals tip over into pathways of violence has progressed to some degree. The emerging consensus is that there is no one pathway to radicalization and not only one profile, but a myriad of factors all coming together in quite unpredictable ways.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Problematic of Notions and Ethical Limits of “Deradicalization”

The terms “radicalization” and, following on, “deradicalization” remain problematic. “Deradicalization” has been criticized in some quarters because it implies an intervention directed at the vision of the person with the aim of changing his/her ideas. As shown by practice, this is difficult, if not impossible, and it also raises doubts of a moral and legal order and leads us to ask, what are the ethical limits of intervention? Given that radicalization means so many different things, and that in certain cultures, contexts, or historical periods “radicals” have positively impacted societies, and indeed have helped to shape the future of societies, it would be foolhardy to attempt to identify a deradicalization “prescription” that attempts to “treat” radicalization. What this chapter has attempted to suggest is not the idea that radicalization must be removed, but that it is in some cases a linked prelude to violence, and it is *this* that needs to be examined more closely by the state, its practitioners, academics, and experts alike. Deradicalization can not and should not replace conflict resolution; nor would it be advisable for deradicalization programs to attempt to solve some of the larger the macro factors that seed conflict in society.

2. The Importance of the Context

The preceding pages, which capture the research and fieldwork of Working Group members, illustrate how and why context is critical. Each “radicalization” process, or movement, fits in a specific context and cannot be understood without it. As a prelude or precursor to violence, radicalization (political/ideological violence) has different origins, causes, drivers, and meanings, according to local/national context. Contributory factors that cannot be ignored might include state-sponsored violence, violation of human rights, corruption, historical relations between majority and minorities etc.

It will be readily apparent that what might well work in one location would not work in other contexts and locations for a whole host of reasons. In each country or region, radicalization (and consequently deradicalization) cannot be understood without taking into account local or national dynamics. For instance in Singapore, religious counseling and rehabilitation is used with radicalized individuals under detention, with great success, but when forms of rehabilitation have been attempted in neighboring countries (Indonesia, for example) the effort has been less successful. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to try this approach in a country like France, for historical

and cultural reasons, not least the relation between religion and state. As another example, the Aarhus model is strictly linked to Danish social tradition, and any attempt to reproduce it in other countries has faced many difficulties, and has sometimes just failed.

Understanding specificities and peculiarities of location and circumstance matters a great deal. The importance of empowering local authorities and communities, is a lesson that could be drawn from the experiences of cities such as Aarhus (Denmark), and Vilvoorde and Mechelen (Belgium). Therefore, there is no easy answer to the vexed question of who should take the lead in deradicalization—Governments? NGOs and civil society? Trusted actors with credible voices? Perhaps it is best in the absence of agreement to settle on this: interventions must be led by the people who best understand not only the context and local issues but also (ideally) the people for whom the interventions are designed.

At the very least, we need to embed ourselves with and within actual communities, to understand which approaches may work, fail, or backfire. A necessary focus of this effort must be youth, who form the bulk of today's extremist recruits and tomorrow's most vulnerable populations. Volunteers for Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and many extreme nationalist groups are often youth in transitional stages in their lives—immigrants, students, people between jobs and before finding their mates. Having left their homes, they seek new families of friends and fellow travellers to find purpose and significance. Ability to understand the realities facing young people will determine whether the transnational scourge of violent extremism continues, abates, or surges. (Atran *et al.* 2017)

3. Between “Deradicalization” and “Disengagement”

Radicalization processes appear to be a complex combination of personal fragilities, multiple pathways, and collective grievances or ideas. Many of the programs considered in this chapter seem to have come up against the realization that, since personal pathways are diverse, an approach whereby the person involved is seen as an individual, not just as a member of a (hostile) group, is required. This is not to say collective issues and circumstances are unimportant. It is just that the *desideratum* of combining a collective work that takes into consideration the social and political dimensions of radicalization with an individual one taking into consideration personal pathways is something that seems, for the time being at least, to be elusive.

“Deradicalization” and “disengagement” are likely to remain entangled—and controversial—for some time to come. It does appear, however, that, in the absence of an agreed standard of successful deradicalization, many countries seem to be more prepared to emphasize disengagement. Unlike deradicalization, disengagement seems to encounter fewer ethical roadblocks and is more readily observed. Disengagement implies a change in observable behaviour; deradicalization implies a change in less observable attitudes and convictions.

Generalizations are difficult to attempt when comparing what has been tried in different countries and regions. Models and practices overlap in many cases, but differences still seem to be readily discernible. For instance, one might speak of differences between more individualistic approaches in Europe and communitarian ones in Africa, and with respect to ideological re-education and counter-discourse in some parts of Asia and the Middle East. In the Europe context, one also encounters approaches more grounded in psychological/social/political practice (e.g., the “individualistic” approach, based on social and psychological rehabilitation, as in Aarhus in Denmark).

There is also the fraught question of whether deradicalization is a collective or a personal process, or both. The question is germane to the critical issues concerning evaluation within deradicalization/disengagement programs. Hard experience has shown that some programs devised to

deradicalize or disengage may probably work for some, but that for those who have already gone deep into violent acts (i.e., actually committing them), they are often useless. Evaluation can pave the way for an understanding of the continuing danger to society that some detainees may (or may not) pose. In particular, it allows those involved in such programs to make the distinction between those who seem to be able to reintegrate into the society and those for whom the programs devised will probably not succeed.

4. Reintegration and Security: An Impossible Compromise

Most important rehabilitation programs share in common the facet of offering the perspective of reintegration into society, or reconnecting the individual in question to the society. Theological or ideological discussions can sometimes have their uses (the Singapore case study provides one example), but, in many cases, it is the emotional dimension of reconnection that is paramount.

It is important to identify channels that can gain a person's trust and help them develop critical thinking, whether it takes the form of a willingness to (re)engage with aspects of mainstream society in the real world or an informed, reasoned eye when viewing extremist propaganda online. The channels in question can be youth and social workers, a prevention official, an imam, a friend, a former extremist—depending upon the specific context and individual involved. The actor in question can act as a credible bridge-builder between communities, and between communities and authorities.

These points will be debated and will continue to excite controversy for years to come. One thing seems certain, however. Ways must be found to allow for continual sharing of best practices across theatres and regions and among a networked community of practitioners, in unforced and unartificial sharing environments that involve multiple stakeholders and see diverse viewpoints freely aired (e.g., those of security experts, counsellors, religious authorities, civil society leaders, kin groups and friends, psychologists, and even marketing and branding consultants). Ways must be found, too, to incorporate the views and experiences of serving security and intelligence professionals. Without this input, the community of experts dealing with these issues will be severely hampered: without the requisite sharing of security services perspectives, any posited “solutions” risk being simply theoretical shots in the dark that simply treat symptoms. What is needed instead is better communication to understand the concerns and experiences of all participants and stakeholders in the process. Perhaps then we will be making real progress.

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CHAPTER 2

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Today, a Childrens' Playground. A view behind the towering accommodation blocks either side of the avenue known as Maala Straight. Here these youngsters, playing football, jockey for position during a ' Throw-In'.

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